Purple Reign: Ascent and Decline of Joint Behavior in the U.S. Military

"The U.S. military sends mixed messages about the degree to which it embraces and practices 'jointness.' Official publications tend to reflect a high degree of inter-service cooperation and interdependence, though history and practical experience reveal frequent bouts of dysfunction and willful independence. There also seems to be disagreement about what constitutes the essence of 'jointness.' Various experts argue that combined-arms success lies in the proper arrangement of forces under a commander with sweeping authority, which reduces squabbles about doctrine and command-and-control issues that periodically plague large operations. Others characterize jointness as the possession of compatible military hardware or the procurement of common equipment. The former allows interdependence on the battlefield; the latter can strengthen national defense by furthering both combined action and fiscal efficiency. This dissertation seeks to identify the conditions that accompany effective inter-service cooperation within the U.S. military. With a backdrop of several established general academic theories and military-specific social science applications, the work examines three historical case studies of cooperative military ventures. The particular examples offered for analysis are the AirLand Battle doctrine and operational concepts developed by the Army and Air Force in the 1980s, the acquisition by the Air Force and Navy of the Joint Primary Aviation Training System starting in the 1990s, and aspects of the close air support and airborne reconnaissance dedicated to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq that began, respectively, in 2001 and 2003. Relying on case-study observations, this work distills existing scholarship into a pre-theoretical framework for analyzing the phenomenon called 'jointness' and attempts to reduce the ambiguity of the term's current usage. The intent is to provide practitioners with a robust set of parameters that characterize military cooperation. With further case-study analysis, this preliminary framework may prove useful for making predictions about the viability of joint military ventures or offer figures in the defense establishment some techniques for encouraging more wide-ranging inter-service cooperation. Drawing initial conclusions from the case studies examined, this work has determined that 'jointness' is by no means the default state of the U.S. military. Since various actors use the term in a variety of ways, it is impossible to provide a precise definition that remains useful. It is helpful, however, to acknowledge that both competition and a plurality of ideas inhere in pursuing jointness, and to neither suppress nor deny this reality. Successful cooperation takes a significant amount of effort to overcome normal bureaucratic forces, and constructive conflict is a part of this creative process. When they ascend to any type of useful outcome, joint endeavors reflect the energy put into them by invested leaders. The semantic flexibility of the term 'jointness' affords a great deal of latitude to anyone who wishes to pursue such efforts. Among joint initiatives that demonstrate utility, observers may expect to see half-lives of disappointing duration -- an inevitable decline of the hard work that is joint cooperation. External influences -- either in the form of international conflict or the direct involvement of high-echelon government figures -- along with exceptional, joint-minded military leaders seem to be the most obvious prerequisites for inter-service cooperation. Even these factors are not enough, however. Advocates must identify and articulate a set of interests that cause competing factions to coalesce around a common cause. As long as their message resonates across the levels of the larger defense establishment, initiatives can survive and, sometimes, even thrive."--Abstract.