Yet, though none of these considerations existed, justice has its own and independent worth, and the most fundamental maxim of all politics as well as civil liberty, is the well known adage: Fiat justitia et pereat mundus. Aristides left a great national legacy to his fellowcitizens by his name of the Just, and that they would repeat from mouth to mouth his opinion, when Themistocles, by their order, had communicated to him his secret plan of burning the confederate fleet: "That the enterprise which Themistocles proposed was indeed the most advantageous in the world, but at the same time very unjust" (4); whereupon the Athenians commanded him to lay aside all thoughts of it. As justice is the great support of the state, so is injustice its ruin; not only corrupt administration of justice, but every act of undeserved partiality or favoritism, of honors bestowed unworthily, or merits requited with evil, spreads in the state like poisonous weed and extends its mischief incalculably farther than merely to the individual or his family. Justice, thus vitally important in all domestic political affairs, is not less so in international. Treaties rest essentially on good faith; for there is no superior power to adjudge between the parties and to coerce into obedience. As international treaties generally cover a large sphere, it is natural that human words should, in most cases, be found not sufficiently minute to exclude all faithless interpretation. There is then no authority which can direct us to do right, except Justice herself in our hearts; while we may confidently rely upon the fact, that nothing gives so much dignity to a nation, and consequently so much facilitates all her national intercourse, attains so great national advantages and extends benefit to all her citizens abroad, for whatever purpose they may travel, in pursuit of wealth, knowledge or pleasure, -as habitual and traditional justice in international affairs. The international transactions of Louis XIV. and the deplorable effects to which the spirit with which they were carried on led, afford an impressive instance of bad faith and injustice; the history of Isabel the Catholic furnishes a striking instance of the becalming and resuscitating power of habitual justice and consequent confidence of the people; and that of England, the most instructive illustration of the immense power, which results from a faithful discharge of the engagements made by government, and a universal belief in the justice of the courts of law. (1) Stewart's Translation of the Memoirs of Timur, published by the Oriental Translation Fund, p. 56. (2) Bolingbroke to Windham, Oct. 13, 1737. Correspondence vol. iii, p. 494. (3) Raumer, Hist. of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Cent. illustrated by Orig. Documents, transl. from the German. Lond. 1835. vol. i, p. 383. The English title may easily mislead. The work is no history, but a collection of original letters, &c. The reader, therefore, must not confound this work with Raumer's Hist. of Europe, likewise quoted in this work. (4) Plutarch, Themistocles. IX. Justice, which demands that we should not only see and judge matters from our point of view, but also from that of others, perhaps of our adversaries or enemies, is on this ground also the most difficult virtue, as it is the highest. No phenomenon in the moral world, or indeed in the political is more common than the adoption of the standard of that circle in which we move, a specific standard of feeling, taste, delicacy, tenderness, even of fairness, justice or candor, honor, and right, and a disregard of that of others. But justice on general grounds as well as in political spheres in particular, demands that we should divest ourselves as much as possible of these distorting views, which must prevent us from free and correct action. There is nothing so dangerous in politics as coteries, on account of this standard of their own, and their consequent injustice to others. The history of most revolutions proves their danger. There is hardly ever a body of men within a nation who know so little of it, as a court, unless the monarch be of a peculiarly sagacious and penetrating or free and elevated mind, gifted with the rare power of a grasping combination and the genius of divination, animated as this must be by original sympathy with the people. Parties, and especially party coteries, have frequently the same effect. X. Nothing however is so apt to prevent justice in us, as passion, which is proverbially blind. As to party passion I shall recur to the subject when I shall treat of Parties. Here may be mentioned only that there are many persons "who have no action except they are animated by some passion, which makes them like incense, giving its perfume only when on fire," a "constitution dangerous to all persons but especiaily to kings, who, as well as every one else, must act by reason," as Richelieu adds (1). These persons are highly dangerous in free countries, because they act not only blindly, and "if correctly but by chance" (2) and by mere impulses, which rapidly evanesce, but they communicate their excitement to others and prevent truth and justice in a larger circle. Yet these unbridled and unmanly characters are not the only ones who suffer from passion; nobler men have to shun it likewise. A large number of those men who have performed the greatest works, have done so partly in consequence of having been endowed with a peculiarly sensitive and excitable organization. Without it, men are frequently incapable of that impulse and enthusiasm which must rouse the mind and inspire it for great and morally bold tasks; without it they will not dare or undertake those things which promise neither reward nor profit, and to which strict duty does not bind them. But this very sensitiveness likewise exposes such characters more to excited feelings than the duller part of the community, and consequently, when excited, to unjust and dangerous actions. Let them therefore learn in season, to bridle themselves and submit to calm judgment, without extinguishing the ardor of their nature; for they are necessary ingredients in a good community. In whatever light then we may view justice, privately, publicly or internationally, it is all-important. It is the foundation of character, the basis of power, the ægis of liberty, the sole support of self-respect; and a great secret of the art of ruling, which many indeed believed to consist in a continued series of coups d'état, is contained, for republics as well as for monarchies, at home and abroad, in the two brief words, Be Just. (1, 2) Richelieu's Testament. XI. That we should be just in its truest and widest sense, in all our dealings, opinions and judgments, strictly political or not, leads us at once to the consider ation of an important question: Is a citizen in conscience allowed to do all that his laws permit? Not a few think so, although in many cases the theory of the persons is worse than their actions really prove them to be. That we have not to inquire whether a citizen may or may not take all the advantage which, in overreaching the laws by using their letter contrary to their evident spirit, he may derive from cunning or fraud, is too evident. The fair and simple question is, may you do all the laws positively allow you to do, and all that they do not prohibit? It has been called by some, abiding by the laws of their country, when it is a mere pretext for actions, of whose depravity they are conscious. From the whole view which has been taken of the state in the previous volume, it appears clearly that those who pretend to consider themselves justified in every thing which the law does not prohibit, are in a great error. The state does not supersede morality or my own conscience, which it evidently would if its laws were my whole code. We must never forget that laws are always addressed to men, whose common sense and moral character is presupposed: otherwise it would be impossible to draw up any laws, and useless to enact them. The more legitimate the action of the state, the more it confines itself to those subjects which necessarily require general interference or action; and the more it leaves individual action to itself. There are thousands of relations of the highest importance which the state, nevertheless, cannot or will not touch, in which we must act for ourselves. The state remains, as has so frequently been stated, a jural society; but there are even relations of right which it is impossible for the state, acting as it does by laws, that is, general |