(1) The more actively the subject, which engages the attention of men, is operating among them, and the more essentially it is understood, the plainer, simpler, and more forcible are the discourses respecting it, in books as well as in speeches, upon religion as well as politics. Not that I undervalue, in any degree, true eloquence; I hold ready, striking and elevated eloquence as one of far the noblest manifestations of the human mind; but it is this very eloquence which suffers, and is stifled by a flowing style, tasteless disquisitions or far-fetched comparisons. How simple are Demosthenes and Chatham! Any one who has read the speeches of the deputies, composing the estates at the beginning of the modern age, will have observed, how unwieldy and pointless the speeches are, and, which is indeed a necessary consequence, how obscured they leave the main subject in the mind of the orator. To give but one instance, I would refer to the French diet of 1593, of which Raumer gives contemporary accounts in the History, &c.. illustrated by Original Documents, quoted several times, vol. i, toward the end. The old testament and natural history and philosophy, as then understood, are ransacked before an idea such as, that the third estate, though inferior to clergy and nobility, still forms part of the state, is expressed. The history of British eloquence, such as it may be gathered from the various historical works, and on which it is high time that we should be furnished with a thorough and philosophical work, shows the same progress, namely, that eloquence becomes the simpler the truer it becomes.

(2) Hence it is right, that it is out of order in the British parliament and in all American legislatures and congress, to speak of a member by name. As regards decorum a mistaken notion can carry it certainly too far; especially if the order is that members must appear, or at least speak, in a particular dress. This is against all business-like debating, and leads to that unfortunate custom of reading prepared discourse after discourse without any reference to one another. Louis XVIII. dwells on the importance of his prescription of the robe in which alone the deputies were allowed to speak. He was right from his point of view. It was to restrain genuine debate, but where real liberty and conformable legislation is the object, the matter assumes a different aspect. It is business these assemblies have to perform and not parade, and no one can have seen the former French chamber of

deputies-I do not know the precise character of their present transactions and the British, commons, without perceiving at once that the whole legislative debating is a native, natural, genuine thing with the latter, which it had not yet become with the former. As to the members keeping their hats on, as the British commons do, and the members of congress did until 1837, unless speaking, a certain taste, of course, can alone decide. I confess, I rather liked it; it showed the business-style of the house; and there is history in it, as well respecting the English parliament in particular, as that in general, the cap, the hat, and to remain covered, has always been with the western race, from the times of the middle ages, the emblem and evidence of liberty or independence.

III. According to the natural order of the subject, I ought to treat first of pledges, and then of the right of instruction, but the latter involves a discussion of the true character of representative governments, and many points which materially serve in solving the question of pledges, so that it will be advisable first to treat of instruction.

By instruction of a representative we understand, in the politics of representative governments, his being directed by his constituents, subsequent to his election, to vote on a question yet depending, in a manner pointed out to him; or the command over the vote of a representative by his constituents. The relations of representatives to those who elect them are different, and the subject of instruction has been viewed accordingly. If a political body, organized and belonging itself to the government, elect representatives, as it is the case with the senators of the United States, who are elected by the state legislatures, instructions are held by many to have mandatory power; that is, that they must be obeyed. If the constituents, it is farther maintained by some, are the people themselves, and the convening of

them, except at the election, is not regular or in forms prescribed by law, the instruction can have no mandatory power, but ought to be unreservedly obeyed so soon as the representative is convinced that the instruction expresses the opinion of the majority of his constituents.

I shall treat of the subject, in as far as it relates to the United States senators separately, and first view the matter in general.

Before we proceed, however, it is necessary to disrobe the question of all undue associations, which generally cling to every subject, which has strongly and in opposite directions interested large numbers. The most important of these is the belief of many persons that an adherence to the doctrine of instruction is naturally coupled with a warm affection for general liberty, and that those who disclaim the doctrine belong necessarily to that class of men who habitually distrust the masses, or are shy of general liberty. It is easy to be explained why this view should be prevalent now on account of the late history of this doctrine; yet the view is unfounded, as can be shown from history. It was the very instructions received by the members of the former estates which prevented the nations, with the exception of England, rising to general civil liberty; and on the other hand, the second republican constitution of France, of 1795, surely not wanting in democratic spirit, contains the following paragraph (§ 52): "The members of the legislative body are not representatives of the departments, which have elected them, but of the whole nation, and no specific instruction shall be given them." The same, almost verbatim, is to be found in the constitution of the Cisalpine republic of 1797. In all the constitutions established under the dictatorship of Napoleon, the expression of national representative or national representation is carefully avoided; and when he was greatly dissatisfied with the deputies, convoked in 1813, in consequence of his disastrous campaigns, after they had been disregarded during his imperial reign, he said to a deputation of them, "And who are you? Not the representatives of the nation, but the deputies of the departments." (1) On the other hand again, we find in article ninth of the constitution or 'Edict' of the grand duchy of Hesse, of 1820-an instrument which no reader of Anglican views would consider liberal-that no member of the first or second chamber can exercise his vote by proxy, nor receive instructions for his vote. (2) So has the constitution of the Batavian republic, of 1805, by which Napoleon, having crowned himself as emperor of the French, made that state approach more nearly to monarchy, for which he had destined it, the following provision (Art. 23): "Their high mightinesses (that is, the representatives) vote singly according to their personal opinion, without mandate, or instructions received from the departments. They are in no manner answerable to the departmental meetings for their conduct in the hall of their high mightinesses." The anxiety to sever the representative from his constituents is here | evident. Lastly, I may mention here the bill of rights, preceding the constitution of North Carolina, adopted in 1776. Article eighteenth of that bill says: "That the

people have a right to assemble together, to consult | for the common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances." But what, according to the public law of that state, this instruction precisely is is not clear; for the legislature of

North Carolina passed, in 1838, certain resolutions with reference to the votes to be given by her senators in congress, on a question of importance then pending; and when the senators asked whether they should consider these resolutions as instructions, the legislature passed a resolution declaring that they had spoken clearly enough, and declining any more distinct or mandatory instruction.

In short, if we peruse the one hundred and thirty or forty written constitutions, more especially so called, which the European race has produced, we shall find the instruction has been declared inadmissible sometimes because the power-holders, granting the constitution, were afraid of too direct a connexion between the representative and his constituents, sometimes because the people, establishing the constitution, felt that it was impossible otherwise largely to protect civil liberty, and give it that guarantee, which advanced political civilisation and national liberty demand. Adherence to the doctrine of instruction, therefore, is of itself in no way a sign of liberal politics. Instruction has been claimed and disclaimed on entirely opposite grounds, according to the peculiar circumstances and their connexions of the time.

(1) It was on the same occasion, January 1, 1814, when Napoleon strikingly expressed the view he took of his whole position: "You strive, in your address, to sever the sovereign from the nation. I alone am the true representative of the nation, for who of you should be able to take upon himself this burden. The throne is a thing of wood covered with velvet; only he who occupies it gives meaning to it," &c. I stated already that Napoleon was the French democracy grown into monarchy; his power rested, like that of the Roman emperors, upon popular absolutism. See the end of volume first. How different from this avowal is the British expression: "The queen is an institution."