instruction, by Mr. Hopkins, of Philadelphia, Circuit Judge of the United States, of great merit, and for instruction by an author, with whose name I am unacquainted, in several numbers of the Literary Messenger, published at Richmond, Virginia, of the year 1837. The judge delivered likewise a speech against instruction on the floor of Congress, in 1812. The Federalist (especially the remarks of Mr. Madison,) is of course to be consulted. It will sound, I allow, strange, if an author refers his reader to a work which is not yet published, and with the contents of which he is entirely unacquainted; and yet I cannot but refer to the Madison Papers, now printing by Congress; for I cannot doubt but that they must contain much valuable matter bearing upon the point of our discussion, since they contain the debates of the constituent congress on the constitution, then forming, and I humbly, yet confidently, hope that they will support the arguments of the text, especially the chief one, that it was the very intention of the constituent congress to superinduce the representative system upon the former deputative, as established in the Articles of Confederation.

CHAPTER III.

Responsibility of the Representative.-Pledges. Implied and positive, general and specific Pledges -Are Pledges moral, and consistent with Liberty and Justice of the whole? - When are they so?-Pledges, originated with the Court Party and Aristocracy. Strong Power of Implied Pledges.Breaking Implied Pledges, and throwing one's self upon the Constituents by Resignation. Duties of Presiding Officers of deliberative Assemblies; Speakers.

XVI. We have found that one of the most essential points of a well-regulated and truly representative government consists in the security and protection of public liberty, that is, of civil liberty as appertaining to and extending over the whole state, the whole jural society as one organic thing, and not as a loosely connected chain of separate independences. This broad, extensive public liberty consists, together with the protection of all essential individual, or, as we have called them previously, primordial rights, in the sway of public opinion, and its regular passing over, by a safe and organic process, into public will, that is law. This public opinion which becomes public will, is the well ascertained, and clearly settled opinion of the whole jural society or state, sifted and freed from the adhesions of momentary excitement, sordid and local selfishness, and tyrannical dictation of one part of society over the rest. The elements of which this supreme public opinion is formed, are the opinions of the several parts of that society, closely and truly represented or enunciated by their respective representatives, gathered according to an even, fair, and proportionate distribution over the whole of the society, upon principles which, to that respective society, appear the best adapted in order to gather the opinion of the whole, and modified by mutual influence upon one another according to the main and fundamental principle upon which all legislation and execution rest, that is, general justice and public welfare. An additional and equally important feature of the representative government, is that civil liberty requires that no one should finally act in any matters of the state, without responsibility; where this principle is abandoned, there is absolutism. As the prince, therefore, in constitutional or representative monarchies, cannot dictate laws at will, although he be within the constitution, and as long as it lasts personally irresponsible, so does public liberty on the other hand, and especially in republics, where the people are the acknowledged power-holders, require that they do not dictate directly their laws, upon no responsibility, which would constitute democratic absolutism, but through responsible intermediate persons-the representatives, although the people, as the monarch in the previous case, are irresponsible, in their suffrage for representatives. The representative, who has received the constitutionally not morally irresponsible suffrages, is bound in all his actions, so soon as elected, by the constitution of the land, and is responsible to the people, who pronounce upon him by their next election, but not in each single case in which he votes; for this would establish at once direct dictation of the power-holder, and defeat one of the main objects of representative government.

The representative then shall represent his constituents closely, as it was called above, under the mediating

and uniting influence of general welfare, and hold himself responsible to the people. These considerations, I think, will lead us safely in discussing the subject of pledges.

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XVII. Representative pledges are assurances or gages given by a candidate respecting his future course as representative, should he be elected. They may be implied or positive, and the latter may be general or specific. Frequently it is impossible for the electors to have a sufficiently accurate knowledge of the candidate's views respecting subjects appearing to the former of great importance. Meetings therefore will propound, through committees, certain questions, which the candidate is required to answer, and on which the suffrages of the querists is made to depend. Since the representative has the duty to represent closely and honestly, a perfect understanding between the constituents and himself is important, and, in order to give him the necessary weight in his elevated position, indispensable. So long, therefore, as the pledges touch principles and views they are right; but the sacred duty of the representative and there is none so sacred as this-to do all he can for the public benefit according to his best judgment, which consists of the opinion of his constituents brought along with him, but enlightened and regulated by the contact with that of other parts, represented and pronounced by his fellow-representatives, must prevent him from giving pledges as to any definite measures or laws, for in this case he robs other citizens of their undoubted right, to state their opinion through their representative, and ask a proper

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share of influence upon the opinion of the legislative body for it, before the law be finally passed.

There are times of utmost exigency in which every thing seems to turn upon one measure, which for years has been discussed by the nation at large, so that a candidate is undoubtedly authorized to give a more definite pledge than is compatible with his duty in common cases. Such a one I take to have existed, when, in 1832, the question in England was reform or not reform. Yet here again it would have been very presumptuous in a candidate to promise that he would only vote for such or such minute details, as might be laid before him on the hustings. Every one sees that pledges of detailed laws are nothing less than antecedent instruction, would amount to a bargaining for votes, and would raise party power and exclusion very high; because a voter might desire to vote for a candidate on account of one pledge, but not of others. Definite pledges, therefore, either beyond principles or great outlines of important, broad measures, having been long before the people, and having formed perhaps for periods, broad party distinctions, would at once defeat the object of representative government, and cannot be given by an honest citizen who religiously loves his country; but they are as a matter of course very readily proffered by demagogues, the fawning courtiers of the people, just as some judges were ever ready to inform James I. how they would give judgment in such or such a case should it be brought before them.

Pledges, like instructions, have often been believed to be necessarily connected with the popular or liberal cause, but history shows the fact to be very different. Pledges to the court and ministers were formerly com