XX. Experience of all constitutional countries has amply shown, that of which every one who has ever been a member of a deliberative assembly, whose decrees have power, is fully convinced, that no such assembly can in the least degree approach the object for which it meets, if considerable power be not given to its presiding officer, especially if the house consists of many members, as the British commons or French deputies, who amount to nearly six hundred. The history of the first French revolution shows the lamentable consequences of a want of knowledge in managing the whole debating business, as I have stated before, and Dumont, the judicious and experienced author of the Reminiscences of Mirabeau and of the two first legislative Assemblies, and their eye-witness, enumerates among the nine chief causes of the unfortunate turn, taken by the French revolution, as the third: "The bad mode of deliberating;" (1) in which opinion every one who knows the details must readily agree with him. The importance of judicious parliamentary debating has been spoken of; here it must be observed, that the chief part of this vitally important subject is formed by the rules to be enforced by the speaker, to which so many other important duties may be added, especially that of appointing committees. Even if a speaker had no other duty and power, than that of granting the floor, by "catching the eye of a risen member," and he or some individual must needs have this power, and that of appointing committees, his power must be very great indeed, and may be very outrageously abused to the detriment of all fairness and free representation. The presiding member who has the power held by the American and English speakers-that of the presiding lord on the woolsack is considerably less-must always remember that he holds one of the most exalted stations; he presides over and in a measure guides the representation of his whole nation; to whatever party he may have belonged, the moment he is elected, he ought indeed to remember the words of Louis XII., who had been duke of Orleans, when he became king: "The king of France must not revenge the injuries done to the duke of Orleans;" as the whole representative organism is the nation's, so is the speaker emphatically a national officer; upon him rests in a great measure the whole operation of the representative system; he may promote a free hearing of all parties, for which they are sent there, if he do his duty, or debar it by injustice. A speaker ought to remember, that he is speaker of the whole house; that is, of the whole representation of the whole nation, and not of a party; that in giving an opportunity of speaking, therefore, and in appointing for committees, justice and fairness ought always to guide him, as in all other acts done by the authority of his chair. The more necessary the great and discretionary power is which he exercises, the more is he bound morally to sway it as a true citizen, justly, judiciously and patriotically. (2)

(1) Souvenirs sur Mirabeau, ouvrage posthume publié, par J. L. Duval, Brussels, 1822, chapter xvii.

(2) The reglements of the various legislative bodies on the continent, as the French call all that part of our parliamentary law and usage which relates to the internal management of the house itself, are interesting on this account. By far the best, is here as in so many other cases, if public opinion is so strong that it pre

vents the speaker from widely swerving from his duties. Long custom and the conviction that strict justice in the speaker is to the advantage of all, cause the speaker of the British commons to act, upon the whole, with great justice and high-minded impartiality.

BOOK SEVENTH.

CHAPTER I.

Executive Officers. - Difficulty of controlling them. Their Interference with Elections; in Athens, Rome, France, England, the United States. Plato's Opinion of the Duties of Officers. - Post Office. - The Chief Executive Officer.-Confidential Officers. - Official Interpretation of Constitutions and Laws. -The Veto.-Ancient and Modern Veto.-Absolute, suspensive and conditional Vetos. - Privilege of Pardoning in Monarchies; in Republics.Danger and Difficulty in Republics. -For what purpose is it granted?— Rules which ought to be observed in making use of the Power of Pardoning.

I. "How can a man serve the public? When out of office his sole object is to attain it; and when he has attained it, his only anxiety is to keep it. In his unprincipled dread of losing his place, he will readily go all lengths." These words sound as if they were taken from a modern debate, or a discussion in our papers of recent date, yet they were spoken two thousand five hundred years ago by the greatest sage of a people at the other end of the world, utterly independent in its whole civilisation upon the western, Caucasian race to which we belong-they are the words of the Chinese sage, Confucius, (1) in which I have substituted only the word public for that of prince, not an illegitimate substitution; for even the Chinese acknowledge in their laws, their classical works, and in the prayers offered up by the emperor, that he is the vicegerent of heaven for the maintaining of justice, order and morality; in short, for the benefit of the people.

The Greeks found the same difficulty. Not to speak of their whole history, which testifies to the fact, their constant, generally annual rotation in office, the appointment of officers and magistrates by lot, the most extensive system of checks, which, in Athens for instance, was carried out into the minutest details, as the reader may see in Beckh's Public Economy, book ii, 8, or of the repeated and periodical inquiry not only into the accounts of officers, but the whole administration of their office-the εὐθύνη, which the Greeks valued very highly, and upon the absence of which in the Lacedæmonian council, Aristotle animadverts (Politics ii, 9.) or the Athenian nomophylakes, the office for the purpose of controlling the officers-not to mention innumerable laws, institutions and events, which prove the fact, we actually meet with insurrections of the people against the officers, who, it was believed, had established themselves as a party, and become an unlawful oligarchy, such as that mentioned of the Thespians in Thucydides, book vi, 95. See also book vi, 36.

The whole Roman history is one continued commentary on the difficulty and danger to be encountered in the solution of that great political problem, how to give sufficient power to the officers, and, at the same time, to prevent them from arrogating more, and uniting into a formidable aristocracy of official places.

Modern monarchies and republics offer no different spectacle. The crown or executive has the command over the legion of executive officers, and must have it in a high degree, for otherwise no government would be able to obtain its end; and, on the other hand, this