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strict principle and consist in a change of what exists. For this reason it is indeed always desirable, that the lawyers take an active part in the legislation of a country, for it is most necessary that the existing state of things be fairly represented, and that the legislators of a state do not precipitate the state into heedless speculation or untried experiments, appearing brilliant to the unexperienced; but their number must not overbalance the other portion of the legislators, who view things without that charm which the existing law invests them with to the eye of the lawyer, or that pertinacity which arises from the pains the lawyer has taken to learn the law with all the intricate difficulties attending it. The greatest part of the most important, radical and salutary reforms have not originated with lawyers, as was mentioned already; still we must not forget that Pym was probably as great a man as Hampden, and quite as indispensable to his great party.

When power struggles with liberty, and that power nevertheless is forced to support itself apparently by law, as is the case when the crown or a despotically disposed party endeavors to arrogate undue power over a people still cherishing their rights or the endeared tradition of liberty, it is natural that the power party should always find many valuable aids among the lawyers, because there are men in all professions who desire their advancement at any price, and it is the willing lawyer who, in the cases alluded to, is of the greatest value on account of his peculiar species of knowledge. When the state of things is such that clergymen can better or equally well aid the swelling power there are never members of that profession wanting, who are ready to degrade their skill, knowledge, and influence

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in a like manner. Indeed the clergy have more frequently and more extensively sided with power and authority, in states, where government can offer any preferment, than the lawyers. Though the British prerogative lawyers have prostituted their knowledge to the essential injury of the people, we must also remember, that the cause of liberty owes to the aid afforded by the profession of the advocate some of the greatest achievements in the cause of national liberty. Laud and Strafford hated the lawyers most cordially; their instinct told them rightly. How much has not Erskine done for the assertion and clearer representation of many valuable constitutional points. Does not our whole race owe much, in the cause of liberty, to such judges as lord Somers and Camden ?

If a lawyer then becomes a member of legislating assemblies he must carefully strive to elevate his mind above the level of special pleading, not to become the mere advocate of his party or of power, and to view subjects on the ground of broad national interest. That, in smaller circles, he must not carry the dust of the courts adhering to his vestments, with all the petty manœuvring to which a circumscribed practice frequently leads, into the halls of the legislature, need not be mentioned.

XV. The importance of pure administration of justice for the state in general, as well as for the individuals separately, lends of course proportionate importance and solemnity to every part and element of this administration, whether it consist in applying the law, and giving every one his due after the truth is known, or in aiding to find out this truth. Among the latter elements of the administration of justice the witness is the most important. A witness upon the stand, whoever may have called him there, whether the government or a private party, ought ever to consider himself as being for the time, in the service of Justice herself, and unbiased truth becomes his binding, solemn, and sole obligation. The oath or affirmation to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," puts a very serious, solemn, and great obligation upon the witness, for it is not only necessary that as witnesses we abstain first from every even the smallest falsehood, secondly, from every thing which in one sense may be true, but in the sense in which it will be probably taken by the adverse party or the court, is not true; thirdly, from all omission which materially interferes with the whole truth, but fourthly, also, we solemnly bind ourselves to state nothing in rashness, nothing which we believe to be true, but which nevertheless is but a framework of facts filled up with the productions of a lively imagination, so often repeated in our mind, that it appears to us perfect truth-an evil to which women in particular are subject. Nor must we allow our feelings to be wrought up so that something may appear to us true at the moment we are testifying, which, nevertheless, is not true, or not precisely as we state it. The holy cause of justice depends in a degree upon every word that drops from the lips of a witness, and the oath he proffers, and which to his fellow-men becomes the most solemn pledge of truth, of which they know, ought to be within him a fervent prayer that his memory may be correct, and his mind calm and clear, so that he himself mistake not semblance for truth, and that he be in a frame of mind to choose the proper words precisely to express what he wishes to express. A witness must take care, therefore, not to suffer his temper to be ruffled, even though the questioning advocate should forget his duty by impertinence and arrogance. In all such cases it is by far the best for the witness to appeal at once to the court for protection, and not to enter by pert repartees into a contest with an insolent lawyer. A witness ought to prepare himself for the discharge of his duty, especially when he has to testify to facts either long gone by, or observed by him when he himself was excited, or which happened surrounded by tumultuous agitation. Few who have not made some careful experiments upon themselves have any idea how far we allow ourselves to be deceived by our constantly working and combining, picturing and deceiving imagination, and in what degree we may succeed in undeceiving ourselves, and unraveling the mazes of our own fancy. Persons of a lively imagination are especially bound to review facts well, and to endeavor to sift and prune what the imagination may busily have added, before they asseverate any thing as witness for or against any man. The law makes a considerable difference between things which may or may not be asked a witness under different circumstances, but whatever the law does allow to be asked-over which the court watchesmust be answered in the spirit of absolute veracity. There is in the oath or affirmation of the witness no different kind or degree of obligation to state the truth; all witnesses, whether for or against the prisoner, (virtually they are all for Justice) solemnly pledge themselves to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

CHAPTER V.

War. Definitions. -Present Exaggerations against War. Christian Religion does not prohibit just War; neither the Bible, nor the early Writers of the Church. Objections against War on the Score of Morality; of Reason; of Political Economy. Just and Patriotic Wars have morally raised Nations.Eternal Peace.-Arbitration by a Congress of Nations.-Just Wars.National Debasing Effect of suffering national Insult and Injustice without Resistance. The Age of Louis XIV.-Wars do not absolve from Obligations to the Enemy. - Who is the Enemy? - Are Citizens of the hostile State Enemies? - What means of injuring the Enemy are admissible?Treaties containing Provisions for the Case of War between the Contracting Powers. Shall Confidence be abused in War?-Does War allow Decерtion?-Capitulations are sacred.-Destruction in War.-Carrying off Works of Art, Archives, &c. - Duties of the individual Soldier.

XV. In this last chapter it is proposed to give a few remarks on War, as connected with our subject. I am well aware that the whole subject of war belongs properly to the so called law of nations and international ethics; yet so much has been advanced of late regarding war as affecting the morality of the individual, and so many cases, to be decided on ethic ground by the individual, necessarily happen in every war, that I feel obliged to add this chapter to the present work, although international ethics in general have been excluded from it. I shall confine myself, however, to some remarks touching in general the admissibility of war among rational and moral beings, and some respecting the conduct of the individual who takes part in a war, excluding from our inquiry, the whole important field of the law of war proper.

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