I have instructed the staff to keep several copies of the statement readily available for those members who wish to come to the committee room and read it. Of course no copies can be removed from the committee room as it is highly classified. Under our rules which we adopted yesterday, no classified documents of any kind can leave the committee room. It is available to be read any time you wish to come down here to examine it and study it. Now, Mr. Secretary, we welcome you here this morning. You are at liberty now to present your posture statement in any form you desire. However, I would suggest that when you cover certain phases, that at the points that you desire to do so, you stop to permit at that point questions to be asked. And I hope the members will confine the questions to the subject matter that has just been covered. Now I have requested the Secretary to furnish the committee information with reference to Cuba. I also have requested that he furnish information with reference to the removal of the bases out of Turkey and Italy, and several other matters. These matters are not in his brief, but he will furnish that information to the committee while he is the witness in the posture briefing. Now, Mr. Secretary, you may start. Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Because of your request for information on the introduction of— The CHAIRMAN. Now wait 1 minute. Now, Mr. Smart, this is an executive session. Everybody has clearance to be in the committee room? Mr. SMART. Yes, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Proceed now. Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, because of your request for information on the introduction of the offensive weapons system into Cuba, I thought it might fit your purpose to start with that subject, and we are prepared to do so this morning. I will outline very briefly some of the events that led up to the introduction of those weapons systems and then call on General Carroll and members of his staff to further elaborate on the intelligence operations that led to the disclosure of the introduction of those systems into Cuba. In addition, Soviet equipment en route to Cuba was kept under visual surveillance during the daylight hours while it was at sea in the vicinity of Cuba and when the ships were in Cuban ports. Through this medium, and through other sources, we were able to keep abreast of the accelerated shipment of arms in Soviet bottoms-but none of this equipment could be identified with offensive missile systems. It now appears, based on what we have subsequently observed, that the offensive missiles and associated equipment were clandestinely loaded and transported to Cuba in holds of large hatch Soviet ships and apparently began arriving in Cuban ports in approximately midSeptember. Since all of the strategic missile-associated equipmentsuch as erectors and transporters-and the missiles themselves were concealed in the holds of the ships and unloaded under the cover of darkness, and under the most stringent Soviet-controlled security restrictions, photographic surveillance at the time was unable to discover the initial introduction of offensive missiles into Cuba. Firm intelligence on the existence of offensive fallistic missiles was developed in this sequence: First, from April to late September, a great volume of unconfirmed. reports and rumors, principally from refugees and exile organizations, was received concerning the situation in Cuba. Many thousands of refugees were interviewed and several thousand specific written reports were produced, analyzed for intelligence value, and collated with other source material. Although a large number of these and other reports received in Washington related to the extensive military buildup, none could be equated to strategic weapons when carefully checked out. Actually, interpretation of the high altitude photographs taken before October 14, 1962, of the areas which refugee reports indicated as the most likely locations to contain missiles, either disproved the presence of missiles or linked the suspected activity to SAM or cruise-type missiles that posed no offensive threat to the United States. The second crucial stage of the story started in late September when a recently arrived Cuban refugee gave the first description of equipment that could be equated with a medium-range ballistic missile. Although raw and unevaluated, this report was an indication of the possible presence in Cuba of offensive ballistic missiles. The third and final stage in our detection of strategic missiles resulted from careful evaluation of this refugee report, together with other intelligence. In conjunction with a suspicious pattern of deployment of SAM sites noted in the same general area a pattern which could not be related to any known military installationsanalysis of this single report resulted in the designation of a specific area as a suspect medium-range ballistic missile site. Photographic coverage was thereupon proposed, and on the 14th of October a military high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft flew a flight route specifically planned to cover this suspect MRBM area. This led to the discovery of the San Cristobal MRBM complex. The aircraft flew directly over the assigned target area and emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal MRBM complex. This is the story of the introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba by the Soviet Union, as viewed from the Department of Defense. Up to the spring of 1962, the Soviet Union had supplied the Cuban Army with great quantities of conventional weapons and supplies, from pistols and rifles to heavy artillery and medium tanks. Mig-15, 17, and 19 aircraft and helicopters had been provided the Cuban Air Force, and motor torpedo boats and coastal patrol vessels of the Kronshtadt class had been delivered to the Cuban Navy. During the latter part of July and the early part of August, an unusual number of Soviet ships unloaded cargo and passengers at Cuban ports. There were also reports that during the unloading process, all Cubans were excluded from the dock areas and that the stevedoring was accomplished by Soviet personnel accompanying the equipment. By the middle of August, analysis of these reports highlighted the possibility that the Soviet Union was probably introducing surface-to-air missile systems in Cuba, and accordingly special attention was focused on the suspected areas of deployment. As a result of the next high altitude reconnaissance mission, flown on the 29th of August, positive identification was established of SA-2 surfaceto-air missile (SAM) sites at two of these suspect locations and at six others also in Western Cuba. A short-range coastal defense. cruise missile installation was also subsequently identified. Up to this time, high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba were flown on a regular schedule, weather permitting. These missions were directed to cover the principal airfields, ports, and areas of particular military significance. As a result, we were able to keep close watch on the progress of aircraft deliveries and assembly, airfield improvements, new construction of military installations, development of defensive works around critical areas, delivery and operational readiness of naval units, and the security of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo. Each flight after August 29 through October 7 discovered new SAM sites, and three additional cruise missile sites were revealed. Still, there was no evidence indicating the presence of an offensive capability; all these missile systems were defensive in nature. This mission which verified the existence of MRBM's in Cuba was then followed by a concentrated reconnaissance effort by both highflying and low-flying reconnaissance aircraft of the Navy and the Air Force. After this successful flight of the 14th, the next operational task was to obtain aerial photography of the complete island to determine the precise nature of the buildup and the exact configuration of missile sites, their number and location, and the status of their readiness along with other related activity. The program was planned so as to photograph at high altitude all of the known or suspected sites, and, at the same time, perform search reconnaissance over the entire island to determine possible additional missile locations, or other significant military activity. When the high-flying aircraft located the objectives, then low-flying aircraft could be dispatched over selected targets to obtain detailed information. With large-scale photography of selected objectives from aircraft flying at altitudes of 500 to 1,000 feet, this information could be readily obtained. On the day following the President's message, specifically on the 23d of October, low-altitude flights were initiated. These flights, flown at high speed, were generally over Cuban territory a maximum of from 4 to 7 minutes. The results were of course outstanding, and these missions were continued on a regular basis with both Navy F-8-U's and Air Force RF-101's participating. Thus, during the crisis, with the high-altitude aircraft providing reconnaissance of wide areas, and the low-flying aircraft providing closeup reconnaissance of selected objectives, the U.S. Intelligence Community was provided with a continuous stream of photography on the basis of which a complete assessment of the situation could be made. Some comments regarding the present status of Soviet military forces in Cuba, as compared to last July, are appropriate. About 17,000 Soviet military personnel remain in Cuba. Since last July the Soviets have introduced and deployed, in addition to the MRBM's and IL-28 jet light bombers subsequently removed, some 24 surfaceto-air (SAM) sites and several coastal defense cruise missile sites. They have also introduced 12 Komar-class cruise-missile motorboats, about 40 Mig-21 jet fighters (in addition to more than 60 Mig-15's, 17's, 19's previously introduced), substantial numbers of late-model tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery weapons, antitank missiles, and other battlefield weapons. At present, the principal elements of the air defense systems, including the SAM sites and the Mig-21 jet fighters are probably controlled and manned by the Soviets. The more modern ground equipment is integral to four highly mobile Soviet ground forces which still remain in Cuba. We are convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that 42 mediumrange ballistic missiles were removed from Cuba aboard 8 Soviet ships between November 5 and 9, and that 42 IL-28 bombers were similarly removed between December 5 and 6. All of the IL-28 bombers and 36 of the missile/transporters were uncovered for photographic and visual alongside inspection while the Soviet vessels were at sea and the remainder of the missiles were observed covered in exactly the same observable condition as previously noted at the specific missile sites. We are convinced that the Soviets did not have sufficient time between the decision to dismantle and the actual shipment dates to construct dummy missiles and transporters possessing the fine detail and precise measurements of the equipment shipped out. Photographic evidence also is available showing both outloading and outshipping of missile erectors and of fuel and oxidizer trailers. Without this associated equipment, a missile system is inoperative. Since removal of the missiles, our coverage has not revealed the existence of strategic weapons systems in Cuba. Mr. Chairman, at that time I would like to introduce General Carroll, who in turn will introduce members of his staff who participated in this effort and who will show you certain of the photographs and describe in more detail the process we used to lead to the results I have outlined. General Carroll. The CHAIRMAN. General Carroll. General CARROLL. Mr. Chairman, with your permission we should like to offer for the consideration of this committee a chronological photographic review of the overall Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, with particular emphasis upon the deployment of offensive weapons systems, their peaking toward operational readiness, and their subsequent rapid dismantling, movement to the ports, and withdrawal from the island. We hope that this sequential pictorial review will provide a clear understanding of this phase of the Cuban story. I would like to introduce Mr. John Hughes of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a special assistant on my staff for photoanalysis matters. Mr. Hughes will present this phase of the presentation. All right, Mr. Hughes. Mr. HUGHES. Gentlemen, the Soviet offensive military buildup in Cuba, in addition to provoking certain swift military and political responses on the part of the United States, caused to be implemented one of the most intensive military reconnaissance efforts ever directed against a single objective area. This intensive effort, employing a variety of sensory media, has been continued up to the present time. The purpose of this briefing is to relate chronologically the nature and extent of the Soviet buildup as reflected by reconnaissance means. We will begin with offensive systems, long-range ballistics missiles, and jet bombers. Included in this category will be the nuclear weapons storage facilities which the Soviets were constructing at each of their offensive missile bases. We will trace the Soviet offensive missile buildup from the initial deployment of systems components at the site locations, following carefully the rapid improvement of launch facilities, through to operational readiness. We will illustrate how the United States was able to monitor the dismantling of Soviet offensive bases and to verify the loading and removal of missile components from the island. In addition, the latest photography, covering the former offensive missile bases, which was acquitted within the past few days will also be reviewed. A similar chronological accounting will be provided for the offensive bombers. We will then review the other weapons systems introduced by the Soviets into Cuba. These will include the SA-2, surface-to-air missile; the Mig 21 fighter interceptor, the coast defense cruise missile, and the guided missile coastal patrol boats. We will then discuss briefly the nature and size of the regular Soviet ground force units that are deployed in Cuba at the present time. Finally, the large Soviet logistical base constructed in support of the weapons systems introduced into Cuba will also be described. As we review these aerial photographs, many items of military equipment and numerous geographic locations in Cuba will be highlighted. In addition, there are certain items of unique military interest revealed by these reconnaissance materials on which I would respectfully request that you focus particular attention. They are, one, the magnitude, intensity, and remarkable rapidity of the Soviet buildup, particularly as it is reflected in the period October 14 through 28; two, the Soviet faculty for simplicity and use of the field expedient; three, Soviet techniques of camouflage concealment and deception; four, U.S. reconnaissance capabilities to include the various types of strategic and tactical reconnaissance photography, low versus high altitude, color versus black and white and oblique versus vertical; and, finally, photo interpretation techniques and capabilities that were employed against and with these reconnaissance materials to include the volume review of photography and such things as measurements of ground objects to tenths of a foot. By late October, three major offensive weapons systems were deployed in Cuba by the Soviet Union. The first and most significant, primarily because it achieved an operational capability, was the medium-range ballistic missile, the MRBM. Second in importance was the intermediate-range ballistic missile, the IRBM. The system, though far more lethal in range capability than the MRBM, never reached an operational status. The fixed IRBM launching facilities were still under construction in Cuba when Chairman Khrushchev agreed to dismantle his bases. The Il-28 bomber, although capable of reaching target areas in the Southeastern United States and Central America, also never reached full operational status. Of the 42 unassembled bombers delivered to Cuba, only 7 reached final assembly stages and were classified as flyable, and of these initial emphasis was placed by the Soviets upon assembly of the trainer version. There is little doubt that the Soviet Union in September of 1962 embarked upon a major military construction program in Cuba, in |