volving their most advanced offensive weapons systems. A primary objective was to achieve clandestinely a full operational capability for all systems by early December 1962, in order to confront the United States at that time with a fait accompli.

Fortunately, this goal was never achieved, because of the ensuing political and military actions that were accomplished in light of the timely and accurate evidence provided by the photography that we will now review in considerable detail.

(Slide: "Soviet Offensive Missile Buildup in Cuba.")

Starting first with the offensive weapons systems introduced into Cuba, it is appropriate to note that the Soviets selected four geographic locations to deploy these offensive systems. They selected the San Cristobal area, southwest of Havana; an area at Guanajay, just west of Havana; and two further east, one at Sagua la Grande and one at Remedios.

On this slide the red symbols reflect deployed Soviet field medium range ballistic missile sites. If you will notice, there are six sites depicted, four in the San Cristobal area and two in the Sagua la Grande area, 135 nautical miles to the east. Each of these sites included four launch positions and had deployed the Soviet medium range ballistic missile. In addition to the field MRBM, the Soviets also had under construction by late October 1962 fixed launching facilities for the intermediate range ballistic missile at two locations, one just west of Havana, Guanajay, where two 4-launcher sites were identified and shown in yellow on this photograph, and a single one at Remedios, farther to the east. The Remedios one, we believe, was in an early stage of construction, and it, too, would have been paired up with another four-launcher site had the Soviets had time to develop this location.

In other words, there were nine Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba, six of them with four launchers each for the MRBM, three of them, fixed sites, for the IRBM, and each of these included four launch positions.

The question might well be asked if the Soviets were able to deploy and we were able to detect by October 14, 1962, these systems deployed at these four geographic locations, what was found at these locations in prior or earlier photography?

We have selected our best photographic materials covering these sites prior to October 14 and would like to review them very quickly. This is the Remedios IRBM location as it appeared on September 5, 1962, an open farm field situated in the virgin forest area shown, and a country road cutting through this sector that within the next 4 or 5 weeks will soon be occupied by Soviet IRBM construction forces.

This is the Guanajay IRBM location as it appeared on August 29. Again, there is no evidence of military activity or occupancy. Note again in this area, which will soon have Soviet IRBM facilities under construction, there is no evidence of activity.

Here are the IRBM locations in the San Cristobal area covered on August 29. There is no evidence of military or general occupancy observed at those locations which later were to have the Soviet offensive sites. Notice, if you will, on this particular graphic taken on August 29, as it was checked carefully by our photo activities, there is no evidence of activity.

In this area there is an open, wooded sector several heavily forested sectors through here, with no evidence of military occupancy.

Sagua la Grande area is shown on September 5 with excellent quality photography, and outlined in this rectangular area is the location of the future location of the Soviet MRBM site.

Notice, if you will, that this area was carefully checked at that time and even though there is a heavy cloud shadow through here, our photo interpreters could pick out a small village or hamlet here, and this county road, the agricultural activity, and no evidence at that time of military occupancy or activity.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is the historic photograph of the Cuban crisis. It was acquired with a high altitude aircraft moving southnorth over the western sector of the Island of Cuba in the early morning hours of October 14, 1962.

Note, if you will, that the photograph appears gray in color and tone. The reason is the early morning hour, and we are also observing at this time a Soviet MRBM unit that apparently recently has just arrived in the area.

As the photo interpreters and intelligence analysts carefully reviewed this photograph on October 15, they noted eight large missile transporters, four at this location, and three at this location, and a single one at this particular location.

In addition, the Soviets had already deployed in a tentative firing position, four erector launchers, one here, and one here, and another one here, and a fourth one at this location.

No doubt, the Soviets were employing the field expedient and making every effort to achieve an operational capability at these sites as quickly as possible. Lines of propellent vehicles were observed standing nearby. Note, however, the absence of any extensive tracking or activity.

The Soviets have apparently in the past few days pulled into this particular area, with their equipment, and have temporarily emplaced their erectors, and have set themselves up an irregularly dispersed or displaced tent area off to the side. We will observe them improve this particular location.

The intelligence analysis carefully checked the photography acquired on October 14 in the vicinity of San Cristobal. A few miles to the east another Soviet MRBM unit was just being deployed. Note, if you will, six missile transporters with missiles on them are tucked away in this small wooded area.

On October 14, again, a Soviet missile convoy is just arriving at the site, and we have caught the Soviets just as they are about to deploy their equipment at their respective firing equipments.

High-altitude photography acquired during the next few days revealed the full nature and extent of the Soviet MRBM threat as found in Cuba. In the Sagua LaGrande area, 135 nautical miles east of Havana, two 4-launcher field MRBM sites were covered one of which is shown in this graphic.

By this time, the Soviets had driven a rough road into this particular area, and four launch positions observed, one here and one here. The erectors have already been placed at the centers of these pad areas. In addition, missile shelter tents have been completed.

At these two pad areas the Soviets are still busy at work. The erectors have not been emplaced, but they stand nearby in an adjacent motor pool. Propellent vehicles are also noted.

The missile equipment that was observed in the Sagua LaGrande and San Cristobal areas was carefully examined by our intelligence

analysts. It was determined that the missile being deployed at these two locations was the standard Soviet MRBM that had been observed earlier in the Moscow parade as shown on this particular photograph. The missile, itself, measures 73.3 feet in length and has a range of 1,100 nautical miles.

When we saw this system deployed in Cuba, we saw it deployed on this identical transporter. The missile, however, was deployed, or at least taken into the field site areas, minus its nose cone. The nose cone was transported in a separate vehicle. The object we were observing, then, measured some 59.6 feet in length and was, indeed, the Soviet MRBM deployed at Sagua LaGrande and at San Cristobal. Gentlemen, again the question is asked if a 70-foot-long missile, and if a 68- to 70-foot-long transporter were found in Cuba on October 14 and 17, how did these weapons and how did those components reach the island? The U.S. naval surface ships and aircraft had carefully photographed all Soviet ships that came to the island of Cuba in August, September, and October. We determined that the hatches of certain larger ships could accommodate the transporter and the MRBM missile.

It was our conclusion that the large-hatch Soviet ships did bring the MRBM systems clandestinely to the island of Cuba. One of these large-hatch ships, the Soviet ship Poltava shown here approaching the island on September 15, 1962. It is photographed obliquely and vertically. We checked carefully the deck cargo. All that we can observe loaded are simple 21⁄2- and 5-ton trucks and vans. Notice though, that the ship rides high, as though instead of a bulk cargo it has a space-consuming cargo, such as an MRBM.

In addition to finding field MRBM's deployed in Cuba, considerable concern was evoked on October 17, 1962, when high-altitude cover provided the first positive identification of a fixed intermediate range launching site in the area of Guanajay and later in the area of Remedios. Two 4-launcher fixed sites were identified in the Guanajay area, one of which is shown on this aerial photograph. There are four launching positions, one here, another here, and two others at these locations. They are paired and focused on a central control bunker. Conduits led from the central bunker area to the center of each of the pads.

Notice that vehicle shelter revetments for vehicles which must remain in the launch position during firing are nearing completion. at these locations.

At this time, a missile servicing building is roofed and nearing completion, while a nuclear warhead storage bunker is having the final touches accomplished with regard to roof construction.

The Soviets at these particular IRBM sites brought with them large amounts of prefabricated construction materials, so that they could rapidly complete their construction program at these sites.

An assessment was made by the intelligence community to the effect that the field MRBM sites on San Cristobal and Sagua LaGrande were designed to fire the 1,100-nautical-mile Soviet medium-range ballistic missile. This particular weapon deployed in Cuba could reach all key target areas in the southeastern United States, and such other important cities as Washington, St. Louis, and Dallas.

Included within the range of the weapon fired from these MRBM sites also was the Panama Canal. The 2,200-nautical-mile intermediate ballistic missile could reach most key target areas in the

North American Continent with the exception of the small portion of the northwestern section of the State of Washington, and all of Alaska. Key countries in the northwestern portion of South America. also came within range of this particular weapons system.

The President directed that beginning October 23, 1962, on the day following his address to the Nation, that the U.S. military aircraft be directed in a low-altitude mode against the Soviet offensive bases on the island of Cuba, in order to provide us more definite data on the nature of the weapons systems being deployed.

The reconnaissance versions of the U.S. Air Force 101, and the Navy F-8-U, were selected for this particular mission and are shown here.

These aircraft swept in at an altitude of well below 1,000 feet and caught the Soviets by surprise on October 23, 1962. Here is the launching site at San Cristobal No. 1. The missile erected is under canvas cover at this location, but telephone cabling leads from the launch point to the covered generator to man and control equipment in the wooded sector to the upper right on this photograph.

A missile shelter tent measuring 100 feet in length and 17 feet wide has been completed. This is the place where the missile is kept and kept perfectly tuned prior to that time when it might be required at the launching position itself.

Note, if you will, that Soviet oxidizer vehicles and Soviet propellant. vehicles with the fuel stand ready in this particular launch position

area.

The Soviets respond quickly to our low-altitude effort. They affect camouflage and concealment where possible. Here, at San Cristobal Site No. 1, we observe three Soviet MRBM missiles on transports, one at this location and two in the lower portion of the photograph.

Note, if you will, that the Soviets have stretched tarpaulins over these missiles, and then they have taken mud or paint and disruptively smeared it across these tarpaulins in order to break up the natural outline of the cylindrical object that lies beneath.

In addition to canvas cover and disruptive painting, the Soviets also attempt camouflage. Nets are strung across these two missiles, again in an attempt to break up the natural outline of the cylindrical object lying beneath.

We note that in addition to the single missile shelter tent formerly found at these sites, a second missile shelter tent is also being constructed at the launch position areas. His second tent is for the refire missile. The Soviets intend to provide a refire capability for each of their firing positions.

In the upper portion of this photograph you will see a firing position being improved. The white rectangular area is a concrete launch pad, upon which the erector will soon be emplaced. The circular structure is a firing ring and flame deflector on which the MRBM will be emplaced. It is just resting in wet concrete. The concrete mixer can actually be seen on the photograph.

The two white linear areas off to the right are what we call wheel chocks, and the rear wheels of the Soviet transporter rides into these chocks and the transporter, acting as a carriage, rotates in the chocks and erects the missile onto the firing table observed at this location. The Soviets improved their MRBM sites in this particular manner.

In addition to providing more permanent facilities at their missile launching sites, and in addition to effecting all means possible insofar as cover and camouflage are concerned, the Soviets, in response to our low-altitude effort, deployed the best weapons that they could to counter this reconnaissance effort. The surface-to-air missile would be ineffective against a high-speed, low-flying, supersonic aircraft. The best weapon one can use against such aircraft are conventional antiaircraft artillery, so the Soviets deployed this system at the sites. Observed here on October 27, at San Cristobal site No. 1, is a six-launcher site with a 57-millimeter antiaircraft gun crew. Notice that the rangefinder has already been emplaced in the center of the area and the radar itself, to acquire the target, has also been emplaced. One interesting thing there is that the Soviet crews or the Cuban crews at these particular sites never had the warning necessary as these aircraft swept in at speeds in excess of 500 knots. You can see the crewmen running toward their weapons now. It is too late to respond to these fast-moving aircraft.

The low-level photograph provided us with excellent detail on the nature of the support equipment usually associated with the Soviet MRBM. This is one of the typical firing positions for the MRBM. Notice the approach roadway. It is widened at this location and includes a missile erector under canvas cover in the center. Under canvas cover is a missile stand and flame deflector where the missile will actually rest prior to firing.

Command and control equipment is located nearby. These include vehicles and tents which are connected by cable lines back to the firing position itself. Note, if you will, that two missile shelter tents, one for the primary and one for the refire missile, are found nearby, and that telltale trackage suggests that a long vehicle has been first pushed and then backed into the missile shelter tent to the lower left. Ladies and gentlemen, off to the right the propellant vehicles stand ready to service this site, while off to the left the nose cone and warhead area remain active. This was a completed and operational Soviet MRBM site as it was observed in Cuba on October 23.

There is a low altitude of the IRBM site at Guanajay, located in the area just west of Havana.

During this period, when low altitude cover was acquired over the sites beginning October 23, construction continued very extensively and intensively in the IRBM fixed facilities.

Note, if you will, two launch positions are observed. One here and one here. These are larger fixed launch pads in contrast to the field MRBM sites. Note, if you will, that a launch ring to hold an IRBM has already been emplaced at the location. The Soviets are working at this location to emplace a second ring.

Conduits lead to a centrally positioned control bunker which is also nearing completion. Note, if you will, the missile servicing building where again the missile is kept in tune prior to being moved into the launch position area. A nuclear warhead storage bunker is up in the upper center portion of the photograph and on the date. of this particular photograph, October 23, it is nearing completion. The Soviets constructed nuclear warhead storage bunkers at the intermediate range ballistic missile launching sites and at the mediumrange ballistic missile sites. The ones at the MRBM sites were somewhat smaller, although, similarly configured to those identified at the IRBM sites.