The Soviets removed their 42 missiles from Cuba on these 8 ships in these numbers, from these ports, on these dates, November 5 through 9.

The next most serious problem confronting the United States following the removal of the offensive missiles from the island of Cuba, was the continued deployment and assembly of the Soviet Beagle IL-28 bomber. This particular bomber could carry a bomb load in excess of 6,000 pounds to ranges out to a radius of about 600 nautical miles. It could reach key target areas in the southeastern United States. Forty-two of these unassembled bombers were delivered to the island of Cuba. Thirty-three were delivered to San Julian Airfield in western Cuba, and the other nine were delivered unassembled to Holguin Airfield in east central Cuba.

We were a bit more fortunate with regard to being forewarned insofar as the offensive bombers were concerned than we were with regard to the offensive missiles. Observed on the deck of a Soviet ship, Kasimov, on September 28, 1962, were 10 large shipping crates, and the ship is approaching Cuba. Eight of them are shown here and two more were observed at these locations.

We carefully studied these crates. We frankly didn't know what they included. After a very careful assessment of these crates, and a very careful assessment of the characteristics of various Soviet aircraft and other types of equipment, it was judged that the Kasimov was carrying Soviet IL-28 bombers to Cuba on this particular date. A report to that effect was released on October 9, 1962.

These crates were delivered to San Julian Airfield, for when our high-altitude aircraft covered the airfield on October 15, 21 of these 60-foot-long crates were found parked in the central area. They measured 60 feet in length and were similarly configured to those observed on the Soviet ship Kasimov. In addition, one of the crates. had been broken open, exposing a 58-foot-long fuselage, conforming to the configuration of the IL-28 bomber.

During the next few days and weeks, we observed with high- and low-altitude photography the progress of the Soviets and the Cubans in assembling these particular bombers. As I mentioned earlier, at San Julian Airfield, 33 of these unassembled bombers were delivered in crates. Of these 33, 13 were broken out from the crates and assembly begun. Of these 13, 7 reached final assembly stages and were considered as flyable, and of these 7, 4 were considered to be the trainer version.

So, frankly, the Soviets and the Cubans never reached full or operational status or readiness with their offensive bombers on the island of Cuba prior to their being removed. This low-altitude photograph, taken on October 27, shows you the detail we can acquire with regard to monitoring the stages of assembly here. The Beagle aircraft being assembled at this location-this one is minus the tail section or the horizontal stabilizer.

Notice, if you will, the engine mounts are being emplaced at this location, while other aircraft components, including tail sections, wings, and a partially completed aircraft are observed in the field area. We carefully watched these aircraft and the field as well, and monitored day by day the progress the Soviets were making in the assembly of these airplanes.

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They responded again to our low-altitude reconnaissance efforts. They threw canvas, tarpaulins, and nets over their assembly activities. They took the 20 remaining crates and dispersed them throughout the airfield and threw camouflage nets across them. But the one thing you must understand here is that with extremely lowaltitude, high-resolution photographs, even the activities of the Soviets beneath the camouflage netting cannot be denied.

Chairman Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the bombers and remove them from the island on November 20. The job, again, of the reconnaissance aircraft was to provide the means or to be the means to monitor disassembly of the bombers and to verify the removal of the components from the islands.

High- and low-altitude aircraft continued after the 20th to cover San Julian Airfield and Holguin Airfield. Frankly, some additional assembly and construction was noted. But on November 25 the first evidence of disassembly was noted. On this high-altitude photograph you can see Soviet IL-28 bombers. Now the wings have been separated from the fuselages, and engines have been separated from the wings. In addition, the 20 aircraft crates that have been dispersed throughout the airfield area itself are now being collected along a central taxiway, apparently in preparation for movement away from the airfield.

By December 4, low-altitude coverage of the San Julian area reveals that in this region and in the overall airfield and in its environs, the IL-28 bomber aircraft and its components have been removed.

At Holguin, as I mentioned earlier, nine IL-28 fuselage crates, shown here on this photograph, and the smaller component crates for engines and electrical equipment were delivered to the island on November 4. This photograph was acquired on November 5. By November 27 these large crates and the component crates were removed from the Holguin Airfield.

Again, the high-altitude aircraft swept the island. They swept the port areas to determine which ones would be used for the removal of Soviet offensive bombers from the island. They checked the railroads and railheads. Finally it was found that the Soviets were moving the Soviet fuselages from Holguin to the port of Nuevitas, and the bombers located in western Cuba were being moved to the port of Mariel. The Soviet ship Ikhotsk pulled into the port of Mariel and picked up three of the IL-28 bomber fuselages. It moved along the north coast of Cuba to the port of Nuevitas where it picked up the nine crated IL-28 bombers from the Holguin Airfield. When this ship departed Cuba on December 5, it carried 12 of the Soviet offensive bombers. This particular photograph was taken as the ship, after picking up three of the bombers at Mariel, is now moving to the port of Nuevitas.

Here it is at Nuevitas, viewed with high-altitude photography, picking up the remaining crates. Four are already deck loaded and the remaining five in the dock area.

The Soviet ship Kasimov departs Mariel on December 5 with 15 more IL-28 bombers, deck loaded. Eleven are in crates and four are under canvas cover at these locations.

The remaining 15 bombers are observed parked in the outer area at Mariel port. Five of them are not crated. The remaining 10 are. The Soviet ship Krasnograd, a large hatch ship, pulls into the Mariel

area. Its hatches are open. It is being readied for loading. This ship will depart Cuba on December 7 with these 15 bombers.

Gentlemen, these ships when they reach the area of the quarantine are inspected by U.S. naval surface craft and aircraft. Here in response to a request of the captain of the Soviet ship, that he permit inspection and counting of the Soviet bombers, the Soviet captain directs that the crews dismantle on the decks of the ships the shipping crates. The end sections are pulled off, and the top sections are stripped back, exposing the IL-28 fuselage jet.

Gentlemen, all 42 bombers observed in Cuba that were later observed deck loaded on Soviet ships were inspected in this manner, and all 42 of them, some of which were in crates, were fully exposed as they departed Cuba.

With regard to the bomber threat, then, three Soviet ships, the Okhotsk, Kasimov, and Krasnograd, removed the 42 bombers observed at San Julian and Holguin Airfield from the island of Cuba. Ports selected were Nuevitas and Mariel, and these ships departed Cuba on these particular dates.

I might mention at this time that all other airfields in Cuba were under continuous and constant surveillance. These aircraft were not moved to other airfields. They were moved to these port areas, and loaded on these three ships.

No complete appreciation for what the Soviets intended in Cuba as a prime offensive base could be had unless we fully understand the nature and extent of the deployment of Soviet defensive systems to the island.

The Soviets deployed five categories of defensive weapons systems on the island beginning sometime in August and September.

The air defense systems deployed included the surface-to-air missiles known as the SA-2. It also included the high performance interceptor fighters known as the Mig 21.

Key or critical possible areas were protected by coastal defense crews missile systems deployed at four known and an additional possible location. In addition, guided missile patrol boats provided a mobile launching capability for antishipping work with 12 Komar class boats were delivered to the island.

And, finally, Soviet ground forces at four locations have also been identified on the island of Cuba, and their equipment are still found on the island.

This graph depicts the deployment of the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missiles on the island of Cuba. These 24 locations, each one marked in red, are characterized by 6 launching or firing sites. The system can reach out to ranges of 30 nautical miles, and you see the interlocking fan providing continuous cover of the north coast of Cuba effected with this particular system.

Notice, if you will, key areas of southern Cuba are also provided protection. This weapon can reach to altitudes of 80,000 feet.

The first evidence of Soviet surface-to-air deployment in Cuba came with high altitude photography acquired on August 29, 1962. At that time, in the vicinity of Havana, a half dozen or so sites were uncovered, Again, the emphasis was placed upon the field expedient. The Soviets quickly moved in and set six circular firing points around a centrally positioned guidance area. A temporary service road was constructed, and a local capability was attempted for this particular site area.

When they had time, the Soviets improved their surface-to-air missile sites, as observed on October 23 on this low altitude view of Bahia Honda. Now, a revetment now encloses each of the firing positions.

In addition, the central guidance area is also reveted, and concrete hardstands have been placed beneath the erectors and launchers and camouflage and cover is provided over each of the launch positions. and in the vicinity of the centrally positioned guidance radar.

Color photography was employed with great success over these locations in Cuba. Here is a color view of the Soviet SAM site at La Coloma, again with the road path torn, and the six firing positions focused on a centrally located guidance area. Notice, if you will, that three missiles are uncovered; one here, another here, and another here. They measure 33.7 feet in length and have two stages. Note again, if you will, three other missiles are under canvas cover, a standard Soviet practice.

In addition to the deployment of surface-to-air missiles, the Soviets also deployed in Cuba the Fishbeds, the Mig-21 fighter-interceptor. This particular aircraft is equipped with air-to-air missiles, can reach altitudes of 40,000 feet and speeds of 1,000 knots.

The Mig-21 aircraft was initially deployed at Santa Clara Airfield. It came unassembled. It was assembled at Santa Clara, and later we observed them being redeployed to San Antonio de los Bonos in the west and Camia Airfield in the east.

This photograph was acquired on September 5, 1962, a high-altitude photograph. It is the first photograph we have indicating or proving that the Soviets were deploying a Mig-21 type aircraft in Cuba. Here is the delta-wing configured aircraft, and this enlargement is several hundred times, near four aircraft shipping crates or boxes.

During the next 6 or 7 weeks these Mig-21 aircraft were assembled at a rapid clip. In the period between September 5 and October 17, 38 additional aircraft were assembled, so that by this date, October 17, 39 were observed in line along the runway area. Older Mig-15 aircraft given to the Cubans by the Soviets were also identified at this field.

That the Mig-21 aircraft were flyable was proven by two points. First of all, as shown here, they could be observed taking off from the runway, as one is here at Santa Clara on October 18. Note the deltawing aircraft with its shadow cast along the runway, just as it leaves the runway in takeoff. These aircraft, as I mentioned, were also deployed at two other fields.

On November 10, low-altitude photography provided us something interesting and new concerning the Soviet Mig-21 aircraft in Cuba. We found, interestingly enough, near these aircraft, on this date, air-to-air missiles. Here is the AA-2, a Soviet air-to-air missile with a range of 6 nautical miles. It is positioned near the delta-winged or configured Mig-21 aircraft. The Soviet crew is placing a rack below the aircraft. The missile will be appended to this rack, as it is already appended to the racks in the wings of these other locations. In addition to employing the Mig-21 in Cuba, the Soviets were affording it an additional weapons capability, that is, the air-to-air missile.

Key beach areas in Cuba are defended by coast defensive missiles. These missiles are aerodynamically configured and have a range of 40 nautical miles. We have four operational sites, one at Banes in eastern Cuba, one at Siguanea, and two near Havana, Santa Cruz del

Norte and Campo Florida. A fifth site has also been identified west of the Havana area.

An excellent photograph of one of the operational sites is shown at Siguanea, on the Isle of Pines. Here they have taken the highest site, and dozed it down, and then chose two earth positions, both of which were reveted. Inside is the 34-foot-long rail launcher uncovered at this location and canvas-covered at this location.

Note the guidance area where command control and cabling is effected from this camouflaged and concealed sector. Because these areas were so close to the beach, so close to the sea, they were vulnerable to attack. The Soviets therefore constructed trenches, Soviet personnel trenches, automatic firing weapons, to afford defense. In addition, to the left in this photograph seven of the cruise missiles on transporters can be observed.

The guided missile patrol craft Komar was observed at two locations in Cuba, one at Mariel in the west, where eight were identified, and Banes in the east, where four were identified.

We noted these boats patrolling back and forth, but we feel that eight are stationed at the Mariel area and four in the area of Banes. This is a photograph of the improved naval base at Banes.

Again, observe the date of this photograph, November 3. A barracks building has been completed, a typical Soviet-type building, and a missile servicing tent 60 feet in length, a drive-through type, as well as cruise missile crates for the missiles fired from the four Komar guided missile patrol boats parked in the pier areas to the left.

This is an enlargement of that pier area, from our low-altitude photography. The boats, Komar boats, measure 83 feet in length. They weigh 66 tons and on the aft end they have 2 missile firing cannisters. These cannisters measure 20 feet in length. The missile fired from this boat is estimated to have a range of 10 to 15 nautical miles. It is primarily a mobile antishipping missile launching platform.

Soviet ground forces were deployed in Cuba some time after midSeptember, the first photographic evidence we have of these ground force locations came on October 17. They are deployed at four major and several smaller locations. Each of these locations is characterized by highly mobile armored task groups. They included assault guns, tanks, tactical rocket launchers, antitank weapons, and a motorized infantry battalion. Note, if you will, that Artemisa Garrison was designed to protect or provide coverage for the western sector of Cuba, where MRBM bases were located.

The Remedios Garrison was designed to protect the central sector of the island of Cuba. The Holguin Garrison was designed to serve as required in the eastern sector of the island. And then, apparently just in case they might be needed right on the outskirts of Havana, at Santiago de las Vegas, was another Soviet garrison area.

High-altitude photography was and is being acquired over these garrison points. Frankly, initially when we saw these garrison locations, we thought that these were tent areas or maybe Cuba militia and much of the equipment arriving in these site areas might be Soviet equipment going to be given to the Cubans.

We carefully, though, checked the character of this equipment with our low-altitude photography and we could only say they were probably tanks, probably mortars with high-altitude photography. Great detail could be discerned with our low-altitude materials. No