I was surprised at the magnitude of the defense system they had built up and the position they were in that many miles from our shore. Can you tell us why we withdrew our missile bases in Turkey? The CHAIRMAN. Let's not go over that now.

Mr. GAVIN. I was wondering whether or not they withdrew from Cuba and we from a defensive position in Turkey.

Is there any connection between the two?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, may I answer this last question?

The CHAIRMAN. Answer the question.

Secretary MCNAMARA. There is absolutely no connection whatsoever between the forced removal by the U.S. military pressure upon Cuba of the Soviet missiles introduced in Cuba on the one hand and not the removal but the modernization of the missiles in Turkey and Italy.

Mr. GAVIN. Why are we getting out of Turkey?

The CHAIRMAN. We will take that up when we finish on Cuba.
Mr. GAVIN. Let him answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. We are interested in Cuba now.

He has answered the question. Let's get back to Cuba. Just as soon as we finish with Cuba we will go to that question.

I have written for the information on that-I don't know what it is but confine yourself to Cuba. We will get to Turkey and Italy and other subjects a little later.

Mr. GAVIN. Then give us the reason why, if you had the island under surveillance [deleted] you recognized what was happening there, why we did not move in before we did with the quarantine?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Gavin, the offensive weapon systems which were the basis for the quarantine were not introduced, to the best of our knowledge, until shortly before the quarantine was established.

We believe, as was pointed out this morning, that the first ship bringing offensive weapons to Cuba arrived in early to mid-September, probably not before the 8th, possibly shortly after that.

Mr. GAVIN. Certainly they could not have completed this defense position, as exhibited to us here this morning, in so short a space of time. They must have been on the problem a great length of time to be able to develop the intensified defenses shown us here this morning. We did not move in until October, did we, of 1962, with the quarantine?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The offensive weapon systems we believe were first introduced early to mid-September and the entire development that you saw described here this morning occurred in the period of approximately 4 weeks.

The other systems that were discussed were moved in earlier during the period July 1 to mid-October.

That particularly applies to the surface-to-air missiles system. I think it is our present estimate that it probably came in around the first of August.

Is that right?

General CARROLL. Yes, sir.

In July there were 12 Soviet dry-cargo vessels that arrived in Cuba. There was an average of 14 each month prior to that back to last January.

So there wasn't any substantial volume buildup during the month of July of the movement of equipment into Cuba.

In the latter part of July certain vessels we feel did bring in equipment associated with the SA-2 sites.

But as is reflected in the fact that by October 14 they had not yet reached an operational capability, they had been in the process of being installed for the past 30 to 60 days.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gavin.

Mr. Hébert?

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Secretary, I would like to know your estimate of the future of Cuba as related to our position.

It seems to me, from the information which we have from the intelligence community, and the estimates made here this morning, that we have to decide on a future position.

With this 17,000 personnel of the Russians in Cuba, Soviet, in Cuba, aren't they actually in a position of dominating the Government, and Castro, instead of being merely a puppet, is a prisoner? We hear a lot of talk about the invasion or uprising must come from the island itself.

From a military viewpoint wouldn't that be absolutely impractical? With the real control of the island in the hands of the Soviets now? Isn't it another Hungary?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Hébert, of the 17,000 Soviet military personnel that we believe to be in the island today, we estimate approximately [deleted] are associated with the air defense system.

The remaining personnel include certain training personnel associated with training of Cuban units and Soviet combat personnel and combat units that might be used for the purpose that you have described are probably limited to something on the order of [deleted]

persons.

Whether they are large enough in size to control the Cuban government, recognizing that the Cuban military force itself, both regular and militia, is large in number, if not in skill, I don't know.

Perhaps General Taylor would care to comment on that.
General TAYLOR. [Deleted.]

[Answer deleted.]

Mr. HÉBERT. As I understood the briefing this morning, there is a strong combat team in there, a very strong combat team, and while the Cubans themselves, the natives, may have numbers, they don't have the effectiveness of resistance.

I suggest that it is the same situation as Hungary.

What position are we in? Khrushchev certainly is not going to allow his base to escape from him there. He has a foothold. Some Cubans would rise, but we certainly would not have enough Cubans, as I envision it, to overthrow the Cuban government even if some of the present Cuban government and government people would go to our side and encourage invasion.

You have the same situation as you had prior to the entry of the Soviets into Hungary.

The position we would find ourselves in, and certainly have to make plans for, would be, suppose such a thing would occur, that the Soviets would immediately deploy more troops into Cuba. Where would you

be?

85066-63-No. 4- -3

Wouldn't that be really an invasion by a European power in this hemisphere?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would interpret it as an invasion; yes, sir, Mr. Hébert.

Mr. HÉBERT. That is important, I think. We have not written Cuba off, have we?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We certainly have not.
Mr. HÉBERT. Thank you, sir.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Any other questions?

Mr. NORBLAD. Last fall there was talk about demanding on-theground inspection. I assume from what you said about our source of aerial reconnaissance, plus intelligence reports, you feel that is not necessary any longer?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would not say it is not necessary.

We have not been able to accomplish it. The sources of intelligence now open to us, particularly the aerial surveillance, in my personal view, are superior to the type of onsite inspection that we might expect under certain forms of international control.

Mr. NORBLAD. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?
Mr. Fisher?

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Secretary, two brief questions occurred to me. No. 1: In view of the intensive antiaircraft buildup by the Soviets in Cuba, do you anticipate any increased difficulty in maintaining the aerial reconnaissance that seems to have been so effective in the past? [Answer deleted.]

Mr. FISHER. One other question: A few months ago there was quite a stir in the press when the announcement was made that there was to be a Soviet naval installation in Cuba. What has happened to that?

Is there anything significant to it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe the press reports were to the effect that the Soviets appeared to be establishing a submarine base in Cuba. We have I believe discovered no evidence of such a base, either before or after October 14.

Perhaps General Carroll would care to comment further on that. General CARROLL. That is correct; perhaps the press reports you are referring to were those which related to an agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba to construct a fish trawler base and it generated concern that that might be merely a disguise for a submarine facility. All during the development of the Cuban situation and particularly with the almost uninhibited opportunity to scrutinize the island very closely, we have checked very, very thoroughly relative to any possibility of either submarine bases or refueling points being established. We have from time to time received a number of reports to the effect that such an event was transpiring here or there about the island. We have run all those down with completely negative results. Mr. FISHER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Fisher.

Any questions here?

Mr. Bray?

Mr. BRAY. Those pictures emphasized a problem that has been, I won't say worrying me, but which gives me some thought That is, that there was apparently no attempt, at least in the early stage, to really camouflage those installations.

I am not an expert on camouflage, but I suppose I have had about the same experience as any officer of my years.

I know they did not do a very good job of camouflaging. In fact, the camouflaging impressed me that it looked like everything was done in emphasize these weapons coming in.

They could have moved them at night to get them off the docks. There is heavy timberland there that was not used for that purpose. I would not say they could have absolutely camouflaged them but they could have done a lot better job.

And perhaps this is not the place to introduce that. But there is always a possibility that a lot of that buildup was to get a trade for something else.

But they could have done a far better job of camouflaging than they did.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Doyle?

Mr. DOYLE. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the subversion.

Do you mean subversion from Cuba into some of the other South American nations?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. I would suggest that a clear attempt to assassinate a properly elected official of a Latin American Government directed by Cubans, for example, would be an act of subversion. Mr. DOYLE. Would that be reason for us to invade Cuba?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't wish to try to predict the policy of the Government under certain circumstances in the future, but I think that the President has made quite clear that we will not tolerate the use of Cuba as a base for subversion and aggression to be carried. out throughout the hemisphere.

Mr. DOYLE. One more question.

Are we now flying low-altitude flights over Cuba three or four times a day?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, we are not.

Mr. DOYLE. Have we stopped them all?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We have not stopped them all.

Mr. DOYLE. Isn't there a time numerically when a so-called defense force becomes an offense force without the presence of high-altitude or intercontinental missiles?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe that the numerical increase in defense weapons, while it might under certain circumstances provide an offensive capability, will do so by itself in Cuba.

They obviously require an amphibious capability to allow this quantitative buildup in defensive weapons to take on an offensive character and that amphibious capability they do not now have. Mr. DOYLE. And we are watching that also?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; we are.

Mr. DOYLE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson?

[Deleted.]

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Osmers?

Mr. OSMERS. Mr. Secretary, I have tried to approach the subject that we are discussing this morning from a little bit broader view than the days on which photographs we were looking at were taken.

We are confronted here, Mr. Chairman, with probably the greatest intelligence failure since Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, we have a choice of three areas in which we can place the blame.

First, there was a criminal conspiracy of some kind on the part of the intelligence community because of its failure to report all of the facts as they knew them-which I doubt-or, second, we are witnessing a massive effort on the part of the Chief Executive and his Cabinet to mislead the Congress and the people because of the lack of timely action or, third, we have an intelligence community that is grossly incompetent or inadequate.

Do we realize what we have seen and heard here this morning. Cuba is a small place 90 miles from the United States. It is the size of New York State with a population the size of the State of New Jersey.

We have listened here this morning to the leading defense authorities of our Nation tell us that these huge vans, trucks, containers, missiles, bombers, boxes, can be moved across the island of Cuba but that we did not know one thing about it until a couple of days before they were ready to blow up half the country.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I don't want to question the Secretary as to whether it was some Tuesday afternoon when the first picture was taken, or whether it was some other afternoon.

All we do know is that when this matter was handed to the President of the United States he had hours to go.

Now, Mr. Chairman, what are we this committee, as the representatives of the people in national defense, this is our responsibilitywhat are we going to do to prevent a recurrence of this intelligence calamity?

We are not here to rewrite history.

What are we, Mr. Chairman, as a committee, as representatives of the people, going to do to prevent a recurrence?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what suggestion have you got to offer?
Let's hear your suggestion.

Mr. OSMERS. Are you referring to me, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I am referring to you.

Mr. OSMERS. I think what we probably will have to do, Mr. Chairman-you asked me, didn't you?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. OSMERS. Let me answer

The CHAIRMAN. When you present an indictment you must present a remedy.

Mr. OSMERS. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's hear your remedy.

Mr. OSMERS. If the gentleman will permit me to answer the question I will try to.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. OSMERS. Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community is completely inadequate for meeting the problems facing the country.

It is evident from everything that has been said here this morning. Therefore, sir, I propose that we take the necessary steps to make it an adequate defense intelligence community. That is my recommendation.