In periods of tension and incipient hostilities, the vulnerability of these missiles to such sabotage would appear especially acute. And a second paragraph relating in this instance to Turkey. Compared with the solid-fueled mobile POLARIS missile or second generation medium range ballistic missiles offered by former Secretary Herter in his speech before the NATO Council in December of 1960, the liquid fueled fixed JUPITERS are obsolete weapons. Since they will not be placed in hardened bases and will not be mobile, their retaliatory value is highly questionable. In the event of hostilities, assuming NATO will not strike the first blow, the U.S.S.R. with its ballistic missile capability logically could be expected to take out these bases on the first attack, which undoubtedly would be a surprise attack. And they go on to say: Construction therefore should not be permitted to begin on the five JUPITER sites in Turkey. Instead of placing 15 obsolete liquid-fueled JUPITERS in Turkey, an alternative system such as a POLARIS submarine with 16 IRBM's operated and controlled by U.S. personnel could be assigned to NATO in lieu of the 15 JUPITERS. Such an assignment could be made before 1962 when the JUPITER system would be coming into operation. The POLARIS submarine system would be mobile and thus a much better retaliatory force. Now it goes on and on in this vein. Mr. ARENDS. That is a public document. Mr. PRICE. It is a classified document. Secretary MCNAMARA. Portions of it are classified, but this particular part that I read from I believe is unclassified. Mr. ARENDS. Unclassified. What is the date of that, Mr. Secretary? Secretary MCNAMARA. It is dated February 11, 1961, and I was reading from page 30, paragraphs subsection (a) and a portion of subsection (b). Mr. ARENDS. Thank you very much. The CHAIRMAN. Then you practically followed the recommendation of the Atomic Energy Commission [sic]. Secretary MCNAMARA. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; yes, sir. Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, may I make an observation? The CHAIRMAN. Wait 1 minute. Mr. Rivers. Mr. RIVERS. You said that the Alliance would have 800 as against 400 missiles now. Well, the Alliance means the United States. missiles, do they, Mr. Secretary? Nobody else has Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, there is a loss of missiles during this year by other than the United States, because the British are removing the THOR and we have taken account of those figures. But at the end of the year the missiles in the Alliance are possessed by the United States. Mr. RIVERS. And the modernization that you speak of in Italy for the U.S. troops are the missiles located in Verona complex? Is that the ones you are talking about? Secretary MCNAMARA. You are speaking now of the CORPORAL? Mr. RIVERS. Yes. Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. Mr. RIVERS. That is the area you are talking about? Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. Mr. RIVERS. I see. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Price. Mr. PRICE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that that is more than just a perfunctory report. The committee put over a year of study into this proposition. And that resulted from an on-site inspection by the committee in the fall of 1960. And it was an unanimous report from the committee, particularly of the members who visited these sites, including both sides-Craig Hosmer signed it and Jack Westland signed it. So it was an unanimous opinion of the committee that something should be done about the JUPITER situation. I think the Joint Committee at least is very happy that action has been taken, or that is being taken at least on this matter. What the report said, in unclassified language, was that during the period November 26-December 15, 1960, the following members and staff of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy visited military installations in seven NATO countries and in Spain: Representative Chet Holifield, chairman, Subcommittee on Legislation; Representative Wayne N. Aspinall; Senator Wallace F. Bennett; Representative Craig Hosmer; Representative Jack Westland; James T. Ramey, Executive Director; John T. Conway, Assistant Director; Lt. Col. Richard C. Lunger, staff consultant. On the basis of the visit a report was prepared, the final draft of which was approved February 11, 1961, and a copy furnished to the President under date of February 15, 1961. Copies were also made available to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others in the Government who had responsibilities within the purview of the report. The JUPITER missiles in Italy and planned for Turkey were subject to comment in the report. Included in the recommendations of the report was the following: Construction should not be permitted to begin on the five JUPITER sites in Turkey. Instead of placing 15 obsolete liquid fuel IRBM's in Turkey, an alternative system such as a POLARIS submarine with 16 IRBM's, operated and controlled by U.S. personnel, could be assigned to NATO in lieu of the 15 JUPITERS. Such an assignment could be made before 1962 when the JUPITER system would be coming into operation. The POLARIS submarine system would be mobile and thus a much better retaliatory force. Criticism of the existing JUPITER system in Italy also was contained in the report, particularly as to its vulnerability. The full committee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy subsequently held hearings during the next 2 years in executive session in which the ad hoc report was the subject of the hearing. During these followup hearings the committee repeatedly was critical of JUPITER systems in Italy and Turkey. Following are some of the dates in which the Joint Committee discussed with representatives of the Department of State, Defense Department, and AEC, the NATO ad hoc report: February 7, 1961, February 20, 1961, April 26, 1961, August 23, 1961, March 1, 2, 1962, September 18, 1962. Was that decision reached along in February of 1961? Mr. PRICE. Well, this report was issued. The decision is just now coming into being; is that right? Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Price is quite correct in emphasizing the strong views of the committee. Because when they came back, although the administration had just come into office a few days prior to the date of the report, the committee members felt so strongly on this that they had a series of personal meetings with me, for example, and with the President. We discussed it at great length. We began in April of that year, just 40 or 50 days after the date of the report, to begin to try to act on the recommendations of the committee. Secretary Rusk at that time began a series of conversations with members of the Government; that is Turkey and Italy. But it has taken from then until now to work this out. The CHAIRMAN. Any questions from any members of the committee about removal of the JUPITER. (Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.") Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Norblad. Mr. NORBLAD. Just one question. You spoke about the growth potential of the POLARIS. Did you mean by "growth potential" the distance of the firing or the warhead? Secretary MCNAMARA. NO. Accuracy, range, and warhead carrying capability, both in terms of yield and weight. Mr. NORBLAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Hall. Mr. HALL. I am interested not from the point of view of the JUPITER, Mr. Secretary, but from the point of view of the replacement by the POLARIS. Secretary MCNAMARA. In Mr. HALL. Does that mean we will still keep complete control in our own U.S. Navy of the POLARIS and the fleet ballistic missile atomic nuclear powered submarines? Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. The POLARIS will be manned 100 percent by U.S. crews. The CHAIRMAN. And later on, Mr. Secretary, when we get to that point in your statement where you point out that POLARIS will be given to NATO, probably we will develop some questions along that line. Secretary MCNAMARA. Perhaps in relation to the Nassau Pact and some implications. The CHAIRMAN. That is right. Secretary MCNAMARA. I will be very happy to discuss that subject. The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions? Mr. PRICE. On that point, Mr. Chairman, it won't be given to NATO, but it will be made available and assigned to NATO. Secretary MCNAMARA. It would be assigned to NATO, exactly, Mr. Price. The CHAIRMAN. Assigned. Mr. PRICE. For support. Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. The CHAIRMAN. We want to know who pays for the upkeep and all those kinds of things. Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Chairman. 85066-63-No. 4 Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. Secretary, what is the status of THOR in Britain? Secretary MCNAMARA. There are about 60 THOR missiles in the United Kingdom, and those are being phased out gradually between roughly the 1st of April of this year and the 1st of October. Mr. HUDDLESTON. What will they be replaced with? Secretary MCNAMARA. To the best of my knowledge, the Britishthese are British missiles are not planning to replace them immediately with any other system. Mr. HUDDLESTON: I thought the THOR would be involved in the replacement of the British NATO obligation by POLARIS submarines. Secretary MCNAMARA. No. This is a British system. A decision to replace them was not our decision. It was a British decision. I am not entirely familiar with the way in which the British look upon it. But I am certain that they don't have any other missile system available to replace them during 1963. The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions on this (Chorus of "Mr. Chairman.") Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman. Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Secretary, I am wondering-and I have had occasion to discuss this matter recently-does this in any way weaken our military posture, Mr. Secretary? Secretary MCNAMARA. No, I think not. Because these JUPITER missiles are so highly vulnerable that basically they have a first strike capability, but very little if any secondary strike capability. Mr. COHELAN. Isn't there any psychological loss? Secretary MCNAMARA. I think there is a psychological loss if they are not to be replaced. Even though they are obsolete and at least as obsolete as the British THOR's that are not being replaced, nonetheless were they not to be replaced in Italy and Turkey, I personally believe there would be a psychological loss. They are, however, being replaced by the POLARIS, which will be assigned to duty in the Mediterranean and pick up their targets. And also other systems-in the case of Turkey, aircraft are being modernized, and in the case of Italy the CORPORAL system is being modernized. Mr. COHELAN. The question of the withdrawal of the JUPITER, what was the position of the Joint Chiefs? Secretary MCNAMARA. I think that the Chiefs would have been very much opposed-General Taylor can speak to this, but I think the Chiefs would have been very much opposed to this had they not been subject to replacement with POLARIS submarines and had not our total Western World missile strength been increasing so rapidly as it is during this year. Between the 1st of July of this year and the 31st of August, about 248 ballistic missiles will be added to the U.S. force. Mr. COHELAN. I wonder if the general would be good enough to comment on that? General TAYLOR. [Deleted.] Mr. COHELAN. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. You strengthen your global defense by substituting the POLARIS for this type of weapons? Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, sir; and inevitably the modernization program should have been carried forward. Perhaps we should have started earlier as a matter of fact. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I just want to inquire when our JUPITER missiles become operational? Secretary MCNAMARA. In 1962. I can't give you the exact date. Maybe we have it here. They become operational over a period of time, but I would think that it was around July. Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. So, really, not even a year? Secretary MCNAMARA. Oh, it is a very short time. Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. A matter of months. And we are phasing them out? Secretary MCNAMARA. Exactly. Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. When did we reach agreement with the Turkish Government for placing them in their country? Secretary MCNAMARA. In, I believe it was 1960, this happened before this administration came into office. And I can't therefore give you the exact date, although I will search the record for it. Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. It is not necessary. Secretary MCNAMARA. But it was in 1960, I think. The interesting point to me and the point that the joint committee emphasized in its conversations with us in February and March of 1961 was the conclusion of the joint committee members who had visited the site. As Mr. Price said, the Turkish JUPITERS should never have been placed in position. And therefore our first objective in talking to the Turkish Government in the initial conversations between Secretary Rusk and the Turkish Government was to try to achieve that objective. But at that point we did not have POLARIS available to replace them. And as Mr. Cohelan or one of the others pointed out, there would have been a psychological loss to the West of simply canceling the program and failing to replace them-the missiles simultaneously with some other more modern system. And they there- At least this was the way the Turks looked at it. fore refused to modify the agreement at that time. go ahead and finish the construction and place them in operation. Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Thank you. Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bennett? Mr. BENNETT. Could I make just a suggestion? Judging from my correspondence, a good portion of the American people still feel, or do feel, that Turkey withdraw all of these weapons, I mean the weapons that are being withdrawn from Turkey, has something to do with Cuba and that there is a possibility of agreement by the President with Khrushchev that this was to be considered in the withdrawal of these weapons from Cuba. (Secretary McNamara nods.) Mr. BENNETT. Now you made a very clear-cut picture to the contrary here. It is just a suggestion I am trying to make to you, that perhaps it might be, to strengthen the confidence of the American people and |