military presence in that country, those missiles represented but a small part of the total Communist threat to freedom.

Even while the Soviet Union was attempting to extend its offensive military power directly into Cuba, the undeclared war against the Government of South Vietnam continued and a new overt military aggression was launched against India by the Chinese Communists. In Europe, Soviet pressure on the Allied position in Berlin continued unabated. In the Near East, the Communists were seeking to make inroads in the Arabian peninsula. In Africa, their efforts to exploit dissension and unrest in the Congo had been temporarily thwarted by the actions of the United Nations. All of these crises or probing actions are simply the more obvious manifestations of the Communist drive toward their basic objective of world domination.

This objective is held by both the Soviet Union and Communist China, but very distinct differences in tactics have become apparent. And, indeed, there is increasing evidence that the apparent monolithic structure of world communism has been fractured, perhaps irreparably. There is emerging a bipolarization of power in the Communist camp, the Chinese Communists trying to capture control of the Communist revolution and the Soviet Communists seeking to retain their present leadership.

Although we may draw some comfort from this falling out between the Communist giants, the world situation remains perilous, nevertheless. The destruction of freedom and free nations is still the ultimate objective of both countries, but each is seeking to attain the objective in its own way, and to capture the spoils for itself.

Oddly enough, in this struggle for power in the Communist camp, the weaker of the two rivals is by far the more belligerent and the more reckless, and therefore, very dangerous to the peace of the world. The reason for this difference is not hard to find. The Soviet Union, after 45 years of unrelenting sacrifice and deprivation, is finally emerging from its status as a "have not" nation. Mainland China, however, after 13 years of Communist rule, has barely, if at all, made a start toward self-sufficiency. Her economic condition is desperate. The Soviet Union today has a great deal to lose in a nuclear warmaterial wealth as well as human life. The economically impoverished Chinese Communists, to whom human life has little value, believe they have much less to lose. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Red Chinese are much more ready than the Soviet leadership to risk even nuclear war. And, indeed, the Chinese Communists have been quick to take the road of active belligerency in Korea, in Tibet, and now in India.

But while war and the threat of war have rightly occupied most of our attention, we must not neglect the fact that the struggle with communism is continuing through other means. As long as serious political and economic instability exists in any part of the world, the Communists will have an opportunity to enlarge the area of the struggle. Even now they continue to demonstrate their ability to take quick advantage of any breakdown of law and order in any part of the word and to identify themselves with any change in the status quo or with any emerging threat to existing authority.

In this regard, there has been no change in the policy of the Soviet Union to encourage what Mr. Khrushchev calls wars of national liberation or popular revolts, and which we know as covert armed aggression, guerrilla warfare, and subversion. And the Soviet Union has not

diminished its efforts through the more subtle means of economic and military aid, political intrigue and propaganda to win over the neutral and emerging nations of the world to the cause of communism. From Africa to the Near East, from southeast Asia to Latin America, the pattern is the same. We may expect that the struggle in this area will intensify and we must be prepared to meet the challenge.

1. LATIN AMERICA

Although the Cuban crisis has greatly solidified the unity and cohesion of the American States, the threat of communism has by no means abated, and a Communist government still rules in Cuba. Our forceful response to the threat of armed aggression from Cuba no doubt has diminished for the present the military aspect of the threat. But this simply means that Communist efforts will be shifted to other areas, and the Castroist Communist sabotage last fall in Venezuela is but one of the more violent examples of this danger. More important from the longer term point of view is the fundamental instability engendered by the widespread lack of adequate economic progress. So long as hunger and economic instability persist in Latin America, the danger of communism will be ever present. Indeed, it is not an overt-armed Communist attack that is the real danger in this part of the world, or even Communist sabotage and subversion-the real danger lies in the discouragement, disillusionment, and despair of the people as a result of the relatively slow rate of economic and social progress.

Prior to fiscal year 1962, U.S. military assistance to Latin America was geared to a concept of hemispheric defense which envisaged the direct participation by Latin American forces in any large-scale conflict. A thorough review of the program convinced us that, except for specific cases where properly equipped naval and air forces could make a significant contribution to the solution of the antisubmarine warfare problem, this concept of hemispheric defense was becoming increasingly unrealistic. The main threat in Latin America today is that of Communist subversion and indirect attack, and not overt military aggression from outside the hemisphere. Accordingly, about one-half of the approximately $75 million per year of military assistance which the United States is presently providing for Latin America is devoted to equipment and training for internal security purposes, with special emphasis on counterinsurgency training. The major portion of the balance is directed to the support of selected ASW forces. Although we fully recognize that the problem is essentially political and economic, the maintenance of law and order is an essential prerequisite to social and economic progress.

In addition to internal security, our program is also designed to contribute to economic and social development through what we call civic action projects. These projects, in such fields as agriculture, transportation, communications, health and sanitation, are beneficial to the people generally. Outstandingly successful programs of this sort have been conducted in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Honduras. More recently we have instituted a similar program in Equador and we are currently developing projects for other Latin American countries, including El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru. Civic action projects are jointly funded by the military assistance

program and AID, with MAP providing the military equipment and related training.

But the military assistance program will not in itself solve the problem of political instability which arises from the continued economic difficulties in much of Latin America, and herein lies the real danger of future Communist penetration. It was to meet this more fundamental problem that President Kennedy last year launched the Alliance for Progress which committed the United States to a longterm program of economic aid and technical assistance for our Latin American neighbors. This aid as explicitly provided in the Charter of Punta del Este-was contingent on self-help and economic reform, which in our view are absolutely indispensable to future economic growth and social progress. Without these vital domestic measures, external assistance, no matter how large, cannot succeed in achieving the purpose for which intended.

Although the United States fulfilled its pledge at Punta del Este to provide $1 billion of economic aid during the year which ended in March 1962, and is prepared to continue its assistance during the year ahead on the same general order of magnitude, progress has not been fully satisfactory. First, the level of self-help has not been sufficiently high, and second, the necessary conditions have not yet been created to encourage private investment, both domestic and foreign. Indeed, foreign private investment in Latin America has actually declined and the flight of private domestic capital has, in some cases, reached serious proportions. Yet, without substantial private investment, both domestic and foreign, the vast needs of Latin America will never be satisfied, since public funds on a scale anywhere near adequate to meet the requirement simply do not exist.

The U.S. Government has not hesitated to bring these shortcomings before the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, where we have urged that every possible measure be taken to create an environment attractive to foreign private investment, and to expand the role of private enterprise in the economies of Latin America. We are confident that further progress will be made in this direction, but the American people must be willing to continue to carry the burden of economic aid to Latin America for some time to come. This effort, seen in the context of the wider struggle between the Communists and the free world, deserves a place of highest priority in our national security program. It is the most productive expenditure we can make to thwart the threat of communism in that part of the world so important to our own security.

2. AFRICA

Africa is another area in which the Communists will try to take advantage of any political and economic instability. Although overt Communist military aggression against Africa is conceivable, it is not very probable because of the logistic difficulties involved. The real danger here is quite similar to that in Latin America; namely, that the Communists could gain a foothold by subverting and overthrowing an existing government. When we consider the large number of newly independent countries on that continent, the many opportunities for troublemaking become readily apparent. We and our free world allies have the military power, both in kind and in quantity, to preclude an overt Communist military attack on any African country,

but we do not have the means to prevent Communist infiltration, subversion, and other forms of covert aggression. Our best hope to foreclose the extension of Communist influence in Africa, therefore, is to assist the new nations of that continent in their efforts to build viable societies. This we can do by giving them economic and technical assistance, and whatever military assistance is needed to insure internal security. Here, again, we also hope to use the military assistance program to support civic action projects in selected African nations.

We do not and need not carry the whole burden of helping to safeguard freedom in Africa. Other free nations, particularly the United Kingdom and France, have special interests and responsibilities in that part of the world. The United Nations, too, has a vital role to play. Our policy is not to supplant the assistance already being furnished by the metropole countries to their former colonies, but rather to supplement their programs where needed, and to help those countries where no other source of aid is available. Our programs in tropical Africa are extremely modest and are directed at internal security.

More important from the longer term point of view are the economic and technical assistance programs. Here, again, we share this task with the other economically advanced nations of the free world. But even with all the help that can be reasonably expected, the development of the African nations into modern viable societies will be a long, arduous, and costly task.

3. NEAR EAST

In the Near East we face quite a different kind of situation. While most of the countries in this area are still politically unstable and economically underdeveloped, some are much further along in their efforts to modernize. Moreover, a number of them, Greece, Turkey, and Iran, border on the Soviet bloc and are thus directly exposed to Communist military power. To these three nations, we have made certain firm military commitments, and they have long been the principal recipients of U.S. military assistance in the area. Since Greece and Turkey are members of NATO and will be dealt with in that context, I shall omit them from this part of the discussion.

Although we provide some grant military aid to certain other Near Eastern countries, notably Jordan and Saudi Arabia, we do not share membership with these countries in any military regional organization. In general, our interest in this area is to help create an environment in which each of the nations can maintain internal stability and develop in its own way without fear of attack from its neighbors or from the Communist bloc.

This is a difficult and exacting role at best. It is particularly difficult where so many nations are divided, not only by the power struggles and rivalries of the moment, but also by mutual fears and suspicions whose origins are buried deep in history. This unsettled situation has been further complicated by the intervention of the Soviet Union in the area by giving military as well as economic aid to some of the nations in the hope of enhancing its influence. This development has made it necessary for the United States to furnish limited amounts of defensive military equipment and supplies to the other nations in the Near East. The U.S. Government has agreed, for example, to sell some HAWK antiaircraft missiles to Israel to

offset large Soviet deliveries of modern fighters and bombers to the United Arab Republic. Depending upon future Soviet arms shipments or other actions that tend to disturb the always precarious stability of the area, we may find it necessary to increase our military aid to still other Near Eastern states.

Iran, with which we have a mutual cooperation agreement is one of the most vulnerable countries to Soviet encroachment, overt or covert. The United States has for many years been furnishing Iran with both economic and military assistance, and some progress has been made in strengthening both its economy and its defenses. But Iran borders directly on the Soviet Union, and even though the terrain favors the defense, we could not expect Iran to withstand alone for very long a major attack from its northern neighbor. The defense of Iran against such an attack could not be separated from the larger problem of the collective defense of the free world. Accordingly, our military assistance objective in Iran is to help that nation build up its forces for internal security and to discourage incursions across its borders. Our economic aid program is designed to contribute to the general improvement of economic and social conditions which here, as elsewhere in the world, is an indispensible element in preventing the spread of communism. To this end, we are also assisting the Iranian armed forces with their own large civic action program.

4. SOUTH ASIA

The situation in south Asia is now reaching the critical point. After several years of nibbling at the northern borders of India, the Chinese Communists last October launched an attack in strength and seized large areas of Indian territory. This attack, considering its scope and character, obviously took many months to prepare and involved a staggering logistics effort. It also constituted a drain on an already greatly strained economy. Both of these factors, plus India's determination to defend its freedom and the Western determination to help her do so, give us grounds for confidence that this new Chinese Communist bid for expansion will also fail.

Although the United States has been furnishing large-scale military assistance to India's neighbor, Pakistan, since 1954 under a mutual defense agreement, the Government of India has until now not sought grant military aid. India has from time to time bought some military equipment from the United States, but its major source of supply has been the United Kingdom. Last October, however, the Indian Government urgently requested aid from us and we quickly responded. A U.S. mission headed by Assistant Secretary of State Harrimanas well as a United Kingdom mission-made a rapid on-the-spot survey of the Indian situation and recommended that a limited military aid program be undertaken immediately. The recommendations of the Harriman mission were approved in principle by the President and an aid program is now underway.

We have been providing materiel such as mortars, machineguns, ammunition, mines, communications equipment, and airlift support urgently needed by Indian forces immediately in the forward area. Some of this equipment was airlifted and the remainder is being sent by sea.

The security and independence of India are matters of urgent concern to the entire free world. We have already made massive invest