propelled howitzers, of which sizable numbers are proposed for procurement.

Another important part of the Army's modernization program is the introduction of a new family of self-propelled artillary, including 105-millimeter, 105-millimeter, and 8-inch self-propelled howitzers.

About $13 million is included to start procurement of a new 105millimeter towed howitzer. This howitzer is light and rugged and can be transported by air and airdropped. For DAVY CROCKETT, $11.4 million is provided.

Funds are included for [deleted] M-60 tanks in order to keep the production line going for another year. This will give us [deleted] M-60 tanks, to equip all the U.S. forces in Europe. other areas will continue to use M-48 series tanks. the M-48, which carries a 90-millimeter gun, will be in these other areas until a new main battle tank, now under component development, becomes available.

Army forces in We believe that adequate for use

The planned 1964 buy of [deleted] M-113's will equip the Active Forces and begin equipping the Reserves. The Federal Republic of Germany is also buying large numbers of these personnel carriers and sales negotiations are underway with other countries.

Funds are also included for T-114 armored reconnaissance vehicles, and command post vehicles, which will fully meet the Active Force requirement and begin the equipping of the Reserves.

(d) Tactical and support vehicles: About $340 million is included. in the 1964 budget for [deleted] trucks, trailers, and other noncombat vehicles. The largest dollar items are 4-, 4-, 2-, and 5-ton trucks.

(e) Communications and electronics: For electronics and communications equipment we are requesting about $406 million, about onethird more than was provided in 1962 or 1963. The largest item, $59 million, is for STARCOM, the Army's strategic communications system. This system will provide the necessary rapid strategic communications required by Army forces deployed worldwide and by the Strike Command, should any of its forces by deployed.

About $20 million is requested for [deleted] AN/PRC-25 "man portable" radios, a sturdy, effective set for company-size combat units. Twenty-two million is included for 5,000 AN/VRC-12 vehicular

radios.

(f) Other support equipment: About $240 million is requested for the procurement of other support equipment which is about $25 million more than in the current year and $100 million more than 1962.

This cateogy includes construction equipment such as cranes, graders, and tractors; small boats; materials handling equipment such as forklift trucks and warehouse tractors; chemical warfare quipment such as protective masks and warning devices; and other heavy equipment, including the amphibious lighters, BARC and LARC.

Now, turning to page 82 in the text, I will skip that paragraph at the top of page and go down to Navy general purpose forces in the middle of the page.

Ammunition: Army ammunition procurement in 1964 will total $589 million, more than 50 percent higher than the amounts provided in 1962 or 1963. The most significant items are 7.62 mm. cartridges, 105 mm. howitzer cartridges and 155 mm. howitzer projectiles. The amounts procured in 1964 will fully meet the inventory objective and provide for peacetime training purposes.

In addition a large quantity of the XM-402 extended range 155 mm. howitzer projectiles will be procured.

(h) Production base program: The Army's production base program will require $143 million in 1964, up slightly from the 1963 level and about the same amount provided in 1962. The increase in 1944 reflects the requirement for additional production facilities associated with the major expansion in the procurement of Army weapons and equipment.

C. NAVY GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

1. Navy forces-Ships

As I indicated earlier, we do not yet have acceptable situation-bysituation analyses of naval requirements comparable to those now available for ground and tactical air forces. Until such analyses become available we are accepting the Navy's general purpose forces as being generally the right order of magnitude and composition. It is chiefly with regard to the rate of modernization that differences of opinion exist, as was so clearly brought out in last year's hearings before the Special House Armed Services Subcommittee on Composition of the Fleet and Block Obsolescence of Naval Vessels.

I am well aware that the Navy faces a difficult problem of "block obsolescence" and that well over half of today's fleet was built during or just shortly after World War II. While it is true that these ships are now approaching the 20-year mark, the useful lives of many combatant types still can be extended by rehabilitation and modernization. Support and auxiliary types, in most cases, can be maintained in a serviceable condition much longer than 20 years. The right solution to the "block obsolescence" problem is not to rush into a crash program of ship construction now and thereby create another equally serious dilemma for the future. Rather, we should overcome the problem gradually over a number of years-all the time, of course, insuring that adequate naval power is always available to meet the essential tasks of national security. This, I believe, our proposed program will accomplish.

For end fiscal year 1964 we plan a general purpose forces fleet of 836 ships, the same number planned for the end of the current year. As new and more capable ships are delivered the overall number will gradually decline. Changing circumstances may require a higher or lower number but we would have time to make the necessary adjustments.

I think now you may wish to turn to the page showing statistics on the Navy ships in the general purposes forces. This is essentially our entire fleet, excluding the POLARIS.

You see for each of the fiscal years starting in 1961 and extending through 1968, the planned total strength.

You see at the bottom of the page certain other reserve forces that are readily available.

The nuclear submarine attack forces are building up, as we discussed in previous years. The other forces are maintained at essentially their present levels.

The Navy ship construction authorization programs for the fiscal years extending through 1968 are highly tentative, because they will depend upon further studies now in progress.

For fiscal year 1964 the total cost of the general purpose forces ships to be built or converted would amount to $1,617 million which is

roughly twice the level of 1961, and approximately the same as that of 1963.

I know you will have many questions on this, and I will be prepared for it.

Mr. HARDY. I am going to have a lot of them, Mr. Secretary. Secretary MCNAMARA. I will be prepared to answer those Monday. Now if we can go back to the text, we can skip over to page 91, I believe

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, read page 85.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I will be happy to, Mr. Chairman. it is an important point.

(a) Attack Carrier Forces: Tentatively, one new attack carrier, conventionally powered, will be started every second year. The last carrier was included in the fiscal year 1963 shipbuilding program and, tentatively, the next carrier will be started in fiscal year 1965, and another in fiscal year 1967. This has been the Navy's program for many years, long before the present administration took office. Yet, by the time the Midway class carriers are phased out of the force, one would be 30 years old and two would be 32 years old, clearly demonstrating that the 20-year rule of thumb is an artificial standard for measuring the useful life of naval vessels. This point is particularly pertinent to our discussion of the next type of ship.

(b) Antisubmarine warfare carrier forces: While it is clear that new construction will eventually be necessary if we are to maintain the present force of ASW carriers, it is not yet at all clear when this program will have to be started. All of the present ASW carriers are of the Esser class and are still highly serviceable ships in the ASW role, particularly after they have been put through a rehabilitation and modernization program. Additionally, more recently built Essex class carriers will become available for ASW duty as they are phased out of the attack carrier force. These ships, without taxing their capacity, can easily handle any of the aircraft now in use or planned for the ASW operation.

While it is true that the Essex class ships, which were all built during World War II, will soon exceed the 20-year mark, there does not seem to be any logical reason why they would not be serviceable in the ASW role for perhaps another 10 years. As I pointed out, the Navy intends to retain the Midway class ships in the more demanding attack carrier role for 30 years, or even longer. It should also be noted that the new ASW carriers the Navy proposed to build would be both smaller and slower than the Essex class carriers.

Furthermore, new developments, either in ships or in ASW weapons or techniques, which we can reasonably anticipate during the next 6 or 7 years, may well make possible the design of radically different types of ASW carriers, or may lead to a reduction in the total number required. For example, the successful development of a VTOL aircraft, on which work has been underway for many years, could substantially reduce the size required of an ASW carrier. So, too, the successful design of a destroyer escort equipped with manned ASW helicopters could reduce the number of carriers needed. We are now studying just such a destroyer escort.

Finally, the cost of a force of new ASW carriers would not be inconsiderable, even in a budget as large as the Defense Department's.

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A new ASW carrier would, of course, be superior to an Essex class carrier in certain respects. The cost of maintenance (normal overhaul, rehabilitation, modernization, etc.) might be less, since by 1970 all the Essex class carriers would be 25 years old or older. Because a new carrier would be somewhat smaller (35,000 tons compared to 40,000 tons) and would be designed to operate at somewhat slower speeds, the operating costs might also be somewhat lower, and we may find that certain of the electronic and command and control systems cannot, physically be backfitted on an Essex class carrier. Nevertheless, recognizing that some sort of replacement program will eventually be necessary and that this program, too, should be phased over a period of years in order to avoid a "block obsolescence" problem in the future, we have tentatively programed one new ASW carrier sometime after 1964. We will be in a much better position then to determine the size and character of the ASW carrier force.

(c) Cruiser forces: We now have a sizable force of cruisers, one of which, the Long Beach, is nuclear powered. Most are armed with one or more of the surface-to-air missile systems, TARTAR, TERRIER, or TALOS, while the remaining are armed solely with guns. During fiscal year 1964, an additional cruiser which has been outfitted with TARTAR, TALOS, and ASROC will join the fleet, replacing one of the gun cruisers.

The Navy proposed the construction of TYPHON armed cruisers, beginning sometime after 1964. The proposed cruisers would carry a TYPHON air defense system utilizing a very large radar, which, because of its bulk, could be installed only in a vessel of that size.

There is also the longstanding question as to how much it is reasonable to invest simply to defend the fleet against air attack. The entire question of the cost and capability of the fleet in relation to the cost of defending it against air attack still requires a most thorough analysis.

Furthermore, experience has convinced me that full-scale testing of these complex systems is absolutely essential before we start to build the ships in which they are to be installed. Therefore, we now plan to install a TYPHON system on the test ship, Norton Sound, to perform full-scale test firings. When the results of these tests are known, we shall be better able to make sound decisions on the desirability of installing the system on frigates or cruisers. We believe the smaller system, which we plan to install on frigates, is more readily attainable. Since the Navy did not propose to start the first new cruiser until well after 1964, we have ample time to review thoroughly all aspects of the problem.

d. Destroyer and escort-type ships: There are now [deleted] destroyer type ships in the Navy General Purpose Forces including [deleted] frigates, [deleted] destroyers, and [deleted] escorts.

During the coming fiscal year, [deleted] more guided missile frigates will join the fleet. All of the gun frigates will be converted to guided missile frigates or guided missile destroyers.

We have not programed any guided missile frigates for 1964. The DLGN in the fiscal year 1963 program and the two DLG's shown for 1964 in the program presented to this committee last year were to be armed with the TYPHON air defense system. Because of the slippage of the TYPHON development we were forced to cancel the 1963 DLGN as well as the two DLG's planned for 1964.

We believe the program is now proceeding satisfactorily and, allowing time for the Norton Sound tests, we should be able to start the DLGN originally planned for 1963 sometime after 1964 followed by the two TYPHON DLG's originally planned for 1964.

Of the $190 million provided in the 1963 appropriations $121 million will be used in this fiscal year for TARTAR, TERRIER, and TALOS improvements on ships currently under construction.

The balance has been reprogramed to make up shortages in other ships under construction, and to reduce our 1964 budget request.

The chairman has asked that this matter be deferred for consideration by him and the committee and we, of course, are deferring it for that purpose.

The destroyer force will gradually decline as the number of frigates and escorts increases.

During the coming fiscal year five DD-931-class ships built after World War II and two of the older and smaller gun frigates will be converted to TARTAR-armed guided missile destroyers.

Additional DDG conversions are planned for [deleted]. In addition, nineteen 2,200-ton-class destroyers will be put through major rehabilitation and modernization in 1964, completing the program of converting all those World War II destroyers which because of their size and condition would still be adequate in the early 1970's. The number of destroyer escorts is programed to increase and 10 of these ships are included in the 1964 budget.

We do not plan to start any more guided missile escort ships (DEG), although we had planned to add more of these ships in the program presented to the committee last year. The cost of the DEG has risen so rapidly that it has now priced itself out of the program. The DEG's in the 1962 program, for example, were estimated to cost about $31 million each, about $6 million more than a regular escort (DE). This year the Navy estimates that a DEG would cost about $11 million more than a DE. Since the DEG has only one TARTER launcher, the additional air defense capability which that launcher would provide would hardly be worth the $11 million cost differential. But even more important, the substantial increase in the number of guided missile destroyers will fully meet the Navy's requirement for missile ships of the destroyer and escort classes. Therefore, all future escort-type ships might best be specialized in the ASW role.

More DE's of the type now being constructed are programed for 1965, plus one new type escort specially designed from the keel up for antisubmarine warfare. This ship, included in the 1964 R. & D. program is still in the concept stage and the Navy has yet to develop the specifications. Generally, the new type would be faster and possibly somewhat smaller than those presently being built. By carefully integrating the electronics, sonar, armament, and ship control into a single system, the Navy believes that the manning requirement could be reduced below the current class of DE's. Because of the urgency of the ASW mission, and the promise held forth by the new concept, we have programed the first of these ships even though the detailed characteristics are still to be worked out.

Although we are planning to build additional large numbers of escorts, we are still quite uncertain as to the specific types.

In addition to the ASW escort I just described, the Navy has also proposed another new type which would be capable of carrying a manned ASW helicopter a development I alluded to in my dis