BADGES General Staff Identification Badge. Interests and hobbies: Fishing. Walking. Civic activities: Religion: Protestant. PERSONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL General WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it ista privilege to appear before your committee to amplify the remarks of Secretary McNamara and Secretary Vance. Although this is my first appearance before the House Armed Services Committee as Army Chief of Staff, I am keenly aware of the constancy with which the chairman and the committee have supported the requirement for a modern, effective, fully equipped Army. I want to express my personal appreciation to the committee in this regard. I also want to congratulate Congressmen Kilgore, Ichord, Foreman, Long, and Nedzi on their election to this committee. I assure them of my own assistance and the full cooperation of the Army in providing any information they may need in meeting their responsibilities to this committee and to the American people. My statement today will update the posture of the Army as it was reported to you last year. I have added certain objectives that the Army is pointing toward, and will comment on significant shortfalls as I now see them. The interests of this committee are so broad that I am certain my statement will leave many questions unanswered. I therefore consider your questions which will follow this statement to be part and parcel of a full appreciation of the current posture of the Army. I assure you that I welcome your questions, and I intend to answer them with complete candor and as fully as my professional knowledge permits. As we all know, one of the basic requirements for an effective Army is trained soldiers in adequate numbers. At the same time, an Army without equipment cannot expect to win on the battlefield no matter how well trained its manpower may be. Some of our equipment and personnel problems were highlighted during the Reserve callup accompanying the Berlin crisis in 1961 and the Cuban crisis of last fall. I am truly heartened by the improvement in the situation which will stem from the program we are presenting to you today. As I see it, the Army posture for any given year should be described in the light of where the Army is now, where we are going and how we are going to get there. There has been visible progress in Army readiness that is engendering a new spirit, an increased confidence and improved response within the Army. We are on the threshold of a truly significant improvement in the capacity of the Army as a guarantor of peace and security for our country. The sizable and needed progress realized so far gives the Army a compelling opportunity to move toward what I consider to be the Army's basic objectivecombat effectiveness. Essentially, the combat effectiveness I am looking for is a clear-cut ability to perform every Army task of response, opportunity, and initiative that Communist pursuit of world domination may create or offer. When I say "clear cut", I mean clear to friend and enemy alike. There can really be no middle ground in the face of an international situation wherein military force is a major element of the Communist program. The details of the threat have already been well covered by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor. The Army agrees with their conceptions of the threat, so I will not say any more about that now. I do want, however, at the outset of my remarks to make an observation concerning the Army posture to deal with the threat. The Communists have amply demonstrated their ability to create multiple crises in widely separated world areas. There are ever-increasing demands for Army ground combat power in its various forms. To thwart Communist efforts and to seize opportunities for support of U.S. policy, we require strong combat-ready deployed forces in or near potential trouble spots, backed up by regional reserves, and reinforced by a strong mobile central Reserve positioned within the United States. The Army posture should be most relevant to the likely threats. Communist bloc efforts very clearly will continue to be probes, tests, exploitation of weak spots, and efforts to divide. These will probably be bold and will be backed by impressive force. Given their careful calculation of risks, their emphasis on keeping events under control, and their preference for a blend of political and military action, they are likely to be attracted by other and more tempting programs short of nuclear war or events leading to it. If U.S. national policy is to deal with these efforts effectively; if we are to stop them; and if we are to create opportunities from them, the Army will have to provide a substantial part of the U.S. military power involved. We have to be able to apply effective counterpressure through the use of conventional forces short of situations of major attack where nuclear weapons might have to be used. Now I would like to discuss the forces currently available to the Army to reflect the capabilities we want to maintain. Major functional groupings of the Army's field establishment pro vide a convenient breakdown for this purpose. I will discuss each of the five functional groupings in turn in this order: Oversea deployments Strategic Reserve CONUS air defense Reserve Forces Special Action Forces First, Army oversea forces. The Army continues to maintain approximately 40 percent of its strength overseas as a positive contribution to forward strategy. The largest force maintained overseas is in Europe where the U.S. Army Europe supports our NATO agreements. The cutting edge of our forces in Europe consists of the five divisions and the supporting forces necessary to their combat missions. Two infantry and two armored divisions are positioned east of the Rhine River, and one infantry division is positioned west of the Rhine. A reconnaissance screen of armored cavalry regiments along the border between East and West Germany has the function of observing Communist movements and activities, of providing early warning in case of an imminent or actual attack, and of delaying the enemy if he does attack. The regiments are highly disciplined, have high morale, and have a sense of urgency about the mission with which they are charged. U.S. forces in Berlin, because of their physical separation from the main allied units in Europe and the importance of their mission, have developed a very high sense of duty and an awareness that they stand together with the other allied units in Berlin as a symbol of the free world. The U.S. forces in Berlin normally consist of two battle groups. Currently, however, there are three. In Italy, we have the Southern European Task Force, or Setaf, consisting of a command group and a medium missile command of two CORPORAL missile battalions. Since the beginning of the Berlin crisis in September 1961 the operational readiness of U.S. Army Europe has been greatly improved. During the buildup more than 40,000 individuals were sent to eliminate shortages in unit strengths. Since the peak of the buildup in Europe, a large percentage of these spaces have been returned to the Continental United States. One of the major improvements in Europe has been made in the modernization of equipment. All of 7th Army now has the new rifle and machinegun. New tanks and armored personnel carriers are replacing older models, the older jeeps are being replaced, and three infantry divisions have been mechanized by receipt of M113 armored personnel carriers. As a consequence, U.S. Army Europe today is better equipped and better trained for the European environment. During troop exercises we have proved our capability to reinforce rapidly the NATO defenses of Western Europe. For example, we have moved a battle group of the 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kans., to Frankfurt, Germany, in approximately 20 hours from the time of departure of the first aircraft from Fort Riley to the arrival of the last aircraft at Frankfurt, Germany. As in Europe, our Pacific Forces are trained and positioned to support U.S. policy. The major element here is the 8th Army in Korea. It consists of two divisions and limited supporting forces. There are a few logistic troops in Japan and in Okinawa. A separate airborne brigade in Okinawa provides Admiral Felt's Pacific Command with a quick reaction force. Another division located in Hawaii is the theater regional reserve. Our capability to operate on the mainland of southeast Asia has been improved by the substantial buildup in Army aircraft in Vietnam and the training exercises completed by two battle groups last year in Thailand. Our Pacific Forces are ready to do their job. In Alaska, we have two battle groups reinforced by appropriate artillery and engineer support and two NIKE-HERCULES battalions. These units, which we of course recognize would have to be reinforced in any emergency, have the primary role of defending the Alaskan land area against attack. In the Caribbean, the two battle groups stationed in the Canal Zone have been converted to our new ROAD brigade organization. To respond to crises in the increasingly volatile Latin American area, this new brigade has an airborne capability. A composite air defense battalion is also available for protection of the Panama Canal. No major changes are planned in our deployment situation during fiscal year 1964. Our deployments are tangible and credible evidence to our allies and our enemies alike that we are committed to the defense of the free world. Since World War II, armed Communist aggression has never been undertaken in the face of deployed U.S. Army combat forces. A crises could occur where U.S. forces are not already deployed, or it could occur in such a manner that our deployed forces would need rapid reinforcement. Therefore, a major requirement is a strong strategic reserve within the United States capable of rapid deployment in any direction. The eight Active Army divisions of the Strategic Army Force stationed in the Continental United States, the backbone of our backup strength, are adaptable to any type of conflict. All eight divisions and the available nondivisional support units are assigned to our two Strategic Army Corps. The XVIII Airborne Corps, which has been in existence for several years with headquarters at Fort Bragg, N.C., now includes four divisions-the 82d and the 101st Airborne Divisions and the 1st and 2d Infantry Divisions. The recently formed III Corps, with headquarters at Fort Hood, Tex., is now operational and includes the two new divisions activated last February. It is made up of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions, and the 4th and 5th Infantry Divisions. Having this two-corps strategic reserve force permits the Army greater flexibility. It provides for two mobile, hard-hitting corps, one that is essentially airborne, and another that is stronger in armor. Both corps could be deployed operationally, in conjunction with elements of the Tactical Air Command, under the direction of U.S. Strike Command, just as rapidly as the Air Force and the Navy can provide the transportation to move them. The Cuban situation provides an example of our employment of these ready corps. This example should be examined in the light of the overall Cuban situation, and the lesson to be learned by the Army. In my opinion, the major lesson for the Army in the Cuban situation lies in the demonstrated value of maintaining ready Army forces at a high state of alert in order to equip national security policy with the military power to make a direct confrontation of Soviet power. As Secretary McNamara pointed out to the NATO ministers recently, 66* * * perhaps most significantly, the forces that were the cutting edge of the action were the nonnuclear ones. Nuclear force was not irrelevant but it was in the background. Nonnuclear forces were our sword, our nuclear forces were our shield." I wholeheartedly agree with this statement. In the Cuban situation, the Army forces were alerted, brought up to strength in personnel and equipment, moved and made ready for the operation as part of the largest U.S. invasion force prepared since World War II. The Cuban enterprise was the largest operation ever planned to be launched and supported direct from the United States. Immediately after the Presidential announcement on October 22, 1962, the Army established a base command with support units in the Southeastern United States. We moved air defense missile units into the area from Fort Meade, Md., Fort Bliss, Tex., and Fort Lewis, Wash. The 1st Armored Division moved from field maneuvers at Fort Hood, Tex., to Fort Stewart, Ga. We also developed the necessary facilities and supply support structure to maintain the forces moved and to prepare for staging the remaining forces into the objective area. Some Active Army units committed to Cuba were not at initial optimum deployable strengths because of several reasons: the lack of sufficient personnel in the Active Army to maintain all units and activities at full strength; unprogramed requirements such as Vietnam; and the need to maintain oversea theaters as near full strength as possible. These problems notwithstanding the results here are plain: Army power provided indispensable support for effective national political action in the Cuban crisis. I want to turn now to the U.S. Army Air Defense Command. It contains over 24,000 troops from the Active Army and some 8,400 Army National Guardsmen, manning approximately 180 NIKEHERCULES and AJAX batteries and assisting in the defense of over 100 cities in the United States. The areas protected by Army air defense units are primarily centered on Strategic Air Command bases and metropolitan areas. These air defense missile units are operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Here, the Army National Guard units are an integral part of the Active Army in its operational air defense. By the end of fiscal year 1964, the Active Army will have turned over additional NIKE-HERCULES batteries to the National Guard. The Army National Guard is performing this mission in a most outstanding manner, and deserves great credit for its highcaliber professional effectiveness. In the world today our Reserve Forces should be more responsive to our military and foreign policy requirements through adoption of a structure specifically designed to accomplish two big tasks: First, to augment on short notice the Active Army during situations which require rapid but limited mobilization. Second, the Reserves should also provide the expandable base for large-scale mobilization. The realinement plan to make the Reserve component structure compatible with the changing structure of the Active Army includes the realinement of eight divisions and modernization of the nondivisional units in the structure. There is an increase in manning levels and improved readiness objectives. Units to reinforce the Active Army increase manning levels from 71 to 80 percent and readiness objectives reduce from 21 to 8 weeks. The manning levels for the six high-priority division forces likewise increase from 71 to 80 percent and readiness objectives reduce from 24 to 8 weeks. The two special mission divisions improve to a slightly lesser extent. The increase in manning levels has been made possible primarily as a result of the realinement of the eight divisions. This will also provide eight ROAD brigades to give additional flexibility to the structure. Reorganization does not affect the 700,000 programed strength of the Reserve components. The means for achieving the improved readiness objective are provided by the increase in manning levels, by an increase individual reinforcement participation in summer training, and by an increase in civilian technicians. In addition, controls have been established to require qualification of 90 percent of unit personnel in their military skills to make sure that qualified personnel are on hand in Reserve units. The Army is most appreciative of congressional interest and support regarding this plan. This has direct bearing on our combat effectiveness, because the realinement plan will make the Reserves more responsive to the pattern of the Active Army structure. |