at all times and at all places. Faulty techniques, error of judgment, impulsive statements, occasional excesses-these are bound to occur. As always in cases of inescapable overlappings of responsibility, the heads of affected agencies must apply judgment—a rule of reason. Such responsible heads can expect to receive the full cooperation of the military leadership in seeing to it that policies are obeyed and flaws are corrected. Accordingly, should departmental instructions be so phrased as unduly to prohibit desirable military participation in these educational efforts respecting the Communist menace, I suggest that your committee recommend their restudy with a view to appropriate revision. The Reds are well aware of the integrity, patriotic motives, and high qualifications of our military. I suspect they would be delighted if we should prevent such people from spreading the truth about Communist imperialism. Pertaining at least indirectly to this subject, I have heard of accusations alleging that military education is so narrow as to make service personnel incapable of grasping the whole complex of dangers confronting our country. It is hinted that the entire officer corps has become politically infected, and prone to be disloyal to the Commander in Chief. I, for one, want to be on record as expressing my indestructible faith and pride in our armed services-even though their loyalty, patriotism, and breadth of understanding need no defense from me or anyone else. The entire Nation, including the armed services, insists that in our free system military influence must be kept within proper constitutional, legal, and administrative bounds. Moreover, as mentioned in my final address as President, we must watchfully mind the military-industrial complex, for it tends to generate powerful economic and political pressures beyond the anticipations even of the participants themselves. But these are matters of proportion and sensible national leadership, requiring the same kind of continuing oversight and perspective that other major power groupings in our society, including business, labor, and government itself, require in the interest of keeping our system flexible, balanced, and free. In a half century of national service, I have yet to meet the American military officer who viewed himself as a budding Napoleon, or even a Rasputin, and I suggest it is worthy of note that in recent world history the three major dictators-Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin came from civil life. This fact does not warrant a general indictment of civilian motivation any more than one or two military extremists might warrant the absurdity that all the military harbors political designs dangerous to our constitutional form of government. I believe, therefore, that your committee will render valuable service by rejecting the recent spate of attacks upon the competence and loyalty of the military and by disapproving any effort to thrust them, so to speak, behind an American iron curtain, ordered to stand mutely by as hostile forces tirelessly strive to undermine every aspect of American life. I say, let our informed military speak, always under properly established policies and the general-not petty-supervision of their civilian superiors. Should they, here or there, speak or act partisanly, imprudently, or in contravention of national policies, then hold them directly accountable, for it is a function of command to keep military personnel properly respectful of the obligations of the uniform. At all events, I am certain of this: Give military leaders a lucid explanation of the Nation's policies, and they will, with rare and easily controllable exceptions, loyally perform. Generally in the same connection, I question the desirability of requiring the topmost Government officials, whether military or civilian, to submit their proposed public statements for what amounts to censorship of content-as distinguished from security matters-prior to their utterance. I am aware, in saying this, that procedures in my own and in the administration of my predecessor may have functioned in this way. But in thoughtful reassessment of this procedure, I incline to the view that when responsible and respected officials feel compelled to submit to censorship, we are smothering the concept of personal responsibility under a practice of heavy-handed and unjustified staff supervision. Responsible officials, when in doubt, will voluntarily "coordinate" proposed public statements within their own and sister departments so as to protect the Nation, their services, and themselves, but such voluntary coordination is some distance from censorship. I would hope that all who study this problem objectively will see the virtues of such a "cooperative" system as opposed to censorship, except, of course, where security is involved. I have always believed cials of great human organizations are far more important to success than are any number of arbitrary regulations and pedantic instructions. This is really the meaning of this letter. So viewing the problems before your subcommittee, I wish you and your colleagues well in your endeavor to maintain balance and good sense in respect to the matters receiving your current consideration. With warm regards. Sincerely, LOVETT STATEMENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. Senator STENNIS. As I said, this was addressed to the chairman of the subcommittee, and on behalf of the subcommittee I want to thank sincerely the former President and now General Eisenhower for his remarks and the trouble that he went to, to put them on paper. Now, in the same search for some responsible guidelines among those that have been down the road of duty and responsibility and experience with outstanding success, the chairman sought former Secretary of Defense Lovett on this mission, and Secretary Lovett was willing to send a statement and did send a statement. I think it, too, is of unusual value to the subcommittee. I think it highly deserves the time that it would take to read, and I, therefore, proceed with the statement now from former Secretary Robert A. Lovett. Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I have a request to make, and it might be in order to make it now while you are waiting for the stateinents. If I recall correctly, when Mr. Truman was President and Commander in Chief, he issued a directive that required all statements and speeches by the military to be cleared not only by the Defense Department, but by the State Department as well. If he has not been requested to do so, I would ask that the chairman request former President Truman to submit a statement for insertion in the record following President Eisenhower's statement on this subject. Senator STENNIS. All right, thank you, Senator Smith. May I proceed? Copies of this statement are on their way to the members. Senator JOHN STENNIS, NEW YORK, N.Y., January 16, 1962. Chairman, Special Preparedness Subcommittee, DEAR CHAIRMAN STENNIS: In reply to your letters of December 7, 1961, and January 6, 1962, I respectfully submit the attached memorandum in which I have attempted to respond to your request that I express any opinions or state any views I might hold, based on past experience, in certain areas which form a portion of the broader subjects your committee is studying. With warm personal regards, I am, Faithfully yours, ROBERT A. LOVETT. ROLE OF THE MILITARY SERVICES IN GOVERNMENT Memorandum for Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services Any examination of the appropriate role of the military in our Government must conclude, I believe, that the separation of the military and civilian functions is not only well established by custom and implicit in our Constitution itself but also that the subordination of the military to civilian authority is specifically established by the provision of the Constitution which makes the President the From this separation has grown one of our great national military traditions: that the military should be nonpolitical and that career military officers should stick to their demanding profession and take no part in partisan activities or become involved in discussions of our political issues. This well-established tradition, which has grown more important in this century, should, in my opinion, apply equally to the civilian heads of these departments while in office for many of the same reasons which apply to the military personnel. But, since World War II, there is a particular and an additional reason for observance of this tradition and it is of great importance. I refer to authorization by the Congress of the continued use of the absentee ballot for military personnel in reliance on the good faith of military and civilian superiors that the votes will not be influenced from Washington or by commanders in the field. I shall later refer to this quasi-trustee relationship in more detail. One of the great virtues of the removal of our professional military services from partisan politics is that it permits the President and the Senate, representing the country as a whole, to appoint professionally trained officers based solely on judgment as to what the man can do professionally rather than on what he has done politically. As a consequence, in time of war or of great national emergencies, both the Congress and the people have found it possible to trust our military implicitly and to turn to the military services for men who are above party and who, as professional military officers, serve no faction and no special cause and seek no political advantage. From the days of Cromwell, some of whose officers not only sat in Parliament but also dissolved it when Parliament failed to do their bidding, peoples whose form of government is based on Anglo-Saxon traditions and institutions have wisely insisted on separating the military and civilian arms of government. Although the lines between the military and civilian functions today are increasingly blurred and overlap because of new weapons of appalling destructiveness, the emergence of a new, competitive world power and disappearance of "splendid isolation," it seems important to retain the separation and to recall Professor Santayana's great warning, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING The primary function of career military officers in national policymaking, apart from their obvious administrative, staff and command responsibilities, is that of advising on military policies and of preparing detailed, strategic plans as part of the complex of specialized advice from which an overall national policy can be evolved. Their activities in their own professional field take place under the direction and control of the civilian head responsible for the Military Establishment and in accordance with instructions from the President. Therefore, when the governmental policy has been decided on, the President is entitled to expect from them more than the mere virtue of minding their own business. He is entitled to receive instant obedience and the loyalty which makes it their duty to avoid any activities which would tend to undermine the policies established by the Government of which the President is the head. There are appropriate places for debating the merits of a course of action before a decision is reached. Differences in points-of-view can be vigorously pressed at several levels-sometimes even to the point of causing exasperation. But these debates customarily take place on a confidential basis and differences are not to be aired in public while policy is being hammered out. As is known, the Constitution places a duty on the Congress "to raise and support" military forces and "to provide for the common defense," thereby imposing an obligation on the military establishments to respond to requests from the appropriate committees of Congress for such information as is necessary to enable the Congress to discharge its constitutional responsibility. The decisionmaking process was complicated beyond belief in World War II. It was frequently necessary for General Marshall to disagree strongly with courses of action advanced by foreign and domestic military and civilian officials with powerful political backing. These differences in points-of-view were aggravated by the fact that the war was global in character and that our allies were numerous and vocal. In these trying circumstances, General Marshall had a simple rule which earned him the admiration of his colleagues at home and abroad and the gratitude of his Commander in Chief as well. He felt that it was of cardinal as forcefully and persuasively as possible (but never in the form of "posterity papers") and that, if he was overruled and then felt that he could not loyally and in good conscience carry out the policy, he should resign. He said, "I think *** what we suffer at times * ** is the unwillingness of the individual to take issue on a confidential basis with his Commander in Chief. That is pretty hard to get people to do. There is where you state your case and put your own commission, or command, or position in peril * * *." But, when the policymaking discussions had been completed and the decision had been reached, General Marshall, having had his say, gave and required the most complete loyalty in carrying out the policy which had been established. He said "when the Chief of Staff of the Army sets an example to the whole Army by disloyalty to his Chief and superior, who is the Secretary of the Army, he has just about ruined the Army, in my opinion." He pointed out "you (as a general) preach loyalty all the time. You are dealing with an organization where a man receives an order, from even a captain, which leads to his death or his wound and he has to obey that order. He doesn't debate it. He obeys it and that has to be instinctive. Now, if the example at the top is contrary to that, then you have got a very serious situation." When entering the armed services, military officers voluntarily forgo certain privileges retained by civilians who are not members of a disciplined arm of government, and I cannot see how there can be any reasonable justification for the career officer attempting to influence elections or taking part in political activities, either domestic or foreign. These seem properly to be the sole responsibility of governmental officials of the legislative, executive, or judicial branches, who are specifically chosen by the people and put into office as their representatives. In this connection, it is worth remembering that the military officer holds his commission by selection and not by election. NEW RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MILITARY SERVICES I have mentioned above in earlier paragraphs the conviction that military professionals should be contributors to and not deciders of final national policies and have tried to emphasize that they are trained to carry out such political policy but not expected to originate it. It is appropriate now to consider certain enlarged responsibilities placed on the military by force of circumstances, including technological advances, vastly improved communications and annihilation of distance, and the emergence of a formidable, aggressive-minded world power to threaten us with premature burial, over which it hopes to preside. All of these matters have a direct and potent effect on the major responsibility of the military in connection with raising, training and putting into the field combat-worthy fighting men. A new and increasing emphasis is placed on the necessity for proper education and indoctrination of military personnel, both active and reserve, bearing most directly on the performance of troops in the field and on occupational duty. Thus, a heavy and continuing duty is laid upon military officers to discuss with troops under their command not only the use of increasingly complicated weapon systems but also certain forms of psychological warfare, brain washing techniques, etc., and the characteristics, tactics and wholly different philosophy of communism and of our potential enemy. This has become an important part of protection of troops from insidious methods of modern warfare. Admittedly, the problem is complicated by the fact that there can be questions of judgment as to what is both effective and appropriate in exposing the communist devices-particularly, their use of deceit and perfidy as part of their normal foreign policy. It is hard to do this job of exposure by use of the easily available incidents and at the same time avoid completely the rocks and shoals of comment on political beliefs which may be held by some groups in this country. But I think it can be done. It will probably require the use of carefully worked-out programs, outling a series of curriculums suitable for all units of the military establishments, and prepared with the approval of the responsible military officers in command of the troops and public officials of the military departments. It does not seem to me to be either necessary or feasible to draw too sharp a line in such cases but, with appropriate forewarning and reasonable guidelines, it would appear possible to set standards which will permit the avoidance of pitfalls. Troop training and indoctrination is, however, a far simpler subject to deal with than your question of "what is the proper function of the military in public that both the military and civilian personnel of the Depatrment of Defense should hold their public speeches to a minimum and in them deal largely with facts in the area of their direct responsibility. I cannot escape the feeling that, as a government, we tend to talk too much. To be sure, we are an open society but we give the impression of being unbuttoned. Military officers on active duty in particular should, in my opinion, restrict themselves to informing the public on matters for which responsibility is placed on them by the Department of Defense and should, as indicated in earlier paragraphs, exercise care not to express partisan views or take positions contrary to the approved national political policy. I have mentioned what seems to me to be the necessity for some system of overall review by the responsible top level departmental officials because the military clearly face a considerable problem in walking the thin line between obvious military matters and those having important bearing on the conduct of troops on foreign duty which would appear to involve, to some extent at least, discussion of relations with the foreign country acting as host or under occupation. Correct conduct of our troops, for example, in West Berlin, or west Germany, becomes of the greatest importance if serious incidents arising out of carelessness or ignorance are to be avoided. The troops are, therefore, necessarily forewarned of the customs, habits, and sensitivity of the country involved, as well as the provocations, incitements, and similar traps which the enemy may be expected to spring in order to cause dissension and unrest. At this point we enter the sensitive area of "review," "clearance,” “evaluation," et cetera, which have always been a red rag to a bull. It has usually seemed to me that the rag looked redder to the bulls outside the services than to those in them. If we are not to have four military services going their divergent ways and adding to public confusion concerning our foreign policy or some pending domestic matter, it seems entirely reasonable to me to require some form of higher level clearance applicable to military officers and civilian officials alike. The crux of handling the problem, in my opinion, lies in the quality, proven judgment, and attitude of the individual who must do the reviewing. I believe the checking should be done at the highest and most experienced level available. If the clearance or evaluation is done routinely, or at some relatively low level, or by someone or a group who gives the impression of being unsympathetic, arbitrary, or power-proud, cries of "censorship" will be deafening. I do not propose to add to the scar tissue I have acquired in former jousts in this field by now venturing to discuss the limits of "free speech" by those in national service. I certainly cannot state them or precisely define them. But most people will admit that some limit must exist. I merely point out now that I believe that, in the military services, duty and loyalty impose one such limit even if self-restraint and good taste did not. PRACTICAL REASONS FOR RESTRAINT ON CERTAIN SUBJECTS There are at least two reasons, as mentioned earlier in this memorandum, why partisan views on political issues have, in the past, been considered improper subjects for education of troops. The first of these is one mentioned earlier: the fact that the Congress and the Defense Department have continued the use of the absentee ballot by soldiers on active service abroad, relying on and trusting in the traditional attitude of the professional military and particularly of the commanding officers that the services will take no part in partisan politics and will do nothing to influence the vote one way or the other. Secretary Stimson during World War II, drawing on his knowledge of the Army gained from his tenure of the Secretary of War position under President Taft and his knowledge of foreign policy gained as President Hoover's Secretary of State, said in September 1943, in speaking of the War Department's reaction against political activities of Army officers: "That policy is founded upon the fundamental concept that it would undermine the sound theories of democracy to permit military personnel to take advantage of their service by appealing for election to civil office, and that it would be plainly incompatible with the effective fighting of the war to allow members of the Armed Forces to divide their energies between military duty and any outside interest, whether political, business, or professional. * * * * * "The existence of the prohibition against political activities by military personnel is not new to the Military Establishment. The policy of the War Depart |