ing here and giving your frank and courageous testimony. And again I want to commend you.

Colonel MAYER. Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND. That is all I have.

CHAIRMAN'S COMMENTS ON MAYER'S TESTIMONY

Senator STENNIS. Colonel, I think your testimony has been very helpful to us. My impression is that you have tried to outline the problem as you see it. Based on your experience and your convictions. ideas, I think you have tried to make constructive suggestions, and that is what the country needs, not noise but basic, tangible, practical suggestions. It is something that will meet the problem and help bring about a solution.

I think you have been helpful in that way. As I have said to many officers before, I certainly trust that your testimony will not in any way injure your career, and I do not believe it will. I think you have summed it up better than anybody else could when you said that some will not agree and some will be angry. But at the same time, an officer's career is a very broad matter and it is considered on a broad scale, as I understand it.

Colonel MAYER. Yes, sir, that is true.

Senator STENNIS. And if you keep trying and are sincere and are a good soldier, I think you will have proper consideration.

All right, now, subject to seeing the film, as I understand it, the subcommittee has completed the colonel's testimony.

You are excused, sir.

We shall be glad to have anybody who wishes to go to the other room and view this film. It will take about 20 minutes.

Tomorrow, the subcommittee will convene at 9:30 in the morning and General Marshall will be the witness. He has a statement which has been filed and distributed to the subcommittee.

I believe we are going to have to firm up something in the way of rules, and I invite suggestions so that we can work out something that will be helpful to the subcommittee members, the witnesses, the press, and the public.

We are adjourned until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

(Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Thursday, March 15, 1962.)

The special subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:40 o'clock a.m., in the caucus room, Old Senate Office Building, Senator John Stennis (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Jackson, Thurmond, Bartlett, Saltonstall, and Smith.

Also present: Special subcommittee staff: James T. Kendall, chief counsel.

Senator STENNIS. Let the subcommittee come to order, please. General Marshall, you were here with us yesterday at which time you were sworn.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator STENNIS. We had another witness then, and you were kind enongh to wait the entire day for which we are grateful. We also appreciate your being here this morning. We are starting a little earlier than usual, but we have the pressure of important matters on the Senate floor as well as other committee meetings.

MARSHALL BIOGRAPHY

You have a prepared statement for which we thank you. We had the benefit of it yesterday, and a chance to look it over during the evening. We have a biographical sketch of General Marshall, Mr. Reporter, which you will put in the record at this point. (The biographical sketch follows:)

BIOGRAPHY OF BRIG. GEN. SAM L. MARSHALL

Mobilization Designation as Deputy Chief, Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army

General Marshall enlisted in the Army in 1917. Appointed a second lieutenant of infantry in the Officer Reserve Corps in 1918 while serving with the AEF in France, his assignments have included command of Depot Service Companies 10 and 64 in 1919 in France. His service during the 1920's included duty with the Texas National Guard.

He entered on extended active duty in September 1942, in grade of major to become Officer in Charge, Orientation and Publications Branch, Special Services Division, War Department. His subsequent assignments have included duty as Chief Combat Historian of the central Pacific area in 1943, Deputy Theater Historian in the European theater of operations in 1944. He was appointed Theater

Historian in April 1944, and by subsequent orders, named Chief Historian of Theater and of the Armies of Occupation.

Relieved from active duty in May 1946, General Marshall was recalled frequently to active duty with the General Staff of the Department of the Army during the period 1946-50. During 1950-51, he was assigned to Korea as infantry-artillery operations analyst, which entailed duty with infantry line regiments. He has also served as lecturer at the Command and General Staff College, National War College, Army War College, Air University, the Infantry School, and the Armor School. He returned to Korea in 1953 in the capacity of war correspondent.

Decorations and awards: Legion of Merit; Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster; World War I Victory Medal; Army of Occupation of Germany Medal; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal; European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal; Korean Service Medal; United Nations Service Medal; Combat Infantryman Badge; French Legion of Honor, Croix de Guerre with Palm, and Ordre d'Armee; Belgian Order d'Leopold with Palms, and Ardennes Medal; Italian Croci di Guerra, and Fatique de Guerra; Ethiopian Combat Medal.

Civil affiliations: Member, Army Historical Advisory Committee; Army Public Relations Committee; Michigan Civil Defense Committee; Board of Trustees. Detroit Chapter, American Red Cross; U.S. Chamber of Commerce (National Defense Committee); Sons of the American Revolution; American Legion; Veterans of Foreign Wars; Board of Advisers, Association of the U.S. Army.

Civilian occupation: Editorial writer and military critic, Detroit News; his books include: "Blitzkrieg," "Island Victory," "The Mobility of One Man," "The Armed Forces Officer," "Armies on Wheels," "Critique of Weapons and Tactics in Korea," "Tactics in Defense Against Atomic Attack," "Pork Chop Hill," "The River and the Gauntlet," "Bastogne," "Men Against Fire," "Makin," and "Hill 440." He is also the author of numerous official military texts and manuals and is a contributor to national publications on military subjects.

MARSHALL STATEMENT

Senator STENNIS. All right, if the subcommittee members are ready, General Marshall will proceed with his statement.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. S. L. A. MARSHALL, U.S. ARMY RESERVE (RETIRED)

General MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman and Senators, it would be better if I did not repeat in my direct statement anything that I have said in the printed statement, and I would try to limit myself to those things in my experience which would give you some idea of why I have arrived at my viewpoints and why I feel that my data are very germane to this investigation.

Senator STENNIS. General, pardon me, just a moment.

We have learned by experience here. We think it is better for you to read your statement.

General MARSHALL. You want me to read it, sir?

Senator STENNIS. Yes, I really want you to. It won't take long, and that will serve as the launching pad, so to speak, for your testi

mony.

General MARSHALL. All right, but I will have to go into some other matters that are collateral in order to amplify it.

Senator STENNIS. We understand that fully, of course.

General MARSHALL. I am well aware that I was called here mainly because, while I respect wholly Colonel Mayer's patriotism and profes sional attainments, I do not agree with his broad conclusions and have

The issue is much too important that my personal opinions or those of any other person should concern you or have any influence on the national policy. There is a great body of data on this subject. It should be carefully reviewed and out of that review, the correct answers will come forth.

I cannot imagine anything worse for this country than an unjustified lamenting, a beating of breasts about failure and weakness in the American character or a mistaken evangelism which pleads for the saving of that which has not yet been lost. If I were today convinced that American youth of military age were as derelict and characterless as the worst pessimists have proclaimed it, though I might say so here, I would be loath to suggest how this story might be put before the country to serve a constructive end. It promotes a limitless danger.

A great nation may not be told: "You are weak. Your young people were proved unfit for war. There is no hope for you but to start anew," without blighting its own power while renouncing pretension to greatness. Yet words of this kind have been spoken and reiterated ever since the Korean conflict.

Something should be said of my own credentials and experience. I am a writer and operations analyst. My whole life has been devoted to these activities. In World War I, I was in combat 6 months in France as an engineer sergeant and infantry second lieutenant. I didn't learn very much.

From 1922 onward, I have applied myself unremittingly to the study of war, and more specifically, to the analysis of the human equation in combat, with particular emphasis on Americans, though I have also worked with foreign troop bodies. Either as a soldier or war correspondent, I have gone to 13 wars and some smaller actions; as a soldier, I have had 15 campaigns wherein I worked forward of regimental headquarters in line outfits.

It is of record that I have dealt with a greater number of American troops in combat than anyone at any time. Finally, I have worked with POW's of many nations over the years. This line of work has continued until now.

Recently, I have been with U.N. forces in the Congo, the Israeli Army, and the Defense Forces in West Germany, making a study in depth at the request of Minister Strauss. Still more recently, I have been with the Canadian Army, witnessing its new programs, and have visited special forces and the 82d Division at Fort Bragg.

In World War II, I was first combat historian of the Central Pacific theater for 10 months, then chief historian of the European theater for 2 years. The titles are somewhat misleading. While in the Pacific, I pioneered the system which we used to evaluate our forward firepower and the effectiveness of our tactics. There was no way to apply it except to be with fighting troops. Then, having learned by that experience that the subject we know least about is the quality of the American fighter, I stayed with troops, and left the administrative load to my subordinates.

In that war, more than 600 rifle companies, tank outfits, and artillery batteries, in or fresh out of combat, passed through my hands that I might evaluate their effectiveness. My data is based only on opera

tions with which I was personally identified. It includes every unit which hit Normandy on D-Day.

In Korea, I was called first as infantry operations analyst for the Eighth Army, doing that work in 1950-51. The battle in the North which we lost was my first laboratory, my initial work being to determine the combat methodology of the Communist Chinese, next to report wherein our own system was weak and how it might be improved. I went to Korea for a second tour in 1953. The fight was still on. My ticket read that I was a correspondent. But immediately that I arrived, Gen. Mark W. Clark called me to a military job-to supervise censorship at Operation Little Switch, advise and assist in the interrogations of returning prisoners and help guide certain high-level decisions contingent on that operation.

Thereafter I was given a second military job-analyzing our patroling and establishing a new school so that we could regularize it across the front and keep the patrols accountable. Between these two tours, I covered the fighting operations of another 200 or so companies mainly Americans soldiers and marines, but also Ethiopians, ROK's, Turks, and the British.

Looking back over 45 years of it, the memory I most prize is the American soldier on that long retreat out of North Korea. That was in December 1950.

The shattered rifle companies among which I moved had been cut to 15 or 20 men by death and wounds; that means that 150 men had been killed in the average company during the preceding 5 days.

It was my task to determine how they and the nonsurvivors had acquitted themselves. We kept at the work. Then when I had learned what I needed to know, invariably some private or sergeant would speak up saying, "Now, Colonel, we have a question for you. What's wrong with the country, with MacArthur, with this command! Hasn't anybody got any guts any more? We can whip these s.o.b.'s. Why don't they turn us around?"

While I had no answer for them, I was aware that I was hearing from the average American soldier in Korea. Yet in the years that followed, I heard this man and his comrades vilified as weaklings unworthy of their country, simply because the more luckless of their number, taken prisoner, thrown into a situation for which they were in no way prepared, did not all acquit themselves like Nathan Hale. This is a perversion of history, and I deny emphatically that the record has any such sinister significance.

It would be intolerable to defend, on the score of ignorance, illness, or cowardice, the treasonable and depraved conduct of the worst actors among them. Certainly many were derelict without excuse, craven with reason. But it is less tolerable and a crime against ourselves that, because a relatively few under trial were found griev iously wanting, all who suffered with them should be slandered, the great Army with which they fought should be besmirched and we should be asked to look askance at a whole generation of young Americans. Yet this canard is recurrent in our literature.

On getting this call, I did not have time to prepare graphs and research statistics. I must recall from memory the general impressions deriving from the body of data; some years have passed since I did