POW's in Korea almost exactly equals the figure which the FBI says is shiftless, mean, and lawbreaking within our society.

Military service and prison camp rigor-will not make a silk purse of a sow's ear. More Americans were decorated for courageous and steadfast conduct in the Korean camps than ever were investigated under suspicion that they criminally had disgraced the uniform. I am not speaking here of the boy who merely attended indoctrination classes and let himself be dragooned into marching in a peace parade or was too inclined to hobnob with his captors for the sake of currying favor, though he spilled no military secrets. Such marginal misbehavior as these things constitute are not the way of the ideal American soldier. But they are not high crimes, and while they cannot be condoned under our military code, what they signify deserves better understanding than we yet have given it.

Men are not alike. They vary greatly in their ability to withstand torture, starvation, mortal terror, chronic illness, cold, and going unloved. I know how easy it is to gain credit for extraordinary endurance when in fact one is not even tried. Each of us has some of that natural strength of body and spirit with which the Creator endowed us; the most fortunate of us was fortified for living by the love, resolution, and teaching of our parents, professors, and the Samaritans met on life's journey.

Our profiles come of the space others grant us. This is true of men everywhere. But we know that the services have to take people as they come. It is too late then for the transforming of character, as Colonel Mayer well pointed out yesterday.

The remarkable thing is that so many make a normal adjustment to military disciplines, when so little has been demanded of them earlier, and still less given of ideal teaching, example in leading the strong life, and loving tenderness. Yet at least these disciplines are positive, and supported by tradition and law, they become readily acceptable to the individual, because the choice is one of conforming or bucking the rhythm of the crowd.

Yet what the man comes to do by the numbers as a soldier, airman, or marine is not transferable to his POW situation, because, of a sudden, he is left without moral props. The forms of organization are swept clean. There is no authority on which to lean except that of the enemy. He must either rise to greater heights of manhood as a prisoner under the sword of adversity than he reached as a warrior under fire, or become a deadweight on every volunteer who is trying to create a new unity out of the most terrible of conditions.

Can we count it remarkable that the greater number is not capable of meeting the emergency as reborn rugged individualists? If the ordeal of prison camp could do this for the mass-make men transcend their own natures-it would be the most helpful of all universities. Without a methodology by which a new leadership will assert itself, whereby a new discipline has a chance to restore the vitality of human organization, the weak must inevitably relapse into stagnant pools, lost and hopeless. Under sustained, inordinate pressure, the truly strong among us may see mainly a challenge to their own fortitude. But here we are not speaking of the majority of men-Americans or

This is what we did for 10 years prior to Operation Big Switch, by which the Korean prisoners were returned to us.

If what we then learned about POW performance in Korea is somewhat soul shocking, it is time that it also rested with full weight on the American conscience. The score was the direct consequence of our institutional carelessness. In 1943, in other words, midway in World War II, we set about the indoctrination of enemy POW's. I know the date because I wrote the plan.

But we should have known when we started that we had no copyright on this idea. As a matter of fact, it was our study of the interrogations by the Russians of German prisoners and their harsh methods that started us on our way toward indoctrination. What we singularly failed to do was give any consideration to the better preparation of our forces so that they might withstand the totalitarian indoctrination or inquisitor who would not be merely ingenious but barbarous. We learned during World War II that 96 percent of all troops of whatever nation-when taken prisoner, must sooner or later find emotional release in talk. Man is a gregarious animal. He must communicate.

Yet we went into Korea still giving troops that business about "name, rank, and serial number" only which implied that if a man talked to his captor about his children, he was somehow being disloyal to the United States. In our way, we were as shortsighted as the Japanese, who couldn't instruct a soldier how to behave as a prisoner because it was against the code to be captured.

Now I turn to the heart of the matter. I have been seeing American forces in battle since 1918. General Pershing's AEF, to those who served in it, was a great army; we never thought we'd see a better

army.

With the exception of a few divisions, the World War II armies seemed not to match it in morale, zeal, and effective use of weapons. Too soon, I concluded on the basis of the evidence which I had compiled, that something had slipped in the American character. Later I knew that was all wrong; the weakening had been in the training system; underestimating our human material, the powers had not put a sufficient demand upon it. Changes were made and we began to get better results.

Then along came the new war over there and the 8th Army, as it found its stride in late 1950, proved to be the strongest fighting force I have known in American uniform. In loyalty, willingness to take risks in battle and strong application of firepower, the 1950-53 troops in Korea were superior to army forces in the earlier wars of this century. If we can continue to mature the same kind of fighters that we had over there we have no reason to doubt the future.

My connections with the present military code of conduct came of the experiences earlier discussed. In the end, I was the penman of the subcommittee which drafted the code.

The language is my language; the body of ideas was the work of the President's Commission which probed the problem, called the witnesses, heard from the experts and decided what should be done.

This last task was merely an exercise in rhetoric. Much earlier I had written a staff study on the program, before the Commission was

operations at Stead Air Force Base, Nev., done for the late Secretary Donald Quarles. That paper is still classified because it alludes to several very sensitive top-secret matters. But it discusses broadly why things happened as they did in the Korean camps and what lessons were to be drawn from the experience. The study went before the Commission among many papers. While such men as composed that Commission guide on their own stars, it suffices to say that finally their views generally coincided with my own. By that chance, I was called as the final witness that together, through interrogation, we could develop additional ideas in support of what we contended.

I now get down to that. My basic proposition was that the performance of Americans in combat-not their conduct in prison camps where their captors violated every civilized precept-was the true test of military character. That being so, the battle record of the 8th Army and what we knew of its individual fighter, should be a tonic to our faith.

In wars of this century, the American in battle has stayed the course, exhibiting no proneness to surrender in groups of any size, save when every alternative was foreclosed. It was my view that the Korea POW showing was neither better nor worse than what we should have anticipated, our own default considered.

I concluded that it was not a national disgrace, that its negative aspects had been overpublicized and in some instances distorted far beyond the statistical proof. These few words are the epitome of the 17-page study I wrote for the Commission but I would ask you to look again at the Commission's printed report. It is barren of lurid language. There is not a despairing note in it. There is far more of praise for the splendid example of the strong than of repining over the regrettable derelictions of the weak. It, too, took the view that the system had to be repaired and the accompanying philosophy made more enlightened, because in their shortcomings was the root of much of the failure that had occurred. These were views that were emphasized by Colonel Mayer yesterday.

There are enough problems without having to engage specters. As to our military manpower, I feel that standards fall short of what is needed for national safety. The training grind-there are marked exceptions in some commands; for instance, in the Senator from South Carolina's old division, the 82d, the training grind needs to be intensified. More night exercises and off-reservation hardening should be required.

Some top-level commanders stay too remote from troops-the men scarcely know them, but what is far worse, leadership loses touch with the nature of ranks, which is the sine qua non of command power. In far too many policy pronouncements, and again I think Colonel Mayer called attention to this yesterday, there is so much accent on fantastic weapons and too little on the indispensability of a broadened national training base and the vitalizing of a national fighting spirit.

Indoctrination-that is, ideological indoctrination-I do not regard as a substitute for, or complement of, any part of the basic school of the soldier. When troops are well trained for their fighting task, and know it, their minds are plastic, and they are receptive to this

whet the fine edge of unit and individual keenness. But if they are only half made as soldiers, and are aware of it, that kind of teaching is resented as an intrusion and an affront to dignity. These are but a few of the reasons why I feel that the regulating of such programs is best confided to military professionals. There are some theoretical arguments on the other side but I have found them the best judges of what is appropriate according to the hour and the state of training. Now, this hastily written document, I would like to supplement with just a few points.

RÉSUMÉ OF MARSHALL'S MILITARY SERVICE AND EXPERIENCE

Senator STENNIS. I was going to say you can now enlarge on that or add to it in any way you wish.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, I have no credits in formal scholarship.

Senator STENNIS. Would you put your microphone a little closer! General MARSHALL. Right, sir.

I have no formal scholarship to bring before you. Such degrees as I have were never earned. They were just handed to me on a platter. The Army was my university; that is where I learned to do things and I have been in and out of it so many times that by the people in the Army, I am regarded as a civilian, and to civilians on the outside, I am thought of as a soldier.

And I would just like to correct the statement here that I am U.S. Army retired. This is not true, and it should be made clear to this subcommittee that I am a USAR, retired.

In other words, I do not come to you as a professional soldier.
Can you hear me now, sir?

Senator STENNIS. I think it is all right. I can hear you and I think the press can.

General MARSHALL. I first enlisted in the Army at age 16 and went overseas. After returning to the United States, 4 years following the war-I had been twice a company commander in Europe during the war, and then I became a company commander both in the Reserve and National Guard-I resigned by commission and spent 5 years as a private in the National Guard for one reason only: I thought that the thing that I wanted to do most was to study more about command relationships from the lowest level.

I had tried that when I was an enlisted man before I was commissioned in France, and I felt that this was one of the things we in the Army needed to know more about; certainly I needed to know more about it to further my education in military affairs.

When World War II came along, I was no longer connected with the service in any way and I was called back as expert consultant to Mr. Stimson, called back

Senator STENNIS. What year was that, please?

General MARSHALL. This was in June 1942, sir, a few months after Pearl Harbor-I was called back as an expert consultant to Mr. Stimson and the only reason that I was called back was because by that time two of my books on military history were being used in

there had come to the Pentagon; this was Col. Lyman Munson and he was in general charge of information programs.

The reason that I am referring to this is because all of the information and indoctrination programs stemmed initially from my office. When I was asked to go into uniform after 2 months with Mr. Stimson, I was asked to go in as the first Chief of Orientation of the Army. "Orientation" is simply another word for indoctrination; I set up the courses of indoctrination in the first year of the war prior to my bailing out to go into the Historical Division.

Now, we had relatively a small staff of officers at that time, and we had practically no interference. There was no censorship upon us, and there was no list of coordinating committees that we had to go through to get our stuff reviewed, and I am frank to say that had there been such an apparatus as exists now we would never have been able to get our materials out of Washington.

This would be my severest complaint of the present system. It wouldn't work in wartime. Everything has become so complicated by way of clearance that the system would have to be swept aside should we get into a great emergency.

In those days we didn't have it. Indoctrination was not considered a political question. It first came about in this way-the press became very much agitated because dealing with American soldiers, correspondents found that the American soldier interviewed said he didn't know anything about his cause; therefore, the clamor arose in the press, and the military response to it was to set up a new policy, and this was the beginning of indoctrination of the American Armed Forces.

Gen. George C. Marshall wrote the first directive; oddly enough if you go back to that paper, you will see in the paper the marks of his own career and the breadth of his thinking. It was not done by a staff subordinate. These were his own ideas, and he pointed out two ways in which the general staff could proceed. There was the broad avenue of informing soldiers on their own business, to increase their military and their fighting efficiency. And the other narrower line was that of informing them about their cause, in order to improve their minds, to whet their zeal, and so on. General Marshall pointed out in that directive that it was up to the general staff to determine which one of these approaches should be accented and how the program should be balanced. It might be exclusively one or the other; or it might be a combination of the two things.

I was brought into the Army to interpret that directive and to organize the initial programs, to get us in business, as it were. In the year that followed, almost as a first duty, I wrote the doctrine which guided us in World War II. It is a manual that is still in being in that nothing has superseded it yet. But the manual set forth the general philosophy of the Army and the ideas that should control all of our information programs.

Initially, the task of informing soldiers overseas had been confided to Elmer Davis as head of the OWI.

Through negotiations with Elmer Davis in person, I got that purview away from him, pointing out to him that this was not a proper function for a civilian agency, that it had to be left to commanders.