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My view, in general, is that our laws covering such matter are adequate. They should, however, be kept under continuous review and improvements enacted as the need becomes apparent. The interpretation and administration of these laws are equally important. Problems such as what does and does not constitute legitimate classified matter require constant attention.

It is difficult to administer laws like these without getting involved in some form of review or censorship of what is being said by others. For example, there cannot be "security review" without the reviewer forming opinions and, in some cases, passing judgments. In any system of "security review" the judgment as to what is a security violation and what is a permissible statement is made by the reviewing officer, rather than the author, who may have had years more experience in positions of responsibility than the individual reviewing his proposed speech or article.

One of the difficulties is that the actual review, or censoring, is often done by subordinates. They do not always have the experience, judgment, or exact viewpoint even of their immediate civilian superiors in the Department of Defense. The system itself is imperfect. The review will aways be influenced by opinions. There is always the natural human tendency to be unsympathetic with views which do not coincide with your own.

Censorship affects the conduct of an organization's internal affairs as well as those matters made available to public scrutiny. Where censorship receives too much emphasis, it affects the attitudes of people involved in many ways. It tends to discourage juniors from questioning the views of superiors and makes it more difficult to initiate critical reviews of established policies. People may become docile and inclined to "go along," and less willing to raise questions which may rock the boat. Disputes are avoided, unpleasant facts are deemphasized. News released tends to be good news, pleasant news, sugarcoated news. Important mistakes can go undetected and unremedied and gradually become compounded-until a serious crisis develops― and then it is too late.

These are some of the dangers which are associated with curtailment of freedom of speech and censorship. The difficult problem in this area, and one which requires continuous attention, is how to do what is necessary in a way which minimizes or avoids the obvious evils.

Freedom of speech is a responsibility as well as a right. It functions best when the individual himself is held responsible for what he says. A man is on most solid ground when he speaks publicly of matters on which he is a recognized authority. He is on shaky ground, and it usually hurts him personally, when he attempts to speak publicly of matters on which he is not an authority. Again, this brings me back to an earlier point. The military today must develop an increasing knowledge in fields other than military technology and tacties. At the same time, the military must apply self-discipline in fields where they have knowledge but not a lifetime of experience. Let me make some specific points.

First, the ultimate vehicle for comment on official policy by a military leader is in answering questions before a congressional commit

Congress has the right to know. The restraints on public speeches have to be different than restraints on congressional testimony, and yet statements made to Congress and statements made in public speaking must be consistent for men of integrity.

Second, in public speaking, there is indeed a question over what constitutes proper discussion of a military man on a foreign policy matter. Certainly current policy on Berlin is foreign policy and what a military man should say about Berlin is a matter of judgment. He must be very careful not to say anything which could do harm to our country.

And this leads to the third point. There must be a degree of academic freedom allowed in the war colleges, in the service journals, and in academic journals when the military might contribute. It was in part due to the writings of Adm. A. T. Mahan that our country was as well prepared as it was for World War I. Let us not restrain any future Mahans. Often far-thinking officers in such writings sow the seeds for important new doctrines.

In sum, I doubt if it is possible to prescribe a rigid set of rules which can insure what and how the various elements should accomplish their jobs without at the same time reducing the initiative and virility of those elements.

A virile democracy requires vigorous, enthusiastic, energetic officials throughout. With this type of official, there are bound to be differences of opinion, even occasional errors in judgment. But none of those mistakes made by vigorous people, eager to serve the U.S. Government, will be as great as those mistakes which would be made by a docile group of officials whose main interest is to conform.

Our constitutional form of government has great strength because of our constitutional system of checks and balances as well as our constitutional system of civilian control over the military.

The ultimate responsibility for the effectiveness of our constitutional government rests in the hands of Congress.

The challenge before this committee is great. The precedents of the past are not fully adequate for the problems of the future. Men of good will must face these problems and in these perilous times see how best to meet the complexities of the struggle we are in, how best to insure that the military in our free society can be developed to make the maximum contributions to their country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That ends my statement.
Senator STENNIS. I thank you, Admiral Burke.

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING SCHEDULED

Members of the subcommittee, may we consider a matter here? It is now almost 20 minutes to 1 o'clock. There is a vote scheduled in the Senate at 2 o'clock on a motion to recommit the bill that is being debated.

If that motion does not prevail, then the unanimous consent rule will continue with the limitation of 2 hours of debate, the first amendment being the Gore amendment, so it is expected there will be a vote around 4:30 to recommit.

Now, if the full Committee on Armed Services is having Secretary McNamara this afternoon, and the information is that they expect him at 2 o'clock, that evidently means after the vote.

If we could, it seems to me that we ought to try to finish with

mittee? Does any member of the subcommittee have a special desire or a special request?

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, this is not a special request; however, as one member of the Armed Services Committee, before which the Secretary of Defense is scheduled to appear this afternoon, I would feel a little bit easier in my own mind if we took the opportunity to listen to him rather than to have this subcommittee in session when he is testifying before the full committee.

Therefore, I would be embarrassed, I think, to return here this afternoon if Secretary McNamara is going to testify before the full committee.

Senator STENNIS. Does anyone know whether or not the Secretary is almost through?

Senator CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say he has about 25 more pages of his prepared statement to read, and I do not know how long the questions will take.

Senator STENNIS. Some members may have special questions they want to ask him about this very voluminous statement.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, would it be convenient for Admiral Burke to return at a later time?

Senator STENNIS. Admiral, could you return in the morning? Admiral BURKE. I have a very important engagement, the first meeting as a director in New York tomorrow, sir. I would like to attend that in the morning. I can be back here in the afternoon.

Senator STENNIS. It seems to me, if any of the members want to question Secretary McNamara on his statement-Senator Symington, do you have a position on that?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, my position is the same as that of Senator Saltonstall.

Senator STENNIS. My judgment is, members of the subcommittee, that there will be several votes this afternoon. Secretary McNamara is giving the full statement, on very important matters in the budget and the whole military program. I think not only in deference to him, but in consideration of committee responsibility it is important that members of the full committee, including members here, have a chance to ask all the questions that they might wish. Anyway, the voting would virtually kill a chance to have very much of a session this afternoon.

Admiral, may I ask you again :

You say you might be available tomorrow afternoon? I do not want to crowd you.

Admiral BURKE. Tomorrow afternoon would be all right, sir. My meeting will be over in New York at 12 o'clock, and I can catch a plane back here and I can be here by 2 easily enough, sir.

Senator STENNIS. That makes the time mighty thin, I think. It seems to me, in view of all of these developments, we might just recess and see what we can do tomorrow, but not ask the admiral to be here.

Could you be here the following day?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir; I could be here Thursday.

Senator CASE. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that procedure would be preferable. We are fortunate in having a witness like Admiral Burke who is no stranger to the problem of rollcalls on the floor when

Senator STENNIS. It is unfortunate about the rollcalls and also about our timing with reference to Secretary McNamara.

So, if it is agreeable to the subcommittee we will just suspend at this time and recess subject to the call of the Chair. Admiral Burke will resume the stand again on Thursday morning and the Chair will consider what the situation is for tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, subject to call1 of the Chair.)

1 REPORTER'S NOTE.-Call subsequently issued for 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, Jan. 24, 1962. in room 318, Old Senate Office Building.

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The special subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room 318, Old Senate Office Building.

Present: Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Jackson, Thurmond, Bartlett, Saltonstall, Smith, and Case.

Also present: Special subcommittee staff: James T. Kendall, chief counsel.

Senator STENNIS (presiding). Let the subcommittee come to order, please.

The photographers will have 1 minute, General Trudeau, after you start testifying, if you do not object, and I am sure you do not. Then under their agreement, they are going to be ready to leave and will leave without any further interruption.

Members of the subcommittee, General Trudeau is here to testify today, having just gotten in last night from Greece. He has already filed with us a statement which he is prepared to take up first.

Yesterday, you will recall that Admiral Burke was on the stand. We were unable to finish with him because of other matters yesterday afternoon. He could not be here today. We will resume with Admiral Burke's testimony tomorrow.

Assuming that we will finish with the testimony of General Trudeau this morning, we expect to hear General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, this afternoon.

There is no significance at all to the fact that we did not call the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs first. As a matter of fact, we did have in mind calling him, but he has been very much engaged all this week and now he is over on the House side, presenting testimony at the posture hearings. But, he is going to get excused this afternoon to come on over, anyway.

We will follow the general plan, and the subcommittee is sorry it was a few minutes late this morning, but we had an executive session on matters pertaining to future hearings, not this one. There are matters that have to be decided.

The general plan adopted by the subcommittee a week or 10 days ago was that the witness would make his statement, and then Mr. Kendall, our chief counsel, would be prepared to question the witness on the general and related matters pertaining to his testimony, pre

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