Mr. KENDALL. And, in the concluding paragraph of that, you said, referring to the speech: It is not to be taken as other than an exception to the policy which prohibits discussion of foreign policy by Defense personnel. Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, Mr. Kendall. Mr. KENDALL. So you are saying then, in effect, that the policy prohibits the discussion of foreign policy by Defense personnel. Mr. Gilpatric's speech is an exception. Is this a fair interpretation of what you said? Mr. SYLVESTER. I think it is. LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF DIRECTIVES CAUSED DIFFICULTY Mr. KENDALL. Now, when and how did the word come down that these directives, these statements, were not to be literally interpreted but that discussion of foreign policy affairs was permissible provided that it did not conflict with established foreign policy, if that word ever did come down? Mr. SYLVESTER. I think we arrived at it, Mr. Kendall, on the basis of experience as we went along. In attempting to reduce or eliminate the discussion of the substance of foreign policy, we found when we were doing that we had affected another area which we had not intended. If you interpreted it literally and rather broadly as we did in the beginning, you did tend to move into not allowing speeches in the very rational, realistic way that I tried to indicate. Any officer making a meaningful speech in military and foreign policy would need to refer to foreign policy, and this realization came as a result of experience. Mr. KENDALL. Exactly, sir. the needs for military might. That is correct, is it not? You cannot talk in a vacuum about Mr. SYLVESTER. We cannot talk about military might in a vacuum. Mr. KENDALL. And when you relate it to the threat and talk about the menace of communism, then you are in the field of foreign affairs. Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; in the sense that there is a fallout, that there are implications in foreign affairs, in foreign policy, that are inherent in that relationship. Mr. KENDALL. So the directives, as written, as a practical matter, were unrealistic because military people just wouldn't have been able to speak upon the need for the Military Establishment at all, isn't that right? Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I don't think it is right. I think frankly in my greenness and in our ignorance in learning the job, if we interpret it or use it literally down to the end, it would have that effect. We did not do that. At times we did. As we learned and saw what the effect of it was, the ship began to right itself, and I think you have this dichotomy between the substance of foreign policy and that relationship between military and foreign policy which has implications of foreign affairs. Mr. KENDALL. So you would say that the fact that the directives were so worded and were interpreted so literally by some, gave you Mr. KENDALL. The Presidential press conference of September 20, 1946, is at the bottom of page 2. Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir. Mr. KENDALL. President Truman's directive of December 5, 1950, is mentioned at the top of page 3. Mr. SYLVESTER. I see it, Mr. Kendall. Mr. KENDALL. The quotation from Mr. McNamara's interview of February 17, 1961, is at the top of page 4. Mr. SYLVESTER. I see it there. Mr. KENDALL. And Mr. Gilpatric's statement from his press conference of July 11, 1961, is in the middle of page 4. Mr. SYLVESTER. In the middle of page 4 is Mr. Gilpatric's- Mr. SYLVESTER (continuing). Press conference on July 11, 1961? Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir. That is there. Mr. KENDALL. In the middle of page 5 is the quotation from DOD Directive 5230.13, dated May 31, 1961, and that says: In public discussions all officials of the Department should confine themselves to Defense matters. They should particularly avoid discussion of foreign policy matters, a field which is reserved for the President and the Department of State. This is a correct statement, is it? Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir. Mr. KENDALL. Are you telling me that you see no difference in the language of the last three documents and that contained in Mr. Truman's statement in 1946? Mr. SYLVESTER. In the press conference statement? Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes. There is a difference in the language. Mr. KENDALL. And if we apply the language and interpret it as written, there is a difference in meaning, isn't there, Mr. Sylvester? Mr. SYLVESTER. I think you would have to then go to a question of interpretation. I can't interpret Mr. Truman's but I think I can interpret the others. Mr. KENDALL. Well, if I understand the English language, there is a difference in saying that the prohibition is in speaking on foreign policy, which is in conflict with our established policy, and in saying that there is a prohibition against speaking on foreign policy, period. Mr. SYLVESTER. I tried to resolve that difference this morning when I attempted Mr. KENDALL. Yes, sir. We are going to get back to that, Mr. Sylvester, but I am talking about the language of the documents that I referred to. Mr. SYLVESTER. There is a difference in the language. Mr. KENDALL. And I refer you to another one, sir. I am sure you are familiar with this one of October 1, 1961. You wrote a memorandum for the Directorate for Security Review on the subject of Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's speech at Hot Springs, Va., on October 21, 1961. You are familiar with that? Mr. KENDALL. And, in the concluding paragraph of that, you said, referring to the speech: It is not to be taken as other than an exception to the policy which prohibits discussion of foreign policy by Defense personnel. Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, Mr. Kendall. Mr. KENDALL. So you are saying then, in effect, that the policy prohibits the discussion of foreign policy by Defense personnel. Mr. Gilpatric's speech is an exception. Is this a fair interpretation of what you said? Mr. SYLVESTER. I think it is. LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF DIRECTIVES CAUSED DIFFICULTY Mr. KENDALL. Now, when and how did the word come down that these directives, these statements, were not to be literally interpreted but that discussion of foreign policy affairs was permissible provided that it did not conflict with established foreign policy, if that word ever did come down? Mr. SYLVESTER. I think we arrived at it, Mr. Kendall, on the basis of experience as we went along. In attempting to reduce or eliminate the discussion of the substance of foreign policy, we found when we were doing that we had affected another area which we had not intended. If you interpreted it literally and rather broadly as we did in the beginning, you did tend to move into not allowing speeches in the very rational, realistic way that I tried to indicate. Any officer making a meaningful speech in military and foreign policy would need to refer to foreign policy, and this realization came as a result of experience. Mr. KENDALL. Exactly, sir. the needs for military might. That is correct, is it not? You cannot talk in a vacuum about Mr. SYLVESTER. We cannot talk about military might in a vacuum. Mr. KENDALL. And when you relate it to the threat and talk about the menace of communism, then you are in the field of foreign affairs. Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes; in the sense that there is a fallout, that there are implications in foreign affairs, in foreign policy, that are inherent in that relationship. Mr. KENDALL. So the directives, as written, as a practical matter, were unrealistic because military people just wouldn't have been able to speak upon the need for the Military Establishment at all, isn't that right? Mr. SYLVESTER. No, I don't think it is right. I think frankly in my greenness and in our ignorance in learning the job, if we interpret it or use it literally down to the end, it would have that effect. We did not do that. At times we did. As we learned and saw what the effect of it was, the ship began to right itself, and I think you have this dichotomy between the substance of foreign policy and that relationship between military and foreign policy which has implications of foreign affairs. Mr. KENDALL. So you would say that the fact that the directives were so worded and were interpreted so literally by some, gave you Mr. SYLVESTER. I would certainly agree with that, yes, Mr. Kendall. LITERAL INTERPRETATIONS OF DIRECTIVES NOT A FACTOR IN STATE DELETIONS Mr. KENDALL. And is this a factor which has contributed to the problem that we are confronted with here today? Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not precise about what you mean on the problem and I am not trying to be technical. Mr. KENDALL. Well, the general pattern or the picture of the deleted phrases and words and the suppression of speeches and the Mr. SYLVESTER. No. I don't think it had to do with that. I don't think it had to do with that because of the type of deleted words which I think we are dealing with and which you have read to me are basically those in the foreign policy area and were deleted elsewhere. CLEARANCE OF GILPATRICK SPEECH Senator STENNIS. If counsel would yield to me just a moment, I think the record here ought to reflect that the Gilpatric speech referred to in questions a few minutes ago is the speech that Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric made, where he emphasized and made further disclosures of our military might. Is that correct, Mr. Sylvester? Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. Senator STENNIS. Now, frankly I was very glad to see that speech come through. It was something, a subject matter that I have been recommending to a degree for a good while, that we be told more, the people be told more, and everyone be told more about our military might, and I think it had a very wholesome influence too, on the people of the United States, and Russia already knew about that might, I think. Their Government authorities did, anyway. It made our people feel better to know that we had it. Now, that necessarily, then, brought about an exception to your general rule. Mr. SYLVESTER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. Senator STENNIS. But that didn't give you any trouble. There wasn't any problem connected with that. You just decided to let up some from overall policy on that type of speech and make one full disclosure. Isn't that correct? Mr. SYLVESTER. That is basically correct, Mr. Chairman. That speech had clearance from the State Department and elsewhere and we went-I did with Mr. Gilpatric-to Europe the following week and the impact on the capitals of our allies was very strong. Senator STENNIS. My point is that for your men working under you, and for even you yourself, it was not in your realm to make decisions about a speech like that. Mr. SYLVESTER. Precisely, precisely. Senator STENNIS. The word came maybe from the President or someone speaking directly for him to tell more about our program. Was that about the way it happened? EXCEPTIONS TO GENERAL RULES OF SPEECH REVIEW Senator STENNIS. I emphasize this because it looks to me like it is an exception to your general pattern, and it has to be an exception. Mr. SYLVESTER. Precisely. Senator STENNIS. And you perhaps have others. Mr. SYLVESTER. Yes, sir. Senator STENNIS. And in those cases where it does-where there is decision to make such exceptions-then there are no particular guidelines that apply except for that particular speech, is that right? Mr. SYLVESTER. Precisely. Senator STENNIS. So in that way your humdrum everyday problem goes right on and you do have to drop back in and apply whatever the old rule was, or the old rule as modified. Is that correct? Mr. SYLVESTER. That is what we are trying to do, yes, Mr. Chairman. Senator STENNIS. Well, I am sorry I interrupted you. Senator Thurmond, may we call on you now without regard to your 15-minute limitation. Take as much time as you want. SYLVESTER'S ACCESS TO POLICY PAPERS Senator THURMOND. Thank you. I was just thinking if counsel would prefer to have continuity, he can go ahead. Senator STENNIS. You may proceed, Senator. Senator THURMOND. Mr. Sylvester, if I understood you correctly, you stated this morning that you had access to all sources of policy including those in the foreign policy area. You have indicated your familiarity with the changes which have been made in the Department of Defense speeches by the State Department. As one who is well informed on foreign policy of the United States, is it your opinion that the policies have been directly applied in the review of Department of Defense speeches by the State Department? Mr. SYLVESTER. Senator, I do have access to the information. I do not have continuous unremitting knowledge of it because I simply haven't the time. It is not my responsibility. Senator THURMOND. What is your answer? Mr. SYLVESTER. That would be my answer to that. Senator THURMOND. Well, I asked you if it is your opinion that the policies have been correctly applied in the review of Defense Department speeches by the State Department. Mr. SYLVESTER. I am not in a position to offer you an opinion, Senator. Senator THURMOND. Well, I understood you had access to the National Security Council papers, Joint Chiefs of Staff directives, and to all of the policy papers. Mr. SYLVESTER. If I gave the impression that I could walk over and knock on the door and demand and sit down and read every paper any day of the week or night, it would be untrue. I think I said on a need-to-know basis and that I have seen and do see Joint Chiefs of Staff directives, Safety Problem memos, among others, and, when necessary, those NSC directives that have any bearing on, or that I |