Behavioral Law and EconomicsOxford University Press, 05/06/2018 - 352 من الصفحات In the past few decades, economic analysis of law has been challenged by a growing body of experimental and empirical studies that attest to prevalent and systematic deviations from the assumptions of economic rationality. While the findings on bounded rationality and heuristics and biases were initially perceived as antithetical to standard economic and legal-economic analysis, over time they have been largely integrated into mainstream economic analysis, including economic analysis of law. Moreover, the impact of behavioral insights has long since transcended purely economic analysis of law: in recent years, the behavioral movement has become one of the most influential developments in legal scholarship in general. Behavioral Law and Economics offers a state-of-the-art overview of the field. Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman survey the entire body of psychological research that lies at the basis of behavioral analysis of law, and critically evaluate the core methodological questions of this area of research. Following this, the book discusses the fundamental normative questions stemming from the psychological findings on bounded rationality, and explores their implications for setting the law's goals and designing the means to attain them. The book then provides a systematic and critical examination of the contributions of behavioral studies to all major fields of law including: property, contracts, consumer protection, torts, corporate, securities regulation, antitrust, administrative, constitutional, international, criminal, and evidence law, as well as to the behavior of key players in the legal arena: litigants and judicial decision-makers. |
المحتوى
D | |
Tax Law and Redistribution | |
Judgments of Progressivity | |
Scarcity | |
Wealth and Subjective WellBeing | |
Methods and Objects of Redistribution | |
c Legal Paternalism | |
F Conclusion | |
3 | |
4 | |
5 | |
C | |
6 | |
C | |
D | |
7 | |
Performance | |
Challenging Taxes 4 The Normative Debate | |
Behavioral Insights and Redistribution 1 General | |
8 | |
C | |
9 | |
E Product Liability | |
Prospects | |
Corporate Law Securities Regulation and Antitrust | |
Administrative Constitutional and International | |
Citizens | |
D | |
Criminal Law and Enforcement | |
PART FIVE The Legal Process | |
Introduction | |
General 2 Information SelfServing Bias and Overoptimism | |
Irrational Motives | |
Biases Stemming from the Adversarial Nature of Litigation 5 ReferenceDependence in Assessing Settlement Offers | |
Framing Litigation Outcomes and Risk Attitude | |
Anticipated Regret and Loss Aversion | |
E Alternative Dispute Resolution | |
F Attorneys and Clients 1 General 2 Fee Arrangements | |
Means | |
Lawyers DecisionMaking | |
Lawyers Motivation | |
G A Note on Plea Bargains | |
H Conclusion | |
b Disclosure Duties | |
The Story Model and CoherenceBased Reasoning | |
Prospect Theory and Related Issues | |
Evidence | |
طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
Amos Tversky anchoring assessments BEHAV behavioral analysis BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS behavioral insights behavioral studies benefits breach cognitive biases confirmation bias consumers context contract law costs criminal damages Daniel Kahneman debiasing DECISION PROCESSES decision-making default rules demonstrated deontological disclosure discussed ECON economic analysis empirical endowment effect escalation of commitment evidence example expected experimental experiments findings framing effects George Loewenstein harm heuristics and biases hindsight bias human incentives individuals infra intuitions issues judicial Law and Economics legal policymaking LEGAL STUD Lewinsohn-Zamir liability litigation loss aversion maximize motivation normative omission bias one’s option outcomes overconfidence overoptimism ownership participants parties people’s perceived percent PERSONALITY & SOC perspective phenomena preferences probability prospect theory PSYCHOL psychological Rachlinski rational choice theory reference point regulation relevant remedies result risk role social specific standard economic subjects Sunstein supra note tend Thaler tort transaction welfare