Behavioral Law and Economics
In the past few decades, economic analysis of law has been challenged by a growing body of experimental and empirical studies that attest to prevalent and systematic deviations from the assumptions of economic rationality. While the findings on bounded rationality and heuristics and biases were initially perceived as antithetical to standard economic and legal-economic analysis, over time they have been largely integrated into mainstream economic analysis, including economic analysis of law. Moreover, the impact of behavioral insights has long since transcended purely economic analysis of law: in recent years, the behavioral movement has become one of the most influential developments in legal scholarship in general. Behavioral Law and Economics offers a state-of-the-art overview of the field. Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman survey the entire body of psychological research that lies at the basis of behavioral analysis of law, and critically evaluate the core methodological questions of this area of research. Following this, the book discusses the fundamental normative questions stemming from the psychological findings on bounded rationality, and explores their implications for setting the law's goals and designing the means to attain them. The book then provides a systematic and critical examination of the contributions of behavioral studies to all major fields of law including: property, contracts, consumer protection, torts, corporate, securities regulation, antitrust, administrative, constitutional, international, criminal, and evidence law, as well as to the behavior of key players in the legal arena: litigants and judicial decision-makers.
ما يقوله الناس - كتابة مراجعة
لم نعثر على أي مراجعات في الأماكن المعتادة.
طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
Amos Tversky anchoring assess Behav behavioral analysis Behavioral Economics behavioral insights Behavioral Law behavioral studies benefits breach cognitive biases confirmation bias consumers context contract law costs courts criminal damages Daniel Kahneman debiasing Decision Processes default rules demonstrated deontological disclosure discussed Doron Teichman Econ economic analysis empirical endowment effect escalation of commitment evidence example expected experimental experiments Eyal Zamir fact-finders findings George Loewenstein harm heuristics and biases hindsight bias human incentives infra issues judges judgments judicial decision-making Law and Economics Legal Stud Lewinsohn-Zamir liability litigation loss aversion moral motivated omission bias one’s option outcomes overconfidence overoptimism participants parties people’s perceived percent Personality & Soc perspective policymakers predictions preferences probability prospect theory Psychol psychological Rachlinski rational choice theory reference point regulation relevant result risk Ritov role social specific subjects Sunstein supra note tend tort Tversky welfare