man's purse on the alternative that I will shoot him if he deny me, he may surrender it rather than be shot; but I have no right to present such an alternative, and the consent of the owner renders it no less a violation of the right of property. If I inflame a man's vanity in order to induce him to buy of me a coach which he does not want, the transaction is dishonest; because I have gained his will by a motive which I had no right to use. So, if I represent an article in exchange to be different from what it is, I present a false motive, and gain his consent by a lie. And thus, in general, as I have said, a transfer of property is morally wrong, where the consent of the owner is obtained by means of a vicious act on the part of the receiver.

The right of property may be violated,

1. By taking property without the knowledge of the owner, or theft. It is here to be remembered, that the consent of the owner is necessary to any transfer of property. We do not vary the nature of the act by persuading ourselves that the owner will not care about it, or that he would have no objection, or that he will not know it, or that it will never injure him to lose it. All this may or may not be; but none of it varies the moral character of the transaction. The simple question is, Has the owner consented to the transfer? If he have not, so long as this circumstance, essential to a righteous transfer, is wanting, whatever other circumstances exist, it matters not, the taking of another's property is theft.

2. By taking the property of another, by consent violently obtained.

Such is the case in highway robbery. Here, we wickedly obtain control over a man's life, and then offer him the alternative of death, or delivery of his property. Inasmuch as the consent is no more voluntary than if we tied his hands, and took the money out of his pocket, the violation of property is as great. And, besides this, we assume the power of life and death over an individual, over whom we have no just right whatever. In this case, in fact, we assume the unlimited control over the life and possessions of another, and, on pain of death, oblige him to surrender his property to our will. As, in this case, there is a double

and aggravated violation of right, it is, in all countries, considered deserving of condign punishment, and is generally rendered a capital offence.

3. By consent fraudulently obtained, or cheating. This may be of two kinds:

1. Where no equivalent is offered, as when a beggar obtains money on false pretences.

2. Where the equivalent is different from what it purports to be; or where the consent is obtained by an immoral act on the part of him who obtains it. As this includes by far the greatest number of violations of the law of property, it will occupy the remainder of this section, and will require to be treated of somewhat at length.

We shall divide it into two parts:-1. Where the equivalent is material; 2. Where the equivalent is immaterial.

I. WHERE THE EQUIVALENT IS MATERIAL. This is of two kinds:-1. Where the transfer is perpetual; 2. Where the transfer is temporary.

FIRST. Where the transfer of property on both sides is perpetual. This includes the law of buyer and seller.

The principal laws of buyer and seller will be seen from a consideration of the relation in which they stand to each other. The seller, or merchant, is supposed to devote his time and capital to the business of supplying his neighbors with articles of use. For his time, risk, interest of money, and skill, he is entitled to an advance on his goods; and the buyer is under a correspondent obligation to allow that advance, except in the case of a change in the market price, to be noticed subsequently.

Hence, 1. The seller is under obligation to furnish goods of the same quality as that ordinarily furnished at the same prices. He is paid for his skill in purchasing, and of course he ought to possess that skill, or to suffer the consequences. If he furnish goods of this quality, and they are, so far as his knowledge extends, free from any defect, he is under obligation to do nothing more than to offer them. He is under no obligations to explain their adaptation, and direct the judgment of the buyer, unless by the law of benevolence. Having furnished goods to the best of his skill, and of the ordinary quality, his responsibility ceases, and it is

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the business of the buyer to decide whether the article is adapted to his wants. If, however, the seller have purchased a bad article, and have been deceived, he has no right to sell it at the regular price, on the ground that he gave as much for it as for what should have been good. The error of judgment was his, and in his own profession; and he must bear the loss by selling the article for what it is worth. That this is the rule, is evident from the contrary case. If he had, by superior skill, purchased an article at much less than its value, he would consider himself entitled to the advantage, and justly. Where he is entitled, however, to the benefit of his skill, he must, under correspondent circumstances, suffer from the want of it. Hence we say, that a seller is under obligation to furnish goods at the market price, and of the market quality, but is under no obligation to assist the judgment of the buyer, unless the article for sale is defective, and then he is under obligation to reveal it.

The only exception to this rule is, when, from the conditions of the sale, it is known that no guaranty is offered; as when a horse is sold at auction, without any recommendation. Here, every man knows that he buys at his own risk, and bids accordingly.

2. Every one who makes it his business to sell, is not only bound to sell, but is also at liberty to sell, at the market price. That he is bound to sell thus, is evident from the fact that he takes every means to persuade the public that he sells thus; he would consider it a slander were any one to assert the contrary; and, were the contrary to be believed, his custom would soon be ruined. Where a belief is so widely circulated, and so earnestly inculcated by the seller, he is manifestly under obligation to fulfil an expectation which he has been so anxious to create.

He is also at liberty to sell at the market price; that is, as he is obliged to sell without remuneration, or even with loss, if the article fall in price while in his possession, so he is at liberty to sell it at above a fair remuneration, if the price of the article advances. As he must suffer in case of the fall of merchandise, he is entitled to the correspondent gain, if merchandise rises; and thus his chance on both

sides is equalized. Besides, by allowing the price of an article to rise with its scarcity, the rise itself is in the end checked; since, by attracting an unusual amount of products to the place of scarcity, the price is speedily reduced again to the ordinary and natural equilibrium of supply and demand.

It should, however, be remarked, that this rule applies mainly to those, whose occupation it is to traffic in the article bought and sold. A dealer in china-ware is bound to sell china-ware at the market price; but if a man insist upon buying his coat, he is under no such obligation, for this is not his business. Should he put himself to inconvenience by selling his apparel to gratify the whim of his neighbor, he may, if he will, charge an extra price for this inconvenience. The rule applies in any other similar case. It would, however, become an honest man fairly to state that he did not sell at the market price, but that he charged what he chose, as a remuneration for his trouble.

3. While the seller is under no obligation to set forth the quality of his merchandise, yet he is at liberty to do so, confining himself to truth. He has, however, no right to influence the will of the buyer, by any motives aside from those derived from the real value of the article in question.

Thus, he has no right to appeal to the fears, or hopes, or avarice, of the buyer. This rule is violated, when, in dealings on the exchange, false information is circulated, for the purpose of raising or depressing the price of stocks. It is violated by speculators, who monopolize an article to create an artificial scarcity, and thus raise the price, while the supply is abundant. The case is the same, when a salesman looks upon a stranger who enters his store, and deliberately calculates how he shall best influence, and excite, and mislead his mind, so as to sell the greatest amount of goods at the most exorbitant profit. And, in general, any attempt to influence the mind of the purchaser, by motives aside from those derived from the true character of the article for sale, are always doubtful, and generally vicious.

It is in vain to reply to this, that if this were not done, men could not support their families. We are not inquiring about the support of families, but about a question of right. And it is obvious that, were this plea allowed, it would put an end to all questions of morals; for there never was an iniquity so infamous as not to find multitudes who were ready to justify it on this plea. But we altogether deny the validity of the plea. Were men to qualify themselves properly for their business, and to acquire and exert a suitable skill in the management of it, that skill being beneficially exerted for the community at large, men would find it for their interest to employ it. He who un derstood his own profession well, and industriously ana honestly put his talents into requisition, never stood in need of chicanery, in order to support either himself or his family.

These remarks have been made with respect to the seller. But it is manifest that they are just as applicable to the buyer. Both parties are under equally imperative and correspondent obligations. If the seller be bound to furnish an article of ordinary quality, and to sell it at the market price, that is, if he be obliged to exert his skill for the benefit of the buyer, and to charge for that skill and capital no more than a fair remuneration, then the buyer is under the same obligation freely and willingly to pay that remuneration. It is disgraceful to him, to wish the seller to labor for him for nothing, or for less than a fair compensation. If the seller has no right by extraneous considerations to influence the motives of the buyer, the buyer has no right, by any such considerations, to influence the motives of the seller. The buyer is guilty of fraud, if he underrate the seller's goods, or by any of the artifices of traffic induces him to sell at less than a fair rate of profit. naught, 'tis naught, saith the buyer; but when he goeth his way, then he boasteth." Such conduct is as dishonest and dishonorable now, as it was in the days of Solomon.

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It has also been observed above, that when the seller knows of any defect in his product, he is bound to declare it. The same rule, of course, applies to the buyer. If he know that the value of the article has risen, without the possibility of the owner's knowledge, he is bound to inform him of this change in its value. The sale is, otherwise, fraudulent. Hence, all purchases and sales affected in