General, would you expand a little bit on what you mean by "created by the Air Force"? Give us some of the history. I assume what you say for Aerospace goes for Rand. I think you have four of these agencies, have you not?

General SCHRIEVER. Rand, of course, was established by the Air Force back in 1946. General Arnold was really the moving force behind the creation of Rand and it is quite a different type of operation than Aerospace. Rand really is in the study and analysis and evaluation sort of thing, and works not only for the Air Force, although it is primary working for the Air Force. It also has done studies for the Ford Foundation, it has done studies for the AEC, and it is still doing so.

So we are not the sole agency working with Rand.

Now, Aerospace, as I said, was created by the Air Force. We felt and still feel very strongly that we need an agency of this type to work with us in the overall management of our space and ballistic missile programs.

Aerospace, however, is not barred from doing work for other Government agencies. For example, if NASA wanted Aerospace to do certain things for them they would be available to NASA for that purpose.

The other organizations that you had in mind, the Mitre Corporation, up in Boston, was created primarily to create systems integration of the Sage Air Defense System. We have expanded their role to that of providing us with technical assistance in the overall command area. That is the communications and control systems, in addition to just Sage, Sage being an air defense system tied into the total NORAD Command.

I don't know whether I have described adequately the relationship between the Air Force and Aerospace, but Aerospace works directly with the Ballistic Missile Division on the West Coast, and they are geographically located together.

Mr. CORMAN. You could give Aerospace a particular problem, or a particular thing to develop. NASA might do the same thing; is that right?

General SCHRIEVER. That is right.

Mr. CORMAN. That is what I didn't quite understand.

General SCHRIEVER. They are not barred from working with NASA. As a matter of fact, they are in essence working for NASA today in the Mercury program because the Air Force has the responsibility of supporting NASA in the booster and launch end of the Mercury program. We actually provide the Atlas booster and work under the supervision of NASA, but in turn the technical assistance to BMD is furnished by Aerospace in the Mercury program so they are, in effect, working for NASA right there.

Mr. CORMAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you now have a new title. What is your new title for the record?

General SCHRIEVER. I don't have it yet. This will be effective on 1 April and the new title will be the Commander of the Air Force Systems Command.

it?

The CHAIRMAN. Now, that gives you more responsibility, doesn't

General SCHRIEVER. It certainly does. It places in one command the total responsibility for the development, the test, and the procurement and delivery to the operational command of a system that will perform in accordance with the characteristics that have been laid down and with a reasonable degree of reliability. So one organization will have the responsibility and the authority for carrying out the program to that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that that will give the space program more impetus ?

General SCHRIEVER. Mr. Brooks, I think from a management standpoint that this is a very good move. We have been studying for some time ways and means of improving management within the Air Force for weapons systems-what we call weapons system acquisition, or system acquisition. And this particular reorganization that is taking place now didn't just come out of thin air. It has been an evolutionary study. We have been at it for some time, and I personally think that it will do much to streamline and place responsibility in one place. This will, in my opinion, get the job done better, more efficiently and faster.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask your comments on the national booster program, how your new responsibilities will work in reference to that, and whether or not it is the view of your office that you should support the NASA program in trying to get a national booster.

General SCHRIEVER. Actually, the new command will not change that because the booster program, that is the military booster program, has been the responsibility of the Air Research and Development Command. We have not had any systems, as such, tied to the boosters. That is, boosters in the sense that you are talking about. So there is no change. We have been working very closely with NASA on the national booster program-what you might call that.

The CHAIRMAN. I borrowed that phrase from the Wiesner report to the President, where they recommended a national booster program. General SCHRIEVER. I think there is no doubt there should be a national booster program. There will undoubtedly be certain elements carried out by the military and certain elements by NASA. It should be a coordinated program and I think we have essentially that now but, of course, as we go down the line certainly new requirements for boosters will arise and we should continue to be very watchful that we do have a fully coordinated program between NASA and the military. I think we have that essentially today.

The CHAIRMAN. As you envision the future, do you envision the need for the peacetime agency in the development of space-for instance, peacetime communciations in space and peacetime navigation, for instance, to assist the merchant marine on the high seas and also of weather reporting there, and at the same time the need, of course, for a military development of space? Do you envision that?

General SCHRIEVER. Yes, sir. I envision it even more broadly than that, Mr. Chairman. We are just in the infancy of development of systems in space. As I see it, going down the line, timewise, we are at that point where we should look at it in the broadest possible context. There will be military requirements and the military will be developing in space. We will have a Government agency such as NASA carrying on developments in space. I think private enterprise will get into space developments.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they should.

General SCHRIEVER. I think they should, too. And, after all, if we had designated one agency years ago, if we had said, "Well, you are going to develop everything having to do with the atmosphere in the aeronautical sense," I don't think we would be where we are today, or, on land. I think you have to look at it in a very broad context. The CHAIRMAN. Do you envision space developments in size as perhaps in time equaling that of the automobile industry in the United States? And I am talking about military plus civilian developments. General SCHRIEVER. You are referring, I presume, to the resources both in terms of facilities, people, and dollars? If that is what you have reference to, I would

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and general need on the part of the peoples of the world for the use of space there in the future.

General SCHRIEVER. Well, I certainly think that it will probably demand of our resources more than the automobile industry demands. I think the first really practical application of space to the civilian, or world economy, probably will come in the communications satellite

area.

The CHAIRMAN. How about weather?

General SCHRIEVER. Weather is certainly another area that is right in there, too. We have already had two very successful weather satellite shots. I think communications, weather, navigation, to be followed at some later point in the actual movement of people and things in a commercial sense through space, is bound to come. These things are going to be evolutionary and the crystal ball is pretty cloudy as to the exact timing, but I personally think these things will come sooner rather than later if we aggressively pursue our programs in this country.

The CHAIRMAN. You think in resources and dollars and development activity it will not only equal but perhaps exceed the automobile industry?

General SCHRIEVER. Well, I don't know exactly what the resources are in the automobile industry today, but I think certainly from the standpoint of looking into the future it will involve perhaps a greater utilization of resources in this country than any other area that I can think of.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we certainly appreciate your interest in coming before the committee, clearing up a field of uncertainty that I think should have been cleared up. You have taken Saturday morning and the committee is not unmindful of that fact, although I know you in research and development work Saturdays and Sundays, too. General SCHRIEVER. Well, we work every Saturday.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, the committee will go into executive session for a few moments.

Mr. FULTON. May I just say I want to welcome the General, and I wanted to say that you are one of the chief redeeming features of the directive's position.

I have one question. My question is, if the directive that has been issued is the right thing for space, why isn't the same thing for aeronautics? Why don't we have the same policy for that, too, then? General SCHRIEVER. I don't know that I can answer that.

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Mr. FULTON. Well, let it go. If you get an answer, put it in the record later.

(See the first question and answer carried at the end of this day's testimony.)

Mr. FULTON. I want to compliment you-when you appeared at the Carnegie Music Hall in Pittsburgh lately, you were in good voice. Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I think we should wish the General a well earned vacation.

The CHAIRMAN. He deserves a well earned vacation. Now, when he comes back he has another hat he has to put on, too, and he has to adapt himself to the new environment.

Mr. MILLER. Are you going to take a postman's holiday and do some flying?

General SCHRIEVER. Well, I plan to go out to the West Coast. My wife swears that I will-this probably shouldn't go on the record, but

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen. If there is no objection, the committee will go into executive session.

As was indicated on the first day of these hearings, there are certain additional questions to which I would like to have answers supplied for the record.

(The questions and answers referred to are as follows:)

QUESTIONS ADDRESSED TO THE AIR FORCE

Question 1. If the DOD directive on development of space systems, dated 6 March 1961, is the right thing for space, why isn't it the right thing for aeronautics?

Answer. In the infancy of military aircraft development, a decision to centralize responsibility for such development in either the War or Navy Department might well have been a valid and economic one. Such speculation should recognize that in an era of no executive control of these departments below the Presidency, such a decision might have been stifling to the fruitful employment of aviation in military undertakings. The facts are that no such decision was made and today the Army, Navy and Air Force are engaged in the development of military aircraft. Certainly no objection exists to the use by all Services of military aircraft, but the question of how many Services, or departments, should be engaged in developing military aircraft is a valid one. It may be stated that the history of multi-department development of military aviation permitted full and free study of its uses for military tasks. The high production rates of aircraft during World War II would have legislated against consolidation under a single department at that time of all military aircraft development. A different situation now exists. The science of aeronautics is relatively mature. The role of pure aeronautics in military affairs is firmly established as are its concepts. The airframe and airbreathing engine industries are in the descendancy and the unit and dollar volumes of military aircraft development are waning. Yet a heavy investment still remains in the departmental development organizations. Development costs constitute an increasing portion of total aircraft programs, due in some measure to the limited numbers of modern aircraft procured in our current programs. The extremely high costs of aerospace systems development makes questionable the benefits from competitive Service duplication. Careful study might determine that many advantages would accrue from consolidation of DOD aircraft development when the unit or dollar volume of such reaches a level which would no longer justify the continuation of separate departmental organizations for such tasks. The question and its broad implications merit thorough study.

Question 2. The committee finds it hard to arrive at a clear statement of what constitutes "unusual circumstances" which would permit the Army or Navy to carry out development of a space project. How does the Air Force

categorize the following with regard to service assignment for development: communications satellites beyond Advent; an anti-satellite Nike-Zeus; mapping and geodetic satellites; Sea Scout; Project Hydra; Renae; Early Spring; Caleb; and sea reconnaissance satellites?

Answer. The current Advent satellite communication program has the principal objective of determining technical feasibility of using microwave frequencies for point-to-point communications. Management responsibility for the Advent program has been assigned by the Secretary of Defense to the Department of the Army. At such time as it becomes desirable to initiate new and follow-on programs having appreciably different objectives than that of the Advent program, the Air Force expects, in light of the 6 March 1961 directive, that the Secretary of Defense will review the matter and will determine the appropriate Service to proceed with the new program.

In the case of an anti-satellite Nike-Zeus, the Air Force considers that solution of the anti-satellite problem requires inspection of the satellite before attempting to destroy it. It is believed critically important that a foreign satellite be inspected at close range to determine the purpose and mission of the satellite. Only after inspection has been accomplished should we make a decision to destroy the satellite or allow it to continue on its mission. Further, it is felt that an anti-satellite system should have the capability to inspect multiple targets for the purpose of economy and operational flexibility.

Since the envisioned anti-satellite Nike-Zeus would not include these capabilities the Air Force would not seek this development program.

The assignment for development of the mapping and geodetic satellites is contained in the Department of Defense Directive Number 5160.34, subject: Reconnaissance, Mapping and Geodetic Programs, dated March 28, 1961 (see attachment No. 1).

The Scout vehicle is a solid propellant rocket booster initiated for development by the Air Force and later transferred to NASA. The Air Force Blue Scout is an adaptation of the NASA Scout and is being used in the HyperEnvironment Test Program. The Sea Scout is a Navy concept to adapt the NASA Scout for space activities. This Sea Scout has not been approved for development, nor has any space system been proposed which is based on the Sea Scout booster. It is presumed that if a proposal to develop the Sea Scout is forwarded to DDR&E the need for this booster will be outlined, and the capability of the Sea Scout to accomplish the proposed task will be judged in comparison with other available or proposed boosters.

The development of Early Spring by the Air Force would be dependent on its evaluation as a solution for the anti-satellite problem. This evaluation should include comparison of requirements and concepts for anti-satellite systems. If such were approved by DOD the Air Force should have the primary role for its development using the resources of the Navy, where applicable. It appears that sea launching of anti-satellite systems offers no unique advantages to an anti-satellite capability.

Hydra is a program for demonstrating feasibility of a water launching system. If this system were to be approved for development by the DOD, it would then seem to be a project falling within the purview of the national ranges. (See the answer to Question No. 3 which outlines the Air Force position.)

Renae is a satellite weather reconnaissance system. No reason is known why the development of such a system, if required, should be an exception to the 6 Mar 61 directive.

Caleb, which conceived the orbital launching of satellites from aircraft, appears to be particularly amenable to Air Force development, if such capability is required.

Sea reconnaissance satellites are presumed to mean satellites capable of reconnoitering ocean areas. The development of this capability is dependent upon achieving sensors aboard the orbital satellite. If this capability is required, the development of sea reconnaissance satellites should take advantage of the economies that can be realized from capabilities developed in other Air Force space sensor and satellite programs.

Question 3. Would the Air Force undertake to develop and operate a satellite launching ship, or is this an "unusual circumstance" that should be granted to the Navy? Would you support such a proposal?

Answer: The Air Force will continue to consider all possible solutions to the satellite launch support requirement generated by the Department of Defense or NASA space programs and will give every consideration to the use of Navy