that direction, bringing industry into that particular effort more rapidly than we have in the past.

I am speaking broadly. I am not speaking just of the Army program, but from a national viewpoint.

I would like to make this observation also, that to date there isn't anything operating in space. We are talking about all these great and wonderful things, but it is still R. & D. essentially in almost all of our efforts, and it is still very expensive.

Now, when you get to operating-let's say in a communications satellite effort which is one that I am personally very much interested in, the cost of operation is essentially zero. The cost per ton mile of a satellite after it is up there is nothing, and I think this is impor

tant.

We are never going to have any operations in space that are worth a damn until we get reliability. It makes no sense to go on researching forever. We have got to get something which works, and when a communications satellite, for example and the same applies to other satellite systems becomes operational and is useful whether it be for military purposes or civilian or any other application we may think of in the future, its cost then is nothing per ton mile. It just sits there, and all of the costs associated with the operating aspects of the program are going to be on the ground and that is where the Army is, on the surface of the Earth.

As in the case of the Navy, in navigation, for example, in Transit, I think in many cases we should look a little further ahead than just to be temporarily glamorized by R. & D. at the moment. We have to look further down the road and perhaps realize when these things become operational-and we are doing things in space, whether it be to make money for stockholders or do it to defend the country or against a satellite, or to communicate world-wide the problems are going to be quite different and it is necessary on a national level and we will think more along these lines of a nationally-planned effort.

We get excited about these things and the directive comes out but it is still research. However, it does affect the future and I think that is why each of the Services is very much interested.

I think those are the main points I wanted to make, if they are of any use.

General TRUDEAU. This is why the position was taken as stated by myself before this committee last year, and this year in the previous recommendations we have made because we could see that whatever you do now with respect to research and development is going to have a major impact on operations. All you have to do is to look at this wonderful model [of satellite orbits around a globe], Mr. Chairman, that you are putting out here, and look at all those bands going around in all these directions at different speeds and for different purposes and realize that somebody at some focal point has got to do a lot of work one of these days.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fulton.

Mr. FULTON. The problem comes up on the new terminology. I spoke of that previously. There is basic research and development; there is applied research and development; there is then testing as a stage and then engineering as a stage.

We may have revisions and variations and so on in models and the changes for practical uses.

What struck me was-and I have been in the Service and worked somewhat in this field in World War II-that it is the start of a terminology where we in Congress can't make the content of the works that we have, have square edges. I can't find where it begins and where it ends yet.

Again on the point of unusual circumstances as the exceptional case, I see nothing in there as a means of decision but somebody's idea at the time he comes to make a decision on the things he thinks are important.

General TRUDEAU. That is correct, sir. Actually that fourth terminology, that "E" on the end of "R.D.T. & E.," is for evaluation. It does what you say.

In other words, it studies the engineering, it recommends revisions and as of yesterday or whatever day the new Air Force directive was published. For instance, it ties on to this Air Research and Development Command the initial production of the items as they come into production and, of course this permits or might permit-we hope, the first run production-some telescoping of the operations in the interests of saving time and providing better unity of control all the way through the cycle.

Mr. FULTON. But you would think going through, say a pilot line or pilot plant stage, would still be in research and development.

General TRUDEAU. That is in the development and the intent of the directive is certainly not to let anybody go that far, except the Air Force.

Mr. FULTON. I wonder about it, so the problems we are raising here might make some people revise some language.

General TRUDEAU. And "except in unusual circumstances"—and as the lady said, these are very key words, "unusual circumstances.'

Mr. FULTON. With the Department of Defense through Dr. York's office, having the ability, the power and the statutory power to assign projects as they come up as a preliminary decision, this looks to me as though they are in advance making a preliminary decision that will be one place; in the Air Force, but if they don't want it there, they can put it some place else.

Secretary MORSE. Under this directive, the decision now for assignment of projects has been raised above York's office.

Mr. FULTON. I couldn't hear you, sir.

Secretary MORSE. Under this directive as now written, the assignment of projects between the Services has now been taken out of Dr. York's office and raised to the level of the Secretary of Defense.

I would not only present this to Dr. York, but the final assignment of a new mission, or one in an unusual circumstance, would not be made by Dr. York but by the Secretary of Defense or his deputy, as I read this.

Mr. FULTON. Now, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been left out of the directive on how to assign-because nobody else seems to know whether or not there was even a meeting of the Joint Chiefs-will the Joint Chiefs in the future be left out of the decision on each assignment under this procedure?

Secretary MORSE. I don't believe we can speak for the Secretary of Defense. This is his decision, not ours.

Mr. FULTON. I am asking you, looking at the directive, what does it mean to you?

Secretary MORSE. I would assume that the Secretary of Defense, and I can't speak for him, would normally

Mr. FULTON. No, just speak about the directives.

General TRUDEAU. No, I think the Joint Chiefs of Staff say what they want but they don't say who is going to develop it. I think Dr. York and the Secretary of Defense that civilian channel will be used on that.

Secretary MORSE. This directive refers to the civilian channel through York, but the actual decision is made by the Secretary of Defense. With respect to an assignment of a mission in R.D.T. & E., that is.

Mr. FULTON. If this is a matter of simply emphasis in the directive, if the Air Force is to be emphasized over the Army or the Navy, then obviously as a corollary to me, that means the Army and the Navy are to be de-emphasized.

Secretary MORSE. I don't think that follows.

Mr. FULTON. Secondly, if the Air Force has 91 per cent of total budget funds for research and development in space now, if there are going to be economies made, it would seem obvious to me that the economies will be made, that they speak of in the Air Force, from the research and development, from the Army and the Navy, which is the nine per cent. Would the General comment on that?

General TRUDEAU. This has been building up because in the initial stages not over three years ago the Army had 90 per cent of the capability, but now you have the Air Force spending 90 per cent of the funds and that evidently is the way the administration and the Congress want it to be. So again we abide by your decision.

Secretary MORSE. I think we make a great mistake in this country, if I may say so we all do-of talking about space projects. I think it is about time this country started talking about the use of space to do something sensible on the surface of the Earth. There is a lot of difference in your thinking. Everybody is talking about the aerospace industry, and the space industry.

Mr. FULTON. Not me.

Secretary MORSE. I am not speaking of you, sir. I am saying in general, one does, and I think the sooner we get off of this wicket and talk about the sensible use of space by the United States or the United Nations or the world, we will get some of these questions in better perspective.

If you look at the Army's effort from this viewpoint, we have got the best programs in space, I think, or certainly many of them, in communications, and Zeus certainly is a space effort. The kinds of things we encounter, the kinds of research problems that we have are in outer space, in Zeus. We are going after ICBM's, we are working on the decoy discrimination problem in outer space by definition, and as a use of space to perform a mission on the Earth. And we will do the same thing with mapping. We will end up with a map someone can use here on the ground, whether it be for civilian use or military

use.

We are not exploiting space as such. We are using it to do our job, the same way the Navy is interested in oceanography, for the same reason they must do this, in order to get on with the antisubmarine warfare program but also perhaps to help the fishing industry.

Mr. FULTON. Well, the remarkable thing about it is that the Air Force is losing the air as a strategic area obviously.

Secondly, the Air Force is losing men in either air or space. So in the future there will be men in the Air Force neither in air nor space. Secretary MORSE. They will be on the ground.

Mr. FULTON. That is my next point. They will either be on the ground

Secretary MORSE. Or underground.

Mr. FULTON. Or on a ship.

Now, with the Air Force losing everybody out there, there will be nobody in uniform in the wild blue yonder.

General TRUDEAU. Perhaps then this is why they need this as an added function, because the Army thinks kindly of them and we wouldn't want to see them only as the silent silo sitters of the seventies here.

Mr. FULTON. I move we adjourn.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have to adjourn promptly at 12 o'clockand that clock is a little bit fast up there. I am watching it. On account of the memorial services on the floor today, we will have to do it. Just bear that in mind.

Mr. Teague.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Secretary, you said, I believe I understood you correctly, that the operational responsibility would obviously follow.

Secretary MORSE. What I meant to say, Mr. Teague, was that we are all concerned with things in the R. & D. phase today more than we used to be because there is such a large part of the total effort in the sense you build up experience and people and so forth. There is no sharp line between development, test, and operation. We are still doing research on the Redstone missile, the first one the world ever had. So in that sense research is more important because it does act, let's say, as a precursor of things to come in operation.

I didn't mean to imply this directive established that rule because the directive necessarily refers to R. & D.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chenoweth.

Mr. CHENOWETH. Just one question: I am sure you don't want to leave the impression with this committee that the Army wants to see all of the Air Force underground.

Secretary MORSE. No, sir, we certainly don't.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know if there is any rule but there should be a rule about one Service there poking at the other Service.

Secretary MORSE. In the R. & D. field we have a very close working relationship and have had in the last couple of years with Secretaries Wakelin and York and Charyk in the R. & D. area.

Mr. CHENOWETH. It is your position that the Army would like very much-in fact, you are going to insist and probably make a fight to retain the mapping, geodesy and Zeus programs to the full extent? General TRUDEAU. And the communications satellite.

Mr. CHENOWETH. The Advent?

General TRUDEAU. We have been assured of that, but these things can change, you know.

Secretary MORSE. The directive specifically excludes reassignment of currently assigned projects. Those are projects which we now have and to which we are devoting a substantial amount of effort. Mr. CHENOWETH. You want to go all the way with these?

Secretary MORSE. That is right.

Mr. CHENOWETH. You want to be relieved of no responsibility with respect to development of these?

Secretary MORSE. That is right. On the other hand, we don't want to duplicate efforts which the Air Force can do better. With regard to boosters, we don't want to develop them and make another facility. Mr. ANFUSO. Mr. Secretary, first, I want to congratulate you on your statement that we ought to do more serious thinking about what space is for.

Secretary MORSE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANFUSO. I gather by that that you meant the greater benefit to mankind to use space for peaceful purposes?

Secretary MORSE. I think that is a very important application of space. We have to look at it on a longer term basis rather than these quickies. When somebody gets excited about the shots the Russians put up or one we do or don't put up

Mr. ANFUSO. And that is one of the functions of NASA and I gather you are willing to assist NASA in that project?

Secretary MORSE. We have a board that has been meeting and we are trying to make certain we don't duplicate efforts between us. Mr. ANFUSO. May I ask this question of either you, Mr. Secretary, or General Trudeau, for whom I have the highest respect and admiration?

General TRUDEAU. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ANFUSO. If you had had it in your power to propose the directive that we are talking about, would you have made such a proposal? General TRUDEAU. No, I didn't make such a proposal. My proposal was on the record here.

Mr. ANFUSO. Would you have made such a proposal?
General TRUDEAU. No, sir, but I accept it.

We read every day about how fortunate we are to have the civilian competency which is being brought into the Government and as a simple military man I accept these profound decisions as being made. in great wisdom.

(General Trudeau requested that the following letter be included in the record in clarification of his statement above:)

Hon. ELVIS J. STAHR, JR.

THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,
Room 3E-718, The Pentagon

March 21, 1961

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am deeply disturbed that a sentence in my testimony before the House Science and Astronautics Committee yesterday gave the impression that I intended to criticize my civilian superiors.

I want to assure you and Secretary McNamara that there was no intention to criticize high Government officials despite the impression the remark gives taken out of context with the balance of my testimony and the atmosphere that then pervaded the committee room.

I don't believe anyone who reads the testimony can challenge the fact that we have clearly expressed our intent to loyally execute the directive on military space responsibilities, despite our earlier expressed desire for a different approach.

I hope no further accent will be placed on the sentence in question and trust you and the Secretary of Defense will accept my explanation at face value. Faithfully yours,

ARTHUR G. TRUDEAU, Lieutenant General, GS. Chief of Research and Development.

Cc: GENERAL GEORGE H. DECKER