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As a member of the last pre-war class at the Army War College (1940), he began establishing a firm reputation as a thorough and imaginative planner. In consequence, with the beginning of the expansion of the U.S. Army, early in 1941 he was recalled from duty with an antiaircraft artillery brigade at Camp Stewart, Georgia, to an assignment with the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff. In this position, and during succeeding months with General Headquarters, U.S. Army and Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, he took part in the planning for mobilization and training of the huge wartime Army and for the projected landings in North Africa, known as Operation Torch.

August, 1942 found him in England as the Commanding General of the 34th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. His intimate familiarity with the plans for the forthcoming North African operation, however, promptly led to his assignment to General Eisenhower's Allied Force Headquarters. Here, although retaining command of his brigade, he was designated Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, charged with directing the final, detailed preparations for the landings and the operations in North Africa. In this capacity he accompanied General Mark W. Clark as second-in-command of the dramatic secret submarine mission to contact friendly French officials three weeks prior to the landings and smooth the way for Allied invasion forces. For his participation in this mission, he won the Legion of Merit (Degree of Officer).

After a brief return to England, General Lemnitzer moved to North Africa as a member of General Eisenhower's staff. In January 1943 he was assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff to General Mark Clark in Morocco during the early phases of the organization of Fifth Army. Resuming active command of his brigade in late February 1943 he led it through the Tunisian Campaign and the early landing phases of the Sicilian Campaign.

General Lemnitzer's service during the remainder of the war was as U.S. Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff to General (later Field Marshal) Sir Harold Alexander, who was first the Commander-in-Chief of the 15th Army Group and later the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean. In addition, General Lemnitzer served as Chef of Staff to the Commanding General of the (U.S.) Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Under Sir Harold Alexander, General Lemnitzer took part in the negotiations with Marshal Badoglio which led to the capitulation of Italy, in the discussions with Marshal Tito and with Soviet Marshal Tolbukhin for the coordination of the final military operations by the Yugoslav and Russian armed forces against the German armies in Southern Europe. In March 1945 General Lemnitzer entered Switzerland in civilian clothes, charged with management of the discussions with German representatives which resulted in the unconditional surrender of the German armed forces in Italy and Southern Austria. In discharging these responsible and important functions he earned a reputation as an able negotiator and military diplomat. General Lemnitzer's skill as a planner was put to immediate use following the war when he was designated as the Senior Army Member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Washington, D.C. He next became Deputy Commandant of the National War College, playing a key part in the establishment of that agency for the highest level of joint military education. At this time, he also served as head of the U.S. Delegation to the Military Com. mittee of the Five (Brussels Pact) Powers in London, helping to pave the way for the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He assisted in the presentation of the NATO Treaty to the Senate for ratification.

On the strength of his experience as a military diplomat, he next was named the first Director of the Office of Military Assistance, under Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. In this capacity he played a key role in establishing the Military Assistance Program which has provided a major element in the Free World's mutual security activities.

Returning to duty with troops, in 1950 General Lemnitzer qualified as a parachutist, at the age of fifty-one, and assumed command of the 11th Airborne Division, at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. A year later he went to Korea, commanding the 7th Infantry Division in the Battles of Heartbreak Ridge, The Punch Bowl, and Mundung-ni Valley, and in the fighting in the Chorwon Valley, winning the Silver Star for conspicuous gallantry.

Back in the United States in 1952, he was named the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research. During this same period he was the Army's Associate Member of the Kelly Committee to Study the Defense of North America against Atomic Attack, and a member of the Secretary of the Army's Advisory Committee on Army Organization.

General Lemnitzer returned to the Far East in March 1955, assuming command of the U.S. Army Forces, Far East and the Eighth U.S. Army. Shortly thereafter, on the departure of General Maxwell D. Taylor to become Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, General Lemnitzer was named Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations and Far East Commands and Governor of the Ryukyu Islands. In this position he maintained the defensive strength of UN forces against any resumption of hostilities in Korea, directed the build-up of the military effectiveness of the Republic of Korea armed forces and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, and encouraged the improvement of economic and military stability throughout that area of the world.

In July 1957 he took up new duties as Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. Among his activities of special note during this period were his influential role in the final decision made regarding the relationship between the National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the space research facilities of the Army, and his participation as U.S. Military Representative at the meetings, in London and Karachi, of the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact Organization.

In March 1959 General Lemnitzer was named to succeed General Maxwell D. Taylor as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and assumed his new duties on July 1, 1959. President Eisenhower on August 15, 1960, nominated General Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was confirmed by the Senate August 27 and was sworn in as Chairman on September 30, 1960.

Personal data

Date and Place of Birth: August 29, 1899, Honesdale, Pennsylvania

Parents: William L. Lemnitzer (father), Hannah (Blockberger) Lemnitzer (mother), both parents deceased.

Marriage: Mrs. Katherine Mead Tryon, Honesdale, Pennsylvania (wife)

Children: Lois Katherine, wife of Captain Henry E. Simpson, USA, Captain William L., USA.

Date: November 6, 1923

Education

U.S. Military Academy, 1920.

The Coast Artillery School, Officers' Basic Course, 1921. Battery Officers' Course, 1931.

Command and General Staff School, 1936.

Army War College, 1940.

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Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster).

Silver Star.

Legion of Merit (Degree of Officer).

Legion of Merit.

Medalha de Guerra (Brazil).

Grand Star of Military Merit (Chile).

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Grand Officer of the Order of Boyaca (Colombia).

Medal for Military Merit 1st Class (Czechoslovakia).

Order of Melnik (Ethiopia).

Legion of Honor Degree of Officer (France).

Croix de Guerre with Palm (France).

Honorary Companion of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath (Great Britain).

Honorary Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (Great Britain).

Military Order of Merit (Italy).

Cavalier of the Great Cross, Royal Crown of Italy (Italy).
Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun (Japan).

Order of Military Merit Taeguk (Korea).

Order of Military Merit Taeguk with Gold Star (Korea).
Presidential Unit Citation (Korea).

Gold Cross of Merit with Swords (Poland).

Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant (Thailand).

Royal Order of the White Eagle, Class II (Yugoslavia).
Grande Official, Order of Military Merit (Brazil).

STATEMENT OF GEN. LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General LEMNITZER. Yes, I would, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to have this opportunity to appear before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics this morning. It is apparent that certain reports that have been carried by national news media have resulted in some misunderstandings, and I always welcome an opportunity to set the record straight. I hope my appearance before the committee this morning will accomplish this purpose. The facts are as follows: On the 24th of February, 1961, I received a request dated 23 February from the General Counsel of the Department of Defense requesting my comments on a draft which revised a previous directive issued by Secretary McElroy, then Secretary of Defense, in September, 1959, and which established policies pertaining to and assigned responsibilities for military space activities. By that same memorandum from the General Counsel, the Service Secretaries and other Department of Defense officials were requested to submit their comments on the same draft directive.

In accordance with the General Counsel's request, I submitted my comments on the 2d of March, 1961. I would like to emphasize that this was several days prior to the date that the Secretary made his decision and issued the directive in final form.

This you will note is completely contrary to the impression given by whoever leaked my memorandum. The impression given by that individual was that my memorandum was sent directly to the Secretary after and I repeat after the Secretary made his decision on the subject directive and that I was protesting his decision. This is completely incorrect and raises the question in my mind as to the motive of the individual involved.

The particularly unfortunate aspect of this matter has been that it implies that there is a lack of close working relationship between the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I would like to assure this committee and the American public that these working relationships are extremely close and harmonious.

That completes my very brief opening statement, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much, General, for your statement. We would like to ask you a few questions. During the course of the hearings that we have had, the matter was brought out that perhaps there was a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of which you are chairman, prior to the issuance of that order and that certain recommendations may have been made. I would like to ask you about that. Is that correct?

General LEMNITZER. I am not sure what meeting you are referring to. We have frequent meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Are you referring to a meeting on this specific memorandum?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General LEMNITZER. There was no meeting on that subject during that period that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a meeting on the question of the handling of the space program in the Defense Department and recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to that effect to the Secretary?

General LEMNITZER. No, there was not. But there were several when the original directive was under consideration by Secretary McElroy. We considered the original directive on several occasions and submitted our comments.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the directive of March 2?

General LEMNITZER. I am referring to the directive which was issued by Secretary McElroy in September, 1959. This is an old problem, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The recent directive that we are referring to is where the disposition of space efforts, the Air Force was given about 91 percent, I think, of the spending of money for space.

General LEMNITZER. There was no meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this particular memorandum during the period you refer to, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have occasion either formally or informally to discuss the matter?

General LEMNITZER. I discussed it with my own staff. It was being handled by the Secretary of Defense so that the views of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be incorporated in the replies which the Service Secretaries were asked to give on the same draft memorandum that I was asked to comment on.

The CHAIRMAN. You made certain recommendations as of March 2? General LEMNITZER. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. How did those recommendations fit into the final directive? Were they in consonance with them?

General LEMNITZER. They were considered by the Secretary, together with the other suggestions which were made by the Service Secretaries and other officials of the Department of Defense. All of the suggestions I made were not adopted. However, the final directive along with the announcements on how it was to be handled, and considering the areas in which I had a particular interest, the final directive was satisfactory from my point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they were accepted by the Secretary and placed in his order

General LEMNITZER. Some of them were.

The CHAIRMAN. What parts were not placed in the order?

General LEMNITZER. The directive was a little more general than I suggested that it be. I was concerned primarily with two areas, and they dealt with the previous assignments of responsibilities to the Services primarily in the field of communications and in navigation. I understand that it has been clearly indicated that previously made assignments of responsibility would remain as they were. This went a very long way in meeting my suggestions.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee would be interested in your views on the contributions to research and development policy and decisions

which could normally be expected to come from the civilian officials of the Department of Defense.

General LEMNITZER. I am not clear as to what you mean by that question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean this: How do you think now the setup is going to work out in reference to space? Is it going to be satisfactory, because these directives really came from civilian officials of the Department?

General LEMNITZER. That is the responsibility of the Secretary. He is responsible for the operation of the Department of Defense. We make our recommendations, and he makes the decisions. That is the way the Department of Defense is set up. That is the way it has been operated. That is the way it is operating now. As I pointed out in my statement, the working relationships between myself and Secretaries McNamara and Gilpatric are very close and harmonious. I could not ask for better working relationships. I am constantly consulted. I see them on a daily basis and many times a day on some

occasions.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I understand from what you say you are supporting that directive?

General LEMNITZER. I am.

The CHAIRMAN. You think it is going to result in pushing forward the military space effort at even greater speed than it is going at this time?

General LEMNITZER. AS I indicated in my own memorandum, we are only in the initial stages of military operations in space. I am not sure that we can arrive at the optimum solution in organization and procedures now. I presume that as a greater experience is gained, there may possibly be further revisions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin.

Mr. MARTIN. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Miller?

Mr. MILLER. General, we are concerned, of course, here with the research and development phases and all of its operations and not with the operation of the military departments or the Department of Defense. But we do have a great concern in the field of research and development. As I look back at it, the Army through the thin years when no one else seemed to have any great interest in this field used the Von Braun team to break through and give us the only real thrust engine that we had for a long time, and it is still a good team.

General LEMNITZER. That is right, sir.

Mr. MILLER. You are to be congratulated. The Navy developed Polaris pretty much on its own without a great fanfare of trumpets, Aerobee and some of these others that came out of the other Services. Now, are the Services going to feel the same confidence when the Army conceives a particular weapon useful for its needs, it is going to be used in space, ground to ground, or the Navy comes up with some other, are they going to feel the same confidence that they have had when they developed these things, themselves, when they have to turn it over to another sister Service who, in turn, traditionally according to the way it has done business, is going to turn it over to some contractor?

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