to hear from General White and from General Wilson and General Schriever, also by your direction, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a good many witnesses already available who will be here next week. I recognize what the gentleman has to say there, that this is short notice for a Saturday session of this committee, but

Mr. FULTON. Mr. Chairman, could you ask the wishes of the others, the other members of the committee? Maybe I am the only one.

The CHAIRMAN. If it was left to the chairman, he would say not to have a Saturday morning session, but the problem is getting the hearing through and perhaps these two witnesses tomorrrow may not be vital witnesses.

Mr. TEAGUE. I could be here, but I think the committee as a whole should decide.

The CHAIRMAN. I will leave it to the committee as a whole.
Mr. MILLER. We already have other commitments.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a matter of whether we have these hearings or wait a number of weeks until the witnesses are available.

Mr. MILLER. I think it is a very important hearing and I don't think we can schedule its closing at any specific date.

Mr. TEAGUE. I suggest we inquire as to how many can be here

tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. How many do we have here now who are members of the committee?

Dr. SHELDON. Fifteen, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not do this: Let's wait until the others come in and then we will poll each one individually and see how many can be here.

Mr. FULTON. I am going to have to call Pittsburgh and cancel. The sooner I do it the better. I suggest we ask those here who can come.

The CHAIRMAN. Who can be here tomorrow morning to hear the testimony of these two witnesses who otherwise would not be presently available?

How many do we have?

Dr. SHELDON. Seven, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many can't be here?

Dr. SHELDON. It is about even, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will rule this: We will wait until the other members come in and take another vote.

Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Chairman, is there a possibility of meeting this afternoon since there will be no meeting of the House today?

The CHAIRMAN. That might be a thought. It would be short notice for the witnesses.

Mr. RYAN. They might prefer to do that than come in on Saturday, Mr. HECHLER. Mr. Chairman, I suggest the chairman decide and work it out to the best interests of everybody.

Mr. DAVIS. I second the motion.

Mr. HECHLER. I think we should get on with the hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard the motion. Is there any objection to that?

Mr. FULTON. As long as you decide in the next five minutes.
The CHAIRMAN. If not, it is so ordered.

The Chair will try to work it out satisfactorily to everybody.

Mr. TEAGUE. I have known of General Schriever's plans to be gone for a month.

The CHAIRMAN. I know the amount of work General Schriever has had to do and I think he is entitled to get away and get his rest and I am very much in favor of accommodating him so he can get away. I recognize, too, if he does leave without giving his testimony, it will be some time before he can give his testimony.

Mr. Feldman, will you come up and have a seat with us?

Now, Mr. Secretary, we have a prepared statement here. Each member of the committee has a copy of it and we would be very happy, sir, for you to proceed with your statement. You may interpolate, add, subtract or whatever you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary GILPATRIC. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, you invited me to appear before you this morning to discuss with you the directive of Secretary McNamara of March 6, 1961 on the development of space systems within the Department of Defense.

The purpose of that directive is to establish policies and to assign responsibilities for research, development, test and engineering of satellites, antisatellites, space probes and their supporting systems for all components of the Department of Defense.

Under this directive every component of the Department of Defense, which includes not only the military departments but also other organi ̈ations of the Defense Department, is authorized to conduct preliminary research to develop ways of using space technology to perform its assigned function. The scope of such preliminary research by each defense component is to be defined by the Director of Defense Research & Engineering in terms of expenditure limitations and other appropriate conditions.

No military department or other Defense agency is authorized to go beyond the defined scope of preliminary research unless and until the program or project has received the express approval of either the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary.

To obtain that approval the several military Services and other Defense agencies are required to submit their proposals to the Director of Defense Research & Engineering for review and determination as to whether they shall be recommended for approval. Any such proposal will become a Department of Defense space development program or project when it has received the specific approval of the Secretary or myself. Once approval has been given, further research development, test, and engineering of Department of Defense space development programs or projects will become the responsibility of the Department of the Air Force unless a specific exception is granted by either the Secretary or by me. The directive provides that such exceptions will be made only in unusual circumstances.

Before discussing the events and circumstances under which this directive was formulated, I should like to review briefly with the committee the history of management of space projects and programs within the Department of Defense. Obviously some of this history took place before Mr. McNamara and I assumed office, but both of us

have been made familiar with it, partly with the knowledge we obtained before we came and what we have ascertained since.

Prior to the orbiting of Sputnik I in October 1957, the development of space projects was the responsibility of the individual Services. Interservice coordination was effected through interservice committees. The orbiting of Sputnik demonstrated the need for greater urgency in the development of both our ballistic missile and space programs and the need for stronger central direction and control. Accordingly, early in 1958 Secretary McElroy created within the Office of the Secretary of Defense the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and assigned to it the responsibility for the research and development of advanced research programs. Subsequently, Congress gave statutory recognition to this agency. From the time of the establishment of ARPA, research and development of space programs and projects within the Department of Defense has been under the centralized management of the Department of Defense, and the military Services have played only such roles as have been assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense.

Upon the creation of the Office of the Director of Research and Engineering by the enactment of the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 supervision and control of ARPA's activities were assigned to the Director of Defense Research & Engineering.

May I interpolate here that Dr. York, who now occupies that office, has been absent on leave. As you may liave read, he is unfortunately leaving the Department of Defense to become chancellor of the new La Jolla division of the University of California and he made plans to go out in connection with that new assignment but he will be back here and I am sure he will be glad to appear before this committee if the committee desires to hear from him personally in connection with its inquiry.

În 1958, Congress established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and during that year the Department of Defense transferred to it those programs which were basically nonmilitary in character. The remaining military space programs continued to be developed by ARPA.

In September 1959, Secretary McElroy, determining that research and development of current space programs had reached a point where further development could be assigned to the Services, assigned to the Air Force responsibility for the development and production and launching of space boosters and the necessary systems integration incident thereto, if approved by the Secretary of Defense.

(The memorandum in question is as follows:)

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., September 18, 1959.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations

(First paragraph Classified and deleted.)

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering considers that the numbers of satellite vehicles to be launched and the numbers of satellites expected to be in orbit in any one period over the next several years will not be large. Nevertheless, the advent of military satellite and space vehicle systems has national security implications which emphasize the need for over-all control and coordination of the military activity pertaining thereto.

The establishment of a joint military organization with control over operational space systems does not appear desirable at this time. The utilization of the present organization of the Military Departments appears preferable in order to realize full advantage from existing support capabilities, to eliminate conflicting research and development interests and responsibility, and to simplify fiscal accounting.

Although the research and development leading to the demonstration of operational feasibility will continue to be the responsibility of the Advanced Research Projects Agency for the time being, it appears desirable at this time to begin the development of a plan for the orderly transfer of space projects to the appropriate military departments. This transfer will normally be made during the development phase at an appropriate time to be determined by the Secretary of Defense. Satellite and space vehicle operations will be assigned to the appropriate military department after consideration of the primary interest or special competence of the respective service. Where no one military department has primary interest or special competence, consideration will be given to special competency in associated fields of development.

The responsibility for the development, production and launching of space boosters and the necessary systems integration incident thereto, as approved by the Secretary of Defense, will be assigned to the Department of the Air Force except for such research and development as may be conducted by ARPA.

The specific assignment of the payload for space and satellite systems will be assigned separately to the appropriate military department which, in addition to budgeting for the payload, will also budget and reimburse the Department of the Air Force for the necessary boosters, launching vehicles and other unique equipment required in launching and necessary systems integration.

The following specific assignments for payload development and payload research and development support and production improvement are approved: (a) Interim satellite early warning system-Air Force. (b) Phase I of satellite reconnaissance system-Air Force.

(c) Interim satellite navigation system-Navy.

(d) Interim satellite communications system—Army.

The date of transfer of the above-listed systems from the Advanced Research Projects Agency will be approved by the Secretary of Defense upon the recommendation of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Assignment of other systems that may be developed will be determined later.

Prior to assuming responsibility for a particular satellite and space vehicle program, the appropriate military department will submit to the Secretary of Defense for approval detailed plans for the system including user relationships with the Unified and Specified Commands and other appropriate agencies. The Secretary of Defense will refer such plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment and recommendation.

The Director of Defense Research and Engineering will review and approve the detailed research and development programs in the space and satellite field utilizing where appropriate the support of the Advanced Research Projects Agency in order to insure the most efficient and effective utilization of the Department of Defense resources in this field. Particular attention should be given to the desirability of incorporating where practicable, more than one payload or system in a particular satellite.

/s/ NEIL MCELROY.

Secretary GILPATRIC. I might remind the committee that in his directive of September 1959 Secretary McElroy made a finding that at that time a joint military organization to control space systems would not be desirable.

In other words, he did consider one of the alternatives we considered in connection with the directive now before the committee.

In addition, he made specific assignments for payload development and payload research, development, support and production improvements to the several Services. Samos and Midas were assigned for further development to the Air Force, Transit to the Navy and Advent to the Army. Further assignment of additional projects were to be determined at a later time.

The September 1959 directive of Secretary McElroy did not clearly delineate the assignment of responsibilities for future space research and development programs and projects and did not define the limitation within which preliminary research by the Services would be conducted.

(A further related memorandum is as follows:)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Washington, D.C., June 16, 1960.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Coordination of Satellite and Space Vehicle Operations

Reference is made to the Secretary of Defense's memorandum of September 18, 1959, subject as above.

The decisions set down in the referenced memorandum are reaffirmed. Additionally, it is desired to emphasize that the establishment of a joint military organization for control over operational space systems does not appear necessary or desirable at this time.

With specific reference to the first full paragraph on page 3 of the September 18, 1959, memorandum, the appropriate Military Department will include in its detailed plans for a particular system not only the user relationships with unified and specified commands and other appropriate agencies, but also, where applicable, provision for the exercise of appropriate operational authority by the unified and specified commanders responsible for the functional area concerned.

THOMAS S. GATES, JR.

Secretary GILPATRIC. May I stress the importance of some control over preliminary research. Without some supervision in that area, preliminary research can go on, involve large amounts of money and can constitute a considerable diversion and dilution of resources within the departments, so it needs some sort of supervision, we feel.

By the time that Secretary McNamara and I assumed office in January of this year, it had become clearly apparent that there was need for immediate re-examination of the McElroy memorandum in light of recent developments. We felt we had several choices. We could reaffirm the McElroy directive or we could modify it, or we could make a completely new approach to the conduct of space responsibilities in the Air Force-in the Department of Defense.

There were a number of factors which led us to move on this problem as soon as we could.

In December of 1960, there had been an uncoordinated announcement by the Department of the Navy of its intention to initiate a series of new satellite programs in fields such as communications and reconnaissance, whereas the Army and the Air Force already had approved projects. In the case of communications, there was already a project well under way in NASA.

The Air Force had also announced a new communications project which would be in addition to Advent and Echo. On January 12, 1961, the Ad Hoc Committee on Space appointed by then Presidentelect Kennedy recommended that there be established "a single responsibility within the military establishment for managing the military portion of the space program.

Promptly upon assuming office, Secretary McNamara made the reexamination of space research and development management a matter of the highest priority and assigned the problem for study and report to the new Office of Organization and Management Planning Studies.