General FRIEDMAN. Yes. That is what I started to comment on previously. I said I felt, as of the current, we are apart from the committee of conference report to the extent we are buying the C-jet as opposed to a turbofan. This matter has not been finally resolved, and our estimates are we might possibly be able to go to the turbofans starting with the 11th aircraft. It is not available prior to that time and that decision is still reserved for further consideration on the part of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. MAHON. I think it is proper to point out that at the time this reprograming was announced through the press, our committee had not been reconstituted by the 87th Congress as a result of difficulties arising in Congress. There was a feeling that since we had no status we should not have meetings. We started to have some meetings and then it was decided, since we actually had not been constituted as an appropriation committee, we should abandon that. Whether or not that was the right course to follow, I do not know, but that was the course that was followed. It is true this was an unusual situation and should not be considered as a typical situation.

Mr. LAIRD. If you would rather not have me pursue this, I will take another one that is right current.

Let's take the conference report, and we will turn to another page and can consider either BOMARC or the Lockheed Jetstar.

I realize that is a technical reason, Mr. Chairman, but I still do not think it is any excuse as far as the Air Force is concerned. Mr. MAHON. Pursue this one and the other one too.

BOMARC REPROGRAMING

Mr. LAIRD. The technical reason the chairman uses is perhaps correct. I still feel it is incumbent upon the Air Force to pay some attention to these reports.

Now we will take on page 10. It says, under amendment 45:

The conferees have approved $244 million for BOMARC air defense missiles instead of $569 million as proposed by the Senate.

It would seem to me that was a fairly fixed figure as far as BOMARC procurement was concerned, and if the Air Force was going forward on any new program to enlarge that particular program, it would be incumbent upon the Air Force to have some approval from the congressional committee if the intent of the Congress was not to be followed.

General FRIEDMAN. First, I want to reassure you on two counts. First, we do not take these reports lightly at all. I maintain myself thoroughly conversant with them, as does General White, and every time we propose an action in the area where there has been specific comment by the Congress, or specific appropriation by the Congress, the first question that is asked of me is "How does this line up with what Congress desires?"

I can assure you the Chief of Staff takes this very seriously.

Now, speaking specifically to the BOMARC, we are not embarked on a program of a size larger than envisaged at the time we came over with the air defense reorientation. It is true, after indicating a savngs of some $381.1 million, I believe, in the BOMARC program, and indicating that this was our rock bottom figure as we saw it, the Con

gress did reduce our request for appropriation, 1960 and 1961, in an amount of approximately $50 million. It was something like $29 million in the 1961 program, with the remainder in the 1960 program. Now we, on receipt of the appropriation, attempted to revise our program downward. I would like to point out that in making the reduction of $50 million the Congress in no way indicated that the program should be reduced. It was a reduction in terms of dollars only. We did, therefore, go back through the entire program, and in the fiscal year 1958 program we reduced $34.8 million in the hopes we could get by within the figure indicated by the Congress with no procurement of spares, no procurement of GSE and GSE spares.

Now, we are proceeding with a program. We are putting these units out in the field and we just have to have the spares and the spare parts for the GSE to make it work. We have done our level best to finance the program which you approved within the amounts appropriated.

Mr. LAIRD. But have you approved a reprograming?

General FRIEDMAN. Šir, the Department of Defense has approved the reprograming. The reprograming report is before this committee now. We are not committed to any of the amounts.

Mr. LAIRD. But it is an accomplished fact now?

General FRIEDMAN. No, sir.

Mr. LAIRD. Have you held up on it? It looks like it is an accomplished program.

General FRIEDMAN. No, sir. It has been approved by the Secretary of Defense, but if the Congress were to advise us now we were not to exceed the amount, then we would have no alternative other than to comply with the desires of the Congress. We would like to get these reprograming reports over here within 48 hours-or 72 hours-so we are not committed before we get an expression of intent by the Congress as pertains to the reprograming.

In this particular instance, it appears now that we will be $22.3 million over what the Congress said. This despite the fact we had indicated we would need $50 million more than the Congress appropriated.

Mr. LAIRD. But you have already committed us to that amount? General FRIEDMAN. No, sir. This is my point: I have released an increase to the 1960 program but I have told the materiel people they cannot proceed to commitment on the 1961 programing, which would in fact put us $22 million over the amounts appropriated, until I get an expression of intent on the part of the Congress.

I would like to ask you to recognize this reprograming to the full amount because we are talking here really about spares. I do not think it was the intent and I may be presumptuous here-it was the intent on the part of this committee to hold us back on spares, but rather to hold the BOMARC program to a given parameter, which we have done.

Mr. FORD. Yesterday, the Navy, in discussing their reprograming. said that without concurrence of the committee they have signed contracts. Obligations have been made. The airlift program we have discussed here this morning, I presume, would be in the same category? General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORD. In the BOMARC instance, you have not done so above the figure that was set for it in the conference report?

General FRIEDMAN. That is correct; because I knew the special feelings of the committee in this particular regard.

In the other instance-let's take the airlift instance right now. If you were to tell me right now we were not to proceed with this, it would not cost the Air Force one cent in termination costs because we have a C-130 line going, and the C-135 line going in the KC-135 area, and we are in a position to reverse the action if that is what the Congress desires.

Mr. FORD. The policy that we have had seemed to work very well. I hope and trust the policy will not change in the future. We have always acted expeditiously when there was any degree of urgency, and I am sure we will do so in the future. But it seems vital to me we do not change the basic policy.

I trust that the Air Force, because of the unusual circumstances that existed in the last month or 6 weeks, does not assume a different policy will exist in the future.

General FRIEDMAN. We certainly do not, Mr. Ford. As a matter of fact, I think the procedure has tightened up, and frankly, I am glad to see it has.

I also agree that the service we get from this committee, and from the Congress as a whole in responding to our requests and recognizing the urgency of the situation, has been grand from our standpoint in all instances. We have no intention whatsoever of jeopardizing that cooperation. I can assure you of that.

Mr. LAIRD. Then this BOMARC reprograming is not on the same basis as the airlift reprograming?

General FRIEDMAN. No, sir; not as far as the 1961 appropriation is concerned.

In other words

Mr. LAIRD. There is word out on the BOMARC reprograming and it has been reported as an accomplished fact, but it is not?

General FRIEDMAN. I believe, sir, I noticed something in the papers about some figure, and I am not sure-I am checking this to determine whether or not-I understand, sir, the $90 million was on the C-135, though I would not have been surprised to see something on BOMARC. There could well have been.

This occurs all the time. I understand there was an indication of 800 million contracts let on BOMARC. It was not; it was on the C-135.

Mr. LAIRD. You would say, would you not, the outstanding success enjoyed by BOMARC in the series of shots in the past few months would be a clear refutation of congressional criticism?"

I was trying just to trace through in the statement the procedure to be used in the future as far as reprograming.

Mr. MAHON. Is there any objection to the Air Force proceeding as tlined here by General Friedman with respect to the BOMARC program?

I have none myself. If the committee wishes to raise a point, it can e made.

Mr. FORD. Off the record.

(Off the record.)

66865-61-pt. 1-10

AIRLIFT REPROGRAMING

Mr. FLOOD. I am going to insist with reference to the MATS operation and this reprograming with reference to the MATS program, I would like to be assured that the money that they have borrowed from these KC-135's to beef up the jets is not going to work a discontinuance of that program, and secondly, I certainly want assurances to be given, although assurances from MATS in the past have been of little value to the Congress, particularly to this committee, at least out of an abundance of caution, and because I still retain a mild sense of humor, I would like MATS even under this command to give us their annual reassurances, for what they are worth, that these jets are not now going to give to MATS a new horizon of plush aircraft. They say the planes they have been operating are obsolete. Now they have 30 jets.

I would like the schedules proposed for these 30 jets to be submitted to the chairman of this committee. I would like to see a map prepared of the routes upon which these jets are to be flown and alongside of it drawn the red lines for the existing commercial airlines with jets and the whole gamut that the MATS propose to make with jets.

Are the doors on the side of the plane?

How wide are the doors on these jets?

Can a jump soldier get through with his sack on without inching through sideways with a rifle?

What are the conditions of the floor with these aircraft?

What is the heaviest piece of hardware a jump rifle platoon can take on one of these jets?

Any antitank hardware?

How soon can they be converted to transport of hardware if we decide we need that on the second week of an operation instead of bodies and rifles?

Have we just given birth now to a new modern jet plush airline instead of the obsolete props they have been using for years?

To what extent is MATS complying with the language written into the law by this committee over a period of years?

I have been advised by the surface transport people that MATS, in the best tradition, has ignored the directions of this Congress for many years, or at least only giving lipservice to it at the very most and fighting it in spirit to the very end, even up to this minute. If it were left to MATS they would do none of these things Congress insists on, and the surface transport people tell me while this committee

rote into the appropriation bill last year language dealing with Surface transport, there was a certain amount of surface transport going on, and this committee and the Congress indicated an interest in Surface transport. Not only am I advised that MATS has not com plied with the wishes of the Congress vis-a-vis ship transport, but have stopped doing whatever had been done. We expected them to do more in the best MATS tradition. So, they are to be complimented for their consistency, even in evil.

These are the things I want to be sure that in this reprograming in the heat of manning the barricades for transport, and in the eager ness to transport troops to the hotspots in the most modern jets, that the Army is going to have everything it wants when it wants

to move troops. I want to be sure these jets will have the configuration to do it, and that the aircraft itself will be in a position to be made available to the Army instead of the dependence on the whole MATS operation, including congressional junkets, or whatever else MATS operates.

General FRIEDMAN. I will respond to all the points raised by Mr. Flood. I would like to state right here at this point in the record, and then I will expand on that in response to all your questions, that we will procure, assign, and utilize these aircraft in exactly the terms. laid down by both this committee and by the committee of conference and as reflected in the legal terms of the appropriation itself.

I would like to go back to this committee's report wherein this committee made available $250 million over the amount requested in the President's budget, the purpose of that being to procure 50 C-130-B extended range aircraft which we now call the C-130-E, and then indicated that the additional amount above that required to procure these 50 aircraft would be available for the purchase of 135 type aircraft. Mr. FLOOD. I am the best friend MATS has as well as their severest critic. I introduced the amendment you are talking about.

General FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. I just do not like for the record to show, Mr. Flood, we do not take your desires and this committee's desires and the Congress' desires in other than a very serious manner, and it is our intention to comply with them.

Mr. FLOOD. Insofar as the history of the Military Air Transport is concerned, and under no circumstances does this statement apply to you, but I deny that categorically as far as MATS is concerned, and its history of operation, vis-a-vis this committee and the Congress over a period of several years. Not you. You have not had anything to do with that, but the statement which I think you should properly make as the Air Force Budget. Officer, in my opinion, must be categorically denied by me because the history of MATS in my opinion is diametrically to the contrary.

The spirit and the feeling and the hearts of most of the administrative top people at MATS, the contrary has been the case year after year after year.

Mr. MAHON. This is not the time to go into a lengthy discussion of these matters here.

Do you have anything more to say about the airlift problem? General FRIEDMAN. No, sir; other than the fact I regret Mr. Flood feels this way. I know it is a feeling he has held for some time. I certainly respect his views. I do not, however, feel as though we have, at least during the time I have appeared before the committee, failed to comply with the provisions of the appropriation acts, the general provisions that deal with the use of MATS, and I am giving the ssurance to this committee, my personal assurance and that of the Chief of Staff, that the use of these additional aircraft which we are procuring will be exactly as intended by both committees and as required by the appropriation.

Mr. MAHON. You can supply any additional comment in the record at this point.

(The information to be supplied follows:)

The C-135 will be used by MATS in peacetime, limited or general war for the strategic airlift of cargo, troops, and patients. Those tanker KC-135's ing off the production line for MATS' use will receive austere modification