DIVISION STRENGTHS General COLLINS. At the present time the strength of the divisions in Korea are 11,500. They have gone up 1,500 in each of the divisions. Actually, the Katusas are not there to fill out the divisions. Katusas are there in the combat unit because they are personnel who know the language, know the terrain and who are similar to the features on the other side of the fence. They were originally an augmentation, and that is what we still consider them. Mr. SIKES. Is it true then that the figure of 900,000 would permit the bare minimum for an additional division, but would not permit building up the strength of other units such as those in Korea and other areas overseas where additional strength is needed for divisions? General COLLINS. Actually, within the 900,000, I think we can bring those two divisions in Korea up to strength and bring other areas up to strength, but there are additional areas between the 900,000 and the 925,000 that we still feel we need. Mr. SIKES. Do you consider 925,000 the actual optimum strength for the Army at this time, or what is its significance, in view of present day commitments, of course? General COLLINS. I would not say it was optimum, Mr. Sikes. I feel it is the minimum needed to adequately carry out all of the missions presently assigned. As I said a minute ago, we can get the extra division, the 15th division, the 4th division of STRAC, out of the 900,000. That would be the minimum, the very bare minimum. Mr. LAIRD. With regard to the questioning just raised about the number of Katusas-it has been my understanding that the number was down to 978 in one division, and 1,100 in the other division, and these two divisions are at full strength now in Korea. General COLLINS. There are 965 in one and about 1,000 in the other. The authorized strength is 11,500. That is not the authorized strength of divisions everywhere. That is the authorized strength figured out by the Department of the Army for those divisions. That is, at the present time. Mr. LAIRD. They are at full strength? General COLLINS. Yes. Actually, they are over strength. General COLLINS. By 41 in one division and 79 in another; yes, sir. Mr. FORD. How do you define "authorized strength"? What does that mean? General COLLINS. That is the strength that the Department of the Army authorizes for the divisions in the various areas in the world, Mr. Ford. The table of organization and equipment strength of an infantry division is 13,748. The infantry divisions in Europe are at about that strength. Some vary due to slight reorganization of support, or tactical units, depending on the area in which they are located. They are reorganized slightly. Mr. SIKES. What is missing from a division when it is below trength such as those in Korea? Are units missing? Or is is true hat all the units are present, but some of the personnel in each unit. s missing? General COLLINS. The ones in Korea are scattered throughout the division. They have all their units. In some cases we do pull out certain units that a division does not need in a particular locality. Mr. SIKES. How long would it take to bring those divisions up to strength in the event of a greater emergency? General COLLINS. That would vary on the number of people we had in the pipeline, or in training at the time, Mr. Sikes. If we had quite a few people in the training plant ready to go these things occur in cycles as you know and it takes about 6 months to get a man out of the training plant ready to go overseas-so if it was at a high peak in the training cycle we would be ready. For instance, this last fall when we were authorized to stay over strength, we had a lot of men in the training plant and they were ready to go to flesh these units out. Mr. SIKES. The Pacific is a very, very big place, and unless men are already in the area, it takes a long time to reinforce the units there. General COLLINS. That is correct. Mr. SIKES. Give us the characteristics of the 15th, or missing division, which is desired by the Army. What kind of division is this? You have told us it is a part of STRAC. What are its actual characteristics and strength and equipments? Give us that breifly and add to the record if you wish. General COLLINS. There have been recent discussions on this, and I am not too sure at this time what the decision was. Formerly, we had two airborne divisions and two infantry divisions. We now have two airborne divisions and one infantry division. This other one I presume will be an infantry division. I would like to check further on that. (The information requested is as follows:) The 15th Division will be organized under the standard Infantry division table of organization and equipment and will provide the Army with the 4th STRAC division. Mr. FORD. How much was each one of these divisions in Kores increased? When was the order issued and when was the increase effectuated? General COLLINS. Each division was increased by 1.500 men. It was last summer sometime. I will have to get that for the record if I may. Mr. FORD. The order was issued sometime in the summer of 1960, and you will supply the accurate figure? General COLLINS. That is correct. Mr. FORD. When was the increase actually achieved? General COLLINS. I would have to get that for the record if I may, Mr. Ford. (The information to be supplied follows:) The current authorized strengths of the two divisions in Korea was established on July 31, 1960, at which time these divisions were at authorised strength They have been maintained at or slightly over authorized strength since that time. ESTIMATED COST OF INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE ARMY Mr. SIKES. General Collins, would you please provide for the record a table which will show the actual costs in sufficient detail so we will know what you are talking about for an increase of Army strength to 900,000, and another table showing the cost of increasing Army strength to 925,000? General ČOLLINS. We will do that. (The table to be supplied follows:) Estimated cost of increasing the strength of the Active Army in fiscal year 1962— Direct obligations IMPA estimates include $28,000,000 for PCS movement requirement in support of 870,000 strength. Mr. ANDREWS. General Collins, does each division in Korea have 11,500 men now? General COLLINS. Yes, sir. Mr. ANDREWS. If you got in trouble, what would you increase that number to, 15,000? General COLLINS. They are slightly over strength now, Mr. Andrews. It would depend on what we had available to send out there. I personally think if fighting started right away they would have to fight with what they have on hand, and we would do our best to supplement them with what we had available at the time. Mr. ANDREWS. What is the strength of the other divisions? General COLLINS. The divisions in Europe are 13,748. They vary up and down according to their location. Mr. ANDREWS. What is the strength of the airborne division? General COLLINS. One is 11,600 and the other 11,900, depending upon the authorization. Mr. MAHON. General Collins, I do not know whether Webster supports you in your phrase "flesh out," but I must admit it is very expressive and very good. We ought to add it to the dictionary if it is not already in it. General COLLINS. I do not know where I acquired that. Mr. MAHON. I do not want the record to imply that we are overly nxious to increase the size of the Army. We want the Army to be t proper strength. We certainly want to get as much value, pernnelwise, as we can out of all the service manpower-military and ivilian. On page 8 of your justification you show an average strength of 70.700 for fiscal year 1962. Am I to interpret this to mean you will not maintain the additional adiness position ordered in fiscal year 1961? MAINTENANCE OF READINESS POSITION General COLLINS. If I understand your question, Mr. Chairman, we were ordered to maintain a readiness position in the early part of fiscal year 1961. We have been directed to come down to 870,000 by the 31st of March, and we are attempting to do that now, and level off at 870,000 from March 31 until June 31. Mr. MAHON. Is this an indication that world tensions are reducing and we do not need quite the readiness in the Army we had in fiscal year 1961, or that we have had in 1961? General COLLINS. This I do not know. All I am doing is carrying out a directive from higher authority. Mr. MAHON. It seems a little singular. I know of nothing to indicate any reduction in tension, or any improving of the world situation. SURPLUS COMMODITY HOUSING The table on page 13 shows that you are budgeting $1,300 per year for quarters with the exception of surplus commodity housing overseas, for which you allow $1,670. Can you explain the reason for this difference, or can you have someone in your group explain? Colonel MILLIKEN. Under the provisions of Public Law 480 of the 83d Congress, as amended, surplus commodity housing is paid for through the forfeiture of both the quarters allowance and the quarters portion of station allowances. The station allowance portion accounts for the difference in the two rates, Mr. Chairman. Mr. MAHON. Has that been the case heretofore? Colonel MILLIKEN. We had not budgeted for it in prior years, but according to the law we should. Mr. MAHON. Does this change the practice actually in the operating procedure? Colonel MILLIKEN. No, sir. LUMP-SUM TERMINAL LEAVE Mr. MAHON. Is there any significance to the fact that lump-sum terminal leave pay shown on page 14 dropped by almost 12 percent in fiscal year 1962? General COLLINS. This was an action taken by higher authority. There is no significance to it, Mr. Chairman. Mr. MAHON. If there was no significance to the action, why was it taken? General COLLINS. I would presume it was an effort on the part of higher authority to induce us to induce our people to take leave befor they came to the point where they were due for discharge or retirement. We have been trying to do this right along, Mr. Chairman.. We do not think we can decrease it any more than we have. We are continuing to make efforts in this direction. Mr. MAHON. This is an effort to apply a little urging on the par of the higher authority? General COLLINS. Correct, Mr. Chairman. PROFICIENCY PAY Mr. MAHON. Proficiency pay for enlisted men, shown on page 16, increases by over 35 percent in fiscal year 1962. What is the chief explanation of that? General COLLINS. This is the fourth year of the program. Although we are not increasing the number of people to receive proficiency pay in the fourth year of the program we are maintaining the level we had at the end of this fiscal year throughout the next fiscal year. We are paying proficiency pay for the entire fiscal year so the average rate of pay has increased by that amount of money. RATION COSTS Mr. MAHON. Can you explain the reduction in the requirement for mobilization rations mentioned on page 27? (The explanation requested follows:) The reduction in investment in mobilization reserve inventory of subsistence items was made in consideration of the following: (a) The availability of commercial counterpart items. (b) The added feeding cost associated with the integration of operational rations, requiring rotation, into the current feeding program. (e) The impairment of troop morale due to feeding the less acceptable operational rations in the current feeding program. In connection with rations, I would like to find out if the services. might possibly unify their ration costs. There is no complaint as to the ration costs as such, but why this confusing differential? Colonel FERGUSON. Are you referring to the difference between the Navy, Air Force, and the Army? Mr. MAHON. Yes. Colonel FERGUSON. The Army and the Air Force are authorized a ration based on an Executive order which lists 39 components of that ration by item and by quantity. The Navy has a separate authorization for their ration, and it is literally determined based on an after-the-fact cost. Each station in the Army may have a different ration value, but they will all use, as maximum limit, the cost of these 39 components. If one place pays ore for milk than another, that alone would make a difference in the ration value. The values we show you are a weighted average for the Zone of Interior, and a weighted average for overseas. Mr. MAHON. All right. Would it serve any useful purpose to try to unify and consolidate !! these procedures? Would we save any money, or manpower, in Dur opinion? Colonel FERGUSON. To my knowledge, we have been working under e direction of the Department of Defense to come up with a uniform ion law for all three services for the past 10 years. Mr. MAHON. We do not want to be too hasty about this matter. What is the stumbling block? Mr. FLOOD. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Colonel FERGUSON. I cannot give you a truthful answer to that. io not know. Mr. MAHON. That is a good truthful answer. Thank you. |