with a very difficult task, and I recognize it, decoy discrimination. On the other hand, the proponents of the ease with which one could make decoys are somewhat fewer than a year ago. It is not as easy to make decoys as people thought a year ago. I would say that this is, unfortunately, one of the few major R. & D. efforts which is essentially on schedule with respect to dollars and time. This is unusual for a massive effort. Other things have happened in the past year, if I may elaborate a bit, of a nontechnical nature. I refer to the fact that there is a growing feeling that perhaps this country will move into the disarmament area. I don't know if it is possible. We would like to, as citizens, partially, wholly or at least move a step somewhere in this field.

To me, it would be extremely difficult to sit down and discuss a disarmament effort in the absence of some active defense against what at the moment is this country's principal threat namely, the ICBM. If we had partial disarmament it would be highly essential, in my opinion, that we should have some active defense to assure ourselves protection against a limited onslaught. Disarmament would eliminate the question of massive onslaught against which Zeus does have difficulties, admittedly.

If, for example, the Russians should in fact develop themselves a Zeus system, and one certainly must assume that they are very active in this field, it would seem to me we would be in an intolerable position versus them if we had not started the production of an active system. We are rapidly reaching the point where the question of a mistake is critical and is one to which I have been directing a good deal of my thought. By that I mean when each of us does have a massive number of quick-response ICBM's, completely automatic, which they must be, because of the time factors involved. Sooner or later I am afraid we are going to be moving in the direction where a nuclear exchange is inevitable, statistically, not perhaps because somebody wants to, but because it just happens. This is a problem. Against this type of threat Zeus is very effective. I think it is also possible that human error will also become a threat, either human error in launching or in thinking the other fellow has launched. I raise all of these questions because I think they are new, nontechnical, psychological reasons for the reappraisal of the Zeus problem. To be more specific with respect to your question on cost, the total deployment which we were discussing [Aside: Are cost numbers classified on Zeus?] Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I never know what is classified and what isn't.

The CHAIRMAN. There are figures going around that are certainly not classified on the cost.

Mr. FULTON. $712 billion is going around.

Mr. MORSE. Let's take that figure. That is a good figure.

The CHAIRMAN. Take that or the $9 billion figure I have heard. Mr. FULTON. I am against Nike-Zeus but

Mr. MORSE. I am not through yet-maybe you won't be. The program which we presented to you, I believe last year, let us say the NORAD requirement, and after all, NORAD is the agency which dictates requirements for continental defense, was, without getting into the number of batteries concerned, in the order of magnitude that you mentioned, $72 or $8 billion. This number is comparable with almost every major systems development this country has already under

taken. It is substantially less than the current yearly national expenditures which we have for strategic effort of the United States.

It is about comparable; as a matter of fact, it is somewhat less than the total yearly effort this country expended at its peak to meet the bomber threat. It is less than twice the current yearly national expenditures which we have for even maintaining the active defensive effort of this country against manned bombers, in an environment where the ICBM is beginning to be the principal threat.

I, myself, do not recommend nor suggest that this country embark upon that kind of program. My effort in this direction has been toward trying to find the lowest possible cost program, the lowest possible rate of production of Zeus batteries per annum, without any brick and mortar and additional plants, which would buy us the maximum amount of time. Because we don't know what we will have to do in the next couple of years. The time involved between initiation of a program and the first early deployment is very substantial; it is several years. That is what I have been doing the past year, with the help of other people, the help of responsible and, I think, objective military and civilians, both within the Army and without the Army. It is my personal view-and this is not shared in by everybody; it is currently the Army position-that we should proceed with an early limited deployment program, very much less than the one to which you refer; only from the point of view of buying time, because of the many unknowns involved in this ICBM situation. This is, as far as dollars are concerned, in 1962, for example, a very small number, compared with most programs and almost any Air Force program that I can think of.

The CHAIRMAN. General Trudeau, have you any opinions?
General TRUDEAU. Yes, I would like to add two points.

The CHAIRMAN. You have strong opinions on some of these things. General TRUDEAU. I think that in the Zeus program, almost for the first time, weight has been brought against it on the basis of its overall cost. None of the other systems that have been developed, that I know of, have been priced out before it went into production. As a result, the cost program for Zeus-even for General Kuter's proposal, which is the most extensive, and would run up into, say Mr. Fulton's figure of $9 or $10 billion-is still less than any other major program which has been used for similar purposes in this country.

It is less than the aircraft warning program up to date. It is less than that for Polaris. I am not suggesting it as a substitute for Polaris.

The CHAIRMAN. You think Polaris is a good weapon?
General TRUDEAU. It is a fine weapon. We badly need it.

Mr. FULTON. The Army would like to have it, too, I believe. General TRUDEAU. No. We are happy to support our Navy friends. The total cost of Nike-Zeus would be one-half of what fighter aircraft cost in the decade of the fifties. It would only be one-half of the IRBM-ICBM from the fifties through 1955 or 1956. It would be only one-third of the continental air defense program in the decade of the fifties, and only one-third of the cost of SAC through the 1950 decade. We ought to take another look when we talk about great costs, particularly when we see this was done in the fifties and costs now are 300 percent of the work done then. I would like to make this re

mark, if I can make an analogy. Our progenitors-take the Neanderthal man, if you will, were pretty dumb, but they weren't so dumb that they scared themselves scientifically that something couldn't be done to sustain their lives. Whether attack was from dinosaurs or bears, or what have you, it was to have a place of refuge; whether it was attack from animals or earthquakes or from forest fires. And also, in addition to that, they didn't wait for the rifle to be developed three or four hundred thousand years later, after they lived, or the the crossbow or even a spear. They whittled themselves a club and they developed themselves as best they could and didn't leave themselves naked and say, "We are going to sit here and take it."

The CHAIRMAN. Drawing the conclusion from that, we should go ahead, then, with the Zeus program?

General TRUDEAU. It is the only possible ballistic missile defense of this country. We are sure it has positive value. We don't say it will stop every missile. People say, "Suppose you knock down nine and the tenth one gets through?" If this is a fair evaluation, then the enemy would have to have 10 times as many, which, as a deterrent, is putting the requirement on him. The same people who use these arguments admit that 30 percent of manned bombers can get through with everything that has been made.

Mr. MILLER. Is there a weapon that has 100 percent effectiveness? General TRUDEAU. Neither offensive nor defensive. It is the man who has the most and uses it effectively.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statements impress me. At this point, Mr. Fulton, from Pennsylvania, has 27 law students who have come down here to visit with us. We are very happy to have them. I am going to recognize Mr. Fulton now, who, by the way, if you haven't discovered it, is by background a Navy man. Fundamentally he is for the United States of America.

Mr. FULTON. They are from the Point Park Junior College. It shows the interest of the young people in this subject, when we are always hearing the destruction and complete elimination cried down on our heads. In time of trouble, I believe the general would agree with me, it is a time for great opportunity in the world, it is not just trouble. It is an untidy world and it is going to stay that way for a long time. With the opportunities we have ahead, if we keep our heads and keep a strong defense, we are going to work out all right; aren't we?

General TRUDEAU. I am an opportunist. I would like to support it by saying to these youngsters here: There is no reason to drop our heads down on our desk and cry in our beer. We have to stand up and face the facts.

Mr. FULTON. I have read Pope Binicus, of the 12th century, where he said, "The invention of the crossbow is the end of civilization." We are still here and I think we are still going to be here, despite these tremendous missiles or mistakes. I would agree, for the first time, with your approach, if you are talking of a limited deployment and using your research and defense funds for such limited deployment, to learn about Nike-Zeus. As you know, I have been a longtime opponent of the original $15 billion for the cost of Nike-Zeus, but I do want to compliment you on the fact that by spending $112 billion for research and development you have brought the cost down to a

half billion dollars. The figure that the chairman has in his mind, and mine, is alike. We agree on the figure, and I see you do, too. I would compliment you on your research and development.

I yield to you.

Mr. MORSE. The numbers that you are quoting, I believe, are keyed to different deployment postures. While we have made substantial progress in research-and thanks to having one of the best contractors on this job, and delegating him responsibility to get on with it without layers of assistant managers in the United States, we have done a good R. & D. job. It is on time and it is on cost. If anything, we have reduced cost. We have eliminated one of the largest single radars in the system. But the numbers that you refer to, unfortunately we can take no credit for as a result of research. We have increased the confidence in the system through research. My approach was not a smaller deployment. My approach was to see if we could possibly find a mechanism for buying time, I mean 2 years. That is a lot, the way things are going in the world today. And to buy time in the context of a very early production program. Again, I say, without building buildings and that type of thing. We don't need to. We have more facilities and people working in this country than people know what to do with, in my opinion. This was trying to find the lowest possible rate of production so we could defer the decision on the part of the Defense Department for any ultimate requirement for all-out productivity efforts which might be your figure of $7 billion or $12 billion or $5 billion. It is lower than some of those figures now, and our cost figures are more accurate.

Mr. FULTON. I would like to compliment you on changing your strategy within the Department of Defense, that you are now expanding it so you are going to use the facilities of the Navy and Air Force, so that it is really a three-way team that you are working out, the Nike-Zeus program. I think that is fine.

Mr. MORSE. I will take credit for that one.

Mr. FULTON. The next one is, on the nearer approach in time than the ultimate Nike-Zeus, let's look and see what you view on time. You have very frankly admitted that if there is saturation on each side with massive deployment of the missiles, that then Nike-Zeus could not be effective?

General TRUDEAU. Oh, no. Mr. FULTON. Be saturated. I want to say parenthetically I disagreed with Senator Symington on the Atlas and these missile stands, that we should not now go into 200 or 300 missiles of a particular variety, because they will turn out in this generation of missiles to be model T Fords in about 3 years. If we could even now produce missiles which would saturate Russia, I think it is a mistake. It hasn't been a Nike-Zeus on which I have had this particular policy. If Russia is in the 2-to-10 class for missiles that are operational at this time, and if we are interested-you have spoken of the threat of one or two missiles on page 5 of your statement, launched by mistake, or one or two, in parentheses, launched by a third country, and perhaps the threat of a very small number of undetected ICBM's that may exist, that would mean to me a very small number, in the range of about 10, up to 10. Would that be for you too? I am

trying to get your your concept of numbers. I am not trying to tie you down specifically.

Mr. MORSE. I can be tied down in closed session. I don't think I can here. I think the implications of those numbers is somewhat smaller than it should be. The NORAD requirement-and it is currently its requirement-I might say the study group I set up to explore this limited production was joined in by NORAD and they have endorsed it, we determined that while the original deployment, let's say, was X batteries, a large number, corresponding to your $8 to $12 billion, this was required in order to meet all all-out onslaught. By that I mean substantial ICBM's arriving on each particular target. By "substantial" I mean hundreds.

Mr. FULTON. That is why we are coming to more agreement. General TRUDEAU. I didn't intend those to be a total, I am sure. Mr. FULTON. We are coming more to an agreement on this type of approach. You might find some of your previous critics are now turning into rather friendly friends.

Mr. MORSE. This would be good.

Mr. FULTON. If we realize the limitations of the Nike-Zeus system so that we aren't fooling this country or trying to fool any other country that it is going to be an all-out continental defense, or that it is really in any quadrant above the Equator, above east and west, that it is a defense. It isn't. If we then look at it strategically as it really is, and that is on a basis of one or two missiles that may come, even by mistake, or by a small third country that might from some source launch a few missiles, that we might try to catch themthat to me is a very fruitful outlook. Because it is the beginning of truth in the strategic concept of the Nike-Zeus program. The NikeZeus program will not in any way protect us against submarinelaunched vehicles, will it?

Mr. MORSE. No, sir, that is not correct. Nike-Zeus is specifically designed against the IRBM threat.

Mr. FULTON. We will take the Nike-Zeus and put it along the northern part of this country. Of course, you are going to have to have the screen like a fan that detects, and then your missile operates. What amount of an arc would you cover with your system; do you think you could cover 360 degrees? Because to me, I think anybody can come in under your screen, because certainly the screen is tangent to the Earth's surface. I think that was brought out yesterday.

Mr. MORSE. You are speaking about the low angle acquisition problem, I presume. I am very glad to hear the comments that you have made on the Nike-Zeus problem. I think there has been a lot of overselling.

Mr. FULTON. That is what my trouble is with it. It is fooling people. So people scream at the Congressman, "Put it into operation, keep us safe."

Mr. MORSE. There is nothing that will save this country in a 100percent sense there is no question about it. That is why I tried to emphasize these other aspects which I think are developing in some people's minds during the past year.

To answer your specific question on numbers: The original NORAD deployment was keyed to a relatively large number, I am talking hundreds, of ICBM's arriving on the North American Con