and other defense agencies-I might say we received comments from each of the offices to which this was submitted-in the light of that the Secretary and I analyzed with great care all of the comments. In light of that analysis, the Secretary and I concluded that the most economical and expeditious method of handling space research and development would be to assign future responsibility for the development of approved Defense space projects and programs to the Air Force. The Secretary then directed the redrafting of the directive in the form in which it has been issued and it is before you. In our analysis of the comments of the several Services, we found that basically there were two criticisms of the Secretary's proposed directive. First was the criticism that such a move would result in overall loss of effectiveness through failure to utilize to its full potential the initiative, background experience and brain power available in the other Services and, further, that the move would impair the capabilities of the other Services.

Without in any way underestimating the seriousness or sincerity with which such contentions were advanced in the present situation, I must in all frankness point out that criticism of this sort directed to a Defense Department proposal is not new. It is also a criticism which is often impossible to prove and which has been made against many proposals for change within the Department of Defense since 1947, and will probably be made against many other proposals for change.

In any event, Secretary McNamara and I gave earnest and thorough consideration to the claim that this directive would bring about an overall loss of effectiveness in the other Services and would result in an impairment of their capabilities. Against these contingencies, we weighed the recommendation of the President's Ad Hoc Committee on Space, which was chaired by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, the President's Scientific Advisor, and the recommendation of Dr. Herbert York, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense on scientific and technical matters. Both of these men are eminent scientists in the field of space. We also took into account the limitation on the concept of a joint space agency and the problem that had been faced by ARPA when it was charged with responsibility for all space research and development projects in the Defense Department.

Furthermore, the Secretary wrote into the directive three safeguards designed to preserve the effectiveness and capabilities of all of the Services.

First, it was provided that each component of the Department of Defense would be permitted to conduct preliminary research to develop ways of using space technology to perform its assigned function. Second, it was provided that no space project would be developed beyond the preliminary stage until it had been specifically approved as a Department of Defense space project or program by the Secretary and myself. Such approval would be given only after an affirmative scientific and technical recommendation had been made by the principal scientific advisor to the Secretary, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. It should be noted that the Department of the Air Force does not select what projects are to be developed. In this respect, the Department of the Air Force is only another pro

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ponent of equal status with the other Services and there is no different situation than the Army or the Navy. It must come forward and justify projects which it wants with just as much support and validity as the other agencies do theirs.

Third, we provided that under unusual circumstances an exception could be made and development assigned to a Service other than the Air Force.

In addition, there is a fourth safeguard. Like all other research and development programs under single management in the Department of Defense, the space programs in their processes of development, research, testing and engineering are under the continuous direction and control of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering who will maintain close program review.

We believe that these four safeguards, the first retained by the Services and the remaining three vested in the Secretary of Defense, myself and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, will be adequate to preserve the overall effectiveness and capability of all of the Services.

The second criticism advanced against the proposed directive was that the assignment of responsibility for space research and development to the Air Force would encroach upon the operational responsibilities of the other Services. The directive as issued, however, does not deal in any way with the operational assignment of space systems. In his memorandum of transmittal of the new directive, the Secretary made it abundantly clear that the question of operational assignment was being reserved for future determination. Whether we will ever have space systems for operational use as weapons systems is something we cannot predict today, but if we do we will then face up to the problem of which Service has the competence, the greatest interest and use in the operational control, and at that time we will determine to what Service the operational assignment should go.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't the ballistic missile a space system?

Secretary GILPATRIC. Well, Mr. Chairman, the ballistic missile programs are not within this directive. They were assigned before the directive was issued and no pre-existing assignments are to be affected by this directive.

In other words, the Polaris program of the Navy, the Atlas, Titan and Minuteman programs of the Air Force, all stay where they are. Now, if we have additional ballistic missile programs in the future, in addition to those we now have, they will be assigned according to what we would then find to be the optimum performance capabilities of the respective Services.

Moreover, the Air Force is making certain organizational changes to make sure that it can adequately and fairly service the requirements of the Army and the Navy, as well as NASA, to the extent that the Air Force has responsibility for the development of space projects of interest or concern to its sister agencies. The Secretary of the Air Force will, when he is with you next Tuesday, describe in more detail the steps which the Air Force is taking to discharge the added responsibilities which will be imposed upon it as a result of the new directive.

There is one other point I should like to address myself to briefly, and that is the manner in which Secretary McNamara's decision was made. It is true that the decision on assignment responsibility for

space developments was made in less time than has customarily been the practice in the Department of Defense. It is not true that the decision was made without full consideration and without giving all parties an opportunity to be heard.

Each Service and other component of the Department of Defense was given ample opportunity to concur and everyone took advantage of that opportunity and Secretary McNamara and I personally considered all the points of view presented by the different Services and the other agencies before we arrived at a final decision.

A major criticism of the Department of Defense, which has been made for many years both in the Congress and elsewhere, has been the slowness of the decision-making process within the Department. Secretary McNamara and I believe that it is imperative, if we are to have a defense adequate to meet the needs of this nuclear and space age, that decisions be made as promptly as possible. We do not feel that important decisions affecting the national security of the United States can be deferred pending attempts to work out a modus vivendi which will be satisfactory and pleasing to everyone.

Once you try to compromise the positions of competing interests, you water down the solution to a point where we believe it cannot be as effective as it should be.

Too often such efforts do not resolve our problems but rather intensify them in at least two ways.

First, during long periods of deliberation, independent actions may be taken by many of the participants which may, in turn, compromise the final policy when it is promulgated. Alternately, a moratorium on all actions during the period of prolonged deliberation may mean that some very necessary decisions are held too long in abeyance. Second, long and involved deliberations on the details of broad policy matters inevitably tend to exacerbate differences of opinion.

I am sure members of this committee have seen that process at work. I want to add, however, that any changes which are made within the Defense Department by the Secretary of Defense and myself will be made in accordance with existing legislation and law and wherever they involve matters within the purview of Congress we are certainly going to come to you first.

Before closing my introductory statement, I want to make a comment on the relations of the Department of Defense with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

On space this directive does not impinge upon that relationship but I have discussed this directive with Jim Webb. Jim Webb and I are old friends; we were in the Government before and we have worked together very closely.

One of the first things we did when we came into office respectively was to reach a written agreement on the National Launch Vehicle Program, on the 23d of February, and agreement that neither NASA nor the Department of Defense would go ahead with additional such programs without coordinating one with the other.

This is not new. Our predecessors had a series of agreements. There was a basic agreement that was reaffirmed as late as September of last year, setting up the Aeronautical and Astronautical Coordinating Board. This is a board which consists of equal representation by representatives of NASA and by the Defense Department. The

Deputy Director of NASA, Dr. Dryden, is co-chairman with Dr. York-or Dr. York's successor, Dr. Brown, when he takes office-and the Board consists of equal representation down the line and that Board is used to monitor programs of equal interest to the two departments and to make sure there is not contention, competition or overlapping between the activities of the two agencies.

Last summer my predecessor, Deputy Secretary Douglas, reached an agreement with Dr. Keith Glennan, then Administrator of NASA, regarding the handling of communications satellites.

As I have indicated in my statement, there are several communications satellite projects. Up to now we have worked out by agreement and I feel sure we will continue to problems where what NASA is doing and what the Defense Department is doing and each in its respective sphere-NASA, the non-military; the Defense Department, the military-can be worked out.

Surely we will have problems and we will have discussions, but I feel confident in assuring this committee that Mr. Webb and I-because the Secretary of Defense has asked me to continue what my predecessor did in monitoring this whole area-I feel sure we can avoid any conflicts, any major differences between the two departments and that will be our effort.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your statement. Your position is Deputy Secretary of Defense. You really are the head of the ARPA, as it is today, is that correct?

Secretary GILPATRIC. Actually the Director of Defense Research and Engineering has control over ARPA, but he, in turn, is subject to my direction and that of the Secretary and, as I indicated, Secretary McNamara has asked me to personally follow this whole area of effort within the Defense Department so in substance, what you say is true.

The CHAIRMAN. Within the realm of the Director of ARPA, you are following the organization of the entire space program in the Defense Department.

Secretary GILPATRIC. That is true.

The CHAIRMAN. The entire matter really goes back, doesn't it, to the Wiesner Report.

Secretary GILPATRIC. The Wiesner Report was one of the factors which led us, as I have indicated, to move in on this problem without delay. There are other factors, however. We found that the different Services had programs and projects of their own which unless brought into a centralized organization for supervision and control, could lead to overlapping and duplication and misuse of resources. felt that there was a great deal of merit in the proposal of Dr. Wiesner, that the responsibility for all space activities within the military departments should be centralized.

We

We felt it would assist us in our relations with NASA, because NASA has some very heavy problems and serious problems in its programs, and it needs the support we can give it, and we, in turn, rely on it, so we felt there should be two strong positions, one in the Defense Department as well as in NASA, to deal with those.

The CHAIRMAN. Now does this directive carry out all of the recommendations of the Wiesner Report?

Secretary GILPATRIC. It only deals with the one recommendation I mentioned. The Wiesner Report goes into a number of other subjects, including specific portions of the military program and also into the heavy booster program which is the responsibility of NASA. Now this directive to which I have referred, which is the subject of this hearing, does not go into that area, and we are only attempting to deal with the one problem of centralized management within the Defense Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you have a copy of that Wiesner Report? Would that be available for the record?

Secretary GILPATRIC. I am sure it can be, Mr. Chairman. It is a published document and we will see that it is furnished.

(The public version of the Wiesner Report is as follows, with the section most pertinent to these hearings printed in italic :)

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON SPACE

I. Introduction

Activities in space now comprise six major categories:

1. Ballistic missiles.

2. Scientific observations from satellites.

3. The exploration of the solar system with instruments carried in deep space probes.

4. Military space systems. (Separate Classified Report)

5. Man in orbit and in space.

6. Non-military applications of space technology.

We rely on the first member of the list, ballistic missiles, for a large part of the retaliatory response to the Russian missile threat.

It is generally assumed by the American citizen that our vast expenditures of money and technical talent in the national space program are primarily designed to meet the overriding needs of our military security. The fact is, however, that the sense of excitement and creativity has moved away from the missile field to the other components of the list, and that missiles, long before they are in condition for us to depend upon them, are slowly being delegated to the category of routine management. Before we proceed in this report to discuss and support the important activities in the other five categories we wish to emphasize the hazard of failing to complete and deploy on time our intercontinental deterrent missiles.

In addition to the need to develop ballistic missiles to provide for our military security, there are five principal motivations for desiring a vital, effective space program. It is important to distinguish among them when attempting to evaluate our national space effort.

First, there is the factor of national prestige. Space exploration and exploits have captured the imagination of the peoples of the world. During the next few years the prestige of the United States will in part be determined by the leadership we demonstrate in space activities. It is within this context that we must consider man in space. Given time, a desire, considerable innovation, and sufficient effort and money, man can eventually explore our solar system. Given his enormous curiosity about the universe in which he lives and his compelling urge to go where no one has ever been before, this will be done.

Second, we believe that some space developments, in addition to missiles, can contribute much to our national security-both in terms of military systems and of arms-limitation inspection and control systems.

Third, the development of space vehicles affords new opportunities for scientific observation and experiment—adding to our knowledge and understanding of the Earth, the solar system, and the universe. In the three years since serious space exploration was initiated the United States has been the outstanding contributor to space science. We should make every effort to continue and to improve this position.

Fourth, there are a number of important practical non-military applications of space technology-among them satellite communications and broadcasting; satellite navigation and geodesy; meteorological reconnaissance; and satellite mapping-which can make important contributions to our civilian efforts and to our economy.