Mr. FULTON. There is one point you have to come up against and that is that Congress, by statute, instituted the vast research project agency, ARPA, after the Secretary established it in 1958. We gave it statutory recognition.

Are you going to abolish ARPA? If it is going to be centered in the Air Force, what is the use of having ARPA?

Secretary GILPATRIC. ARPA is doing other projects and there is no disposition at the moment to change ARPA.

Mr. FULTON. You have said the directive provides such exceptions will be made only in unusual circumstances.

Will you please give us your method of deciding what unusual circumstances are? Is that on an emergency basis or is that on an area or geographical basis, and if it is on geographical bases, please tell me where space begins. Where does it begin to you?

Secretary GILPATRIC. I am not enough of a scientist.

Mr. FULTON. Where does space begin?

Secretary GILPATRIC. I couldn't define the unusual circumstancesthe reason we put the exception in was to give ourselves a leeway to deal with conditions that cannot be predicted today.

Mr. FULTON. You gave yourself a leeway that has no reason to do it one way or another and you can decide that as you go, isn't that right?

Secretary GILPATRIC. We shouldn't be hidebound about this. Who could have predicted three or four years ago we would have the space programs we have now?

Mr. FULTON. Shouldn't Congress note your method of decision? Secretary GILPATRIC. You will, certainly-as these things come up they will not be determined by secret processes. We can't think down there in the Pentagon without

Mr. FULTON. It brings us back to point that you are going to say that space is the Air Force's exclusive prerogative.

Secretary GILPATRIC. Not for operational purposes, not for research.

Mr. FULTON. Except in unusual circumstances. That I must say to you, you must define to me where space begins before you can eliminate either the Army or the Navy. Where does it begin? Because you are up against the logical dilemma, you are setting something as a method of decision but you can't define space.

If the Navy goes up and fires a missile from a missile ship, for example, or a Terrier, a 15 to 25-mile range, is that Navy or is that space?

Secretary GILPATRIC. We have had no problem with this today and I am just not qualified. I am not a scientist and I can't deal with problems we haven't yet confronted.

Mr. RYAN. Will the gentleman yield?

It occurs to me that it is getting into an occult or mysterious thing here which to me is very simple. It is just a question of military or civilian, isn't that it?

Secretary GILPATRIC. That is one division. He is talking about another.

Mr. FULTON. I am talking about within the Department of Defense how they define space.

Apparently the Department of Defense can't say where space is.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield? I have been trying to get a suitable definition of space for three years. I haven't been able to get it from anybody, military or civilian.

Secretary GILPATRIC. You are not going to get it from me.

Mr. FULTON. Here is a directive written on space and nobody can tell where it is.

Mr. MILLER. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. FULTON. I am through. I think there is enough confusion

now.

Mr. MILLER. May I make an observation?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Miller, do you want to ask a question?

Mr. MILLER. No. I will add to the confusion by saying, I see Mr. Feldman here. Last year we went over to the International Astronautical Congress in Sweden and we heard many speeches. We spent several days trying to find out where space was. We came away like Omar Khayam says, "by the same door wherein we went." We had some of the best legal brains connected with this field in the country. Mr. FULTON. May I make one more point, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say this: We can't even define satisfactorily what the seaward limits are of the United States. We can't even get off the Earth.

Mr. MILLER. We can but other nations can't. They won't accept our judgment.

Mr. FULTON. May I just finish on one point?

The CHAIRMAN. If you will, at this point-then I will turn it back to you-we have Secretary Hitch here.

Mr. FULTON. I have just one point Mr. Daddario brought up.

The CHAIRMAN. What I want to ask the committee is this: What is the pleasure of the committee? Is it to continue on until 12:30? Mr. FULTON. I so move.

Mr. MILLER. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is no objection and you can do it, sir, we will go right on through and finish with these witnesses.

Mr. FULTON. On page three of your statement you said

From the time of the establishment of ARPA, research and development of space programs and projects within the Department of Defense has been under the centralized management of the Department of Defense, and the military services have played only such roles as have been assigned to them by the Secretary of Defense.

Now, in response to Mr. Daddario's comments, you said it was not centralized and that you were going to centralize further because Mr. Daddario, as I understood him, had though it was divisive and diffuse. My question is this: How do you fit that in with your statement on page three that it was already centralized and that it would be the Secretary of Defense advising various missions and weaponry systems to the various departments within the Department of Defense and the components as seemed advisable at the time?

You see, when we come down to then question you exactly on your method in the directive, I would say to you it appears to me you are right back to what you have said at the top of page three in your statement that I have quoted, with the exception that now you are not only going to have 91 percent in the Air Force, you are going to come up with 97 or 98 percent.

Secretary GILPATRIC. I don't know because we are talking about future programs that haven't come up as yet.

Mr. FULTON. What is wrong with your statement that I have read to you then that it was centralized management under the Department of Defense under ARPA?

Secretary GILPATRIC. As I said later in the statement, Mr. Fulton, we found some things that weren't being attended to under this. We had to improve it.

Mr. FULTON. Then why don't you as a managerial administrative matter from day to day pull them in where you need, rather than put a directive out where I agree with Mr. Miller, it just cuts the ground out from under a lot of people who have put their lives into developments. Where would you have been without some of these programs that have been done by the Navy and the Army?

Secretary GILPATRIC. Mr. Fulton, when a person like myself takes on a responsibility such as I have, he can only use his best judgment and his best efforts.

Now, this is the belief of Secretary McNamara and myself, that this is the most effective way of achieving this objective.

If this directive doesn't work, we will probably change it.

Mr. FULTON. We are trying to get your methods of decision, the reason for the directive and the meaning of it.

I am trying sincerely to get it with an inquiring mind. When you first say you don't know where space is, and secondly you have said at page three that it was centralized already, and next that you have ample statutory authority, unless you want to really over-emphasize the Air Force and deemphasize the Army and the Navy on research and development, leaving out the operations from it, I can't see the reason for the directive.

Secretary GILPATRIC. Well, I apparently haven't made a sale with you, but I hope that my testimony and my statement made as a whole will satisfy most people. That is all you can do, I find. You can't make a 100 percent.

Mr. FULTON. I never said how you feel but I am certainly inquiring into the reasons. I would certainly like to know about that meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whether informal or formal, and wasn't the vote six to one against it?

Secretary GILPATRIC. I would to know it myself. They will be up here and you can ask them and I will be surprised if you find there was such a meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. At this time we would like to proceed with Hon. Charles Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Do you have a prepared statement, sir?

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We do appreciate your action in coming here.

Does this discuss your book, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary HrTCH. It refers to my book, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have you go into it.

68138 0-61-4

STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES J. HITCH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

Secretary HITCH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your committee today to clarify my position with respect to Secretary McNamara's March 6th memorandum assigning responsibility for the development of military space systems.

It has been suggested in a recent newspaper article that I opposed not only this particular action, but that, on the basis of the views expressed in a book of which I was joint author, "The Economics. of Defense in the Nuclear Age," I oppose, in general, attempts to eliminate duplication and inter-Service competition in weapons development.

First, let me say that with respect to Secretary McNamara's memorandum and directive of March 6th, I had offered the Secretary no opinion, either pro or con. In fact, my office, while I was absent and sick with pneumonia, concurred in the directive. The implication, therefore, that I actively opposed issuance of the order is clearly in error.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that mean you did not approve it?
Secretary HITCH. My office concurred.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you approve it?

Secretary HITCH. The opinion of my office was asked. My personal opinion was not solicited and I did not volunteer it.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have not approved it?

Secretary HIGH. I have not approved it, no, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir, proceed.

Secretary HITCH. The concurrence of my office was signed in my absence by my deputy, Mr. Hoover.

Second, as to the more general views expressed in our book, it is perhaps inevitable that the very brief reference quoted in the newspaper accounts should lead to some misinterpretations; a more complete quotation would perhaps have avoided this. I was quoted as having written in praise of the virtues of inter-Service rivalry. But, immediately following the passage mentioned in Sunday's Washington Post we went on in our book to say

But there is also no doubt regarding the undesirable consequences of some aspects of inter-Service rivalry. Perhaps the least desirable consequence for research and development is the use of exaggerated claims, on paper, for future weapon systems in the struggles for budget, roles, and missions.

I would take it that it was to avoid just such undesirable consequences that Department of Defense Directive No. 5160.32 was issued. Obviously there cannot be a simple yes or no answer to the question of permitting competition in weapons development. There are no clearly divided black and white issues. We stated in our book that, granting the desirability of some diversification, no one knows enough to give precise, quantiative answers to the questions of how much diversification is useful, and where. This has to be a matter of judg ment. Some theoretical studies indicate that in many circumstances there are great gains to be made from pursuing two or some small number of paths to a research objective, but that greater duplication provides rapidly diminishing returns.

The right number of research paths to support does depend, in my opinion, on how critical the project is and on how uncertain the outcome is, as well as on the cost of supporting alternate efforts. For example, as we pointed out in our book, it may have made sense to develop two intermediate range missiles-Thor by the Air Force and Jupiter by the Army-but not to buy quantities of both for operational use.

We also went on to say that there should be the greatest amount of duplication in exploratory development and research, where the cost of trying another path, or testing it, is usually a tiny fraction of prototype fabrication costs. It seems to me that Secretary McNamara's recent order specifically recognizes this point.

In the chapter on research and development in our book we were dealing mainly with the problems of a Service or agency in managing a research and development program, and only incidentally with how many Services or agencies should support research and development in a particular area. One of our key sentences reads

*** there is nothing so stimulating to most people and organizations engaged in research and development as the fear that another company or laboratory will beat it to the objective.

I think it is quite clear we were talking essentially about competition between laboratories and companies and only incidentally about competition between agencies and Services.

Secretary McNamara's order does not preclude, it seems to me, diversification and competition of this beneficial kind. While the Air Force now has primary responsibility for the latter and more costly stages of development of military space systems, the healthy aspects of competition and diversification can be retained since there. will be competition among project organizations within the Air Force and among the Government laboratories and private corporations engaged in space research and development.

The order also authorizes each service to support research and development in its early, inexpensive stages, and, of course, there is also NASA supporting research and development at all stages.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this somewhat more complete statement of the views expressed in our book will make evident the fact that they are not, on the face of it, in disagreement with the Secretary's recent action. However, be that as it may, I should like to make it very clear that I do not consider the opinions Mr. McKean and I expressed as private individuals to be binding on me now as an official of the Department of Defense.

Not only has there been a significant alteration in my responsibilities since writing this book, but it would be most unusual if my assumptions and conclusions did not undergo some sort of a revision after being subjected to the test of experience. And while I expect, of course, to express my considered best judgment on appropriate matters, for me to be doctrinaire in matters that are of only secondary concern to the Comptroller's Office would be in my opinion both illadvised and unhelpful.

Some two and a half weeks ago I had occasion to discuss my feelings on this issue when I spoke to the Armed Forces Management Association. I said at that time

*** I do not consider my appointment as Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, in any way, a blanket endorsement of all the views contained in