Solid effort though obviously leaves you hanging with the situation utterly unresolved in about early 2009. So it does not deal with the Obama 'surge' or any of the political or military developments since that time. To my mind one salient point stands out above all else and that is the role of Pakistan in harboring and even helping the Taliban and other insurgents. One has to conclude that Afghanistan has next to no chance to succeed (on western terms) without Pakistan becoming serious about the border regions. And that seems utterly unlikely and in the end a depressing realization. ( )

Jones starts In the Graveyard of Empires going back to Alexander the Great's march into Afghanistan. This is to put Afghanistan's tumultuous history into perspective. Readers shouldn't be worried a historical quagmire because Jones moves through the early bloodshed pretty quickly. Around the time of the Soviet invasion he slows the tempo down and goes into more detail. One of the things I appreciated about Jones's writing is that he manages to stay pretty objective, hardly inserting himself into the analysis, despite his personal ties to the region. He stays true to the subtitle, "America's War in Afghanistan" of which he had no military part. He served as advisor to the commanding general of the U.S. Special Ops Forces. His work is heavily supplemented by countless interviews and extensive research. You can read more of his profile on the RAND corporation website. ( )

I was all set for a heavy-duty session of eye-rolling when the author started this book about the U.S. military's involvement in Afghanistan with a short account of how tough a time Alexander the Great had in subduing Afghanistan (because you know, something that happened over 2000 years has so much relevance to the here and now) but luckily that particular folly only lasted a couple of paragraphs - just enough time to justify the title of the book I suppose - and then Jones swiftly moved on to the matter at hand (The book is subtitled 'America's War in Afghanistan' after all). Which is a good thing too because his knowledge of the actual topic and his insights are outstanding. This is all in all and excellent look at how the United States got involved in Afghanistan, what that involvement has entailed, the challenges the United States faces and some suggestions about how they might be approached. The account necessarily ends in 2010 and so its perhaps not the most up-to-date book out there, but I can't think of a better all-round book on America's war in Afghanistan than this one. ( )

This is a useful survey of American involvement in Afghanistan since 2001, if one which didn't surprise me with any of its analyses. The main reasons for the insurgency in Afghanistan were the Bush administration largely ignoring it once the Iraq invasion began, the historically low troop levels, and the wariness of various NATO members to commit forces outside of urban areas like Kabul. The thing which Jones covered that was most interesting to me was his analysis of the wider regional politics and Pakistan's involvement in the insurgency. Obviously, this has become much better known since In the Graveyard of Empires was published, with Osama bin Laden's killing making the ISI's involvement self-evident, but the behind-the-scenes stuff was fascinating.

I do wish that Jones had brought a little more of his own personal experiences in Afghanistan to play in this book. He states that he sat down to write it because of his various trips there and because of the unique access that he had to key players, but there were few moments where I really got a sense of that. Most of the book felt like a synthesis that could have been written from anywhere in the US. More moments from Jones' personal perspective would have helped to ground his analysis and give it more immediacy for the reader. As is, there are times when this reads a little too much like a briefing packet. ( )

This is a solid book that every citizen who wishes to be informed on America's conflict in Afghanistan should read. It is written in a straightforward manner sans unwieldy acronyms that burdens other texts on military strategy and current operations. Jones does an excellent job of providing just enough historical context without getting too far down into the weeds.Although he appears to contradict himself, I believe his conclusions are essentially correct. Although he does not address in any concise manner on whether or not the current conflict in Afghanistan in a post-2005 environment is strategically important, significant, and vital to the interests of the United States. This is especially important as the current debate on the Afghanistan conflict remains fixated, and rightfully so, on the stability of Pakistan. I would definitely recommend this book to others. ( )

The pace is a little plodding, but that's to be expected in a volume that goes into this much history about America's seemingly ill-fated invasion of Afghanistan. The author brings together all sorts of resources to provide a context. ( )

September 1 2010 saw the official end of combat operations in Iraq with the transition from "Operation Iraqi Freedom" to "Operation New Dawn" and the withdrawal of all combat oriented brigades. Regardless of one's opinions concerning the war in Iraq this is remarkable in that just a few years ago Iraq was riddled with sectarian violence and written off by many as a lost cause but now has achieved an albeit tenuous stability through a combination of many factors including a "surge" of troops and the so-called Sunni "awakening". This is particularly ironic since as events have settled down in Iraq the security situation in the "other" war, i.e. Afghanistan, has severely deteriorated with 2009 having been the deadliest year yet in terms of casualties for NATO forces since the beginning of the war. (Additionally, the war in Afghanistan just recently became the longest conflict involving American military forces.)

But initially Afghanistan was viewed as a veritable international success. So what then can account for this apparently sudden shift towards chaos? The answer to this question is what forms the bulk of Seth G. Jones' excellent book "In the Graveyard of Empires." Jones begins of course with a requisite description of the history of Afghanistan focusing primarily on the Soviet invasion in the 1980s and the civil war in the 1990's which ultimately brought the Taliban to power. But as the subtitle of the book notes (America's War in Afghanistan) the essence of the work has to do with the history of America's involvement in the war and in particular with an analysis of the factors that the author believes has led to the increasingly deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan today. A summary of these factors is as follows:

1.)Though the initial "light footprint" method resulted in a surprisingly rapid overthrow of the Taliban by the utilization of a paucity of US troops (most of whom were SOF) it also created a situation that allowed many Taliban leaders to escape into Pakistan as well as leaving too few troops on the ground to provide continued adequate security, especially to the rural population.

2.)Pakistan though ostensibly a NATO ally has continued to covertly supply and support various insurgent groups including the Taliban and the Haqqani network largely by permitting them a sanctuary in the nominally governed FATA region of Pakistan.

3.) The government of Hamid Karzai has become rife with corruption as was recently exhibited by the re-election of Karzai as president via widespread election fraud and intimidation at the polls. (In terms of counterinsurgency principles this factor is one of the most crucial because a people disenchanted with their government will increasingly turn toward other alternatives of rule which in this case of Afghanistan means the Taliban.)

4.) Many aspects of nation building in Afghanistan have been failing miserably. For example the Germans were given charge of equipping and training the Afghan police force but ultimately proved utterly inept to do so. Another example has been the failure of the Italians to properly instruct the Afghans in legal matters which has led to widespread corruption in the judicial system of Afghanistan.

5.) Lastly, the US preoccupation with the war in Iraq diverted many precious resources from the Afghan theater. A major example being the reassigning of a critical diplomatic asset, namely, the former ambassador to Afghanistan, Khalizad, who was born and raised there and spoke fluently the two major languages, to that of ambassador to Iraq.

After laying out these factors Jones' then attempts to offer some solutions to these problems. This is the weakest part of Jones' book because most often he does not really give solutions but rather simply re-states problems and then declares that these need to be resolved. For instance when discussing the major problem of Pakistan's continued support of insurgent groups Jones' merely states that the United States needs to be more forceful in convincing Pakistan to cut these ties without offering any concrete examples of how the US should proceed to do this.

The last part of the book then tries to answer the question of whether or not Afghanistan is still of national security interest to the United States. Jones' argues that it is, primarily by emphasizing that although Al Qaeda does indeed have other places in which it can plot against the West (Yemen, e.g.) Afghanistan is still most advantageous to them because of their close ties to the Taliban and the sanctuary that the AfPak border gives them.

Unfortunately, as Vietnam and Iraq have shown democracies don't tolerate long wars well. And though it may be just to continue the war in Afghanistan and though Jones' analysis may well be apt and apropo it may well be too late to persuade Americans, who are fast turning against the war in Afghanistan, of the necessity of seeing it through. Only time will tell. Nevertheless, to those seeking a concise history of the involvement of America in Afghanistan I would definitely recommend this book. ( )

Mr. Jones is obviously well informed and well connected, and he covers in credible detail the decisions and events that brought us to our current situation in Afghanistan. It is remarkably timely, in the sense that events have not yet overtaken his narrative, and fairly well written--though a little dry, still very readable.

I do wonder if he did the research to support the conclusions or derived the conclusions from the research, but either way this is no blaring polemic with made-up "facts". ( )