Deterrence by diplomacy
"Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the prospects for effective diplomacy, yet leaders nevertheless expend much time and energy trying to resolve conflicts through verbal negotiations and public statements. Deterrence by Diplomacy challenges standard understandings of deterrence by analyzing it as a form of talk and reaches conclusions about the effectiveness of diplomacy that are much more optimistic."
Print Book, English, ©2005
Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., ©2005
x, 164 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
9780691116990, 9780691134000, 0691116997, 0691134006
56493908
How bluffs can hurt a state's diplomacy, and honesty provides the ability to communicate
The failure of Chinese diplomacy, 1950
A reputational theory of diplomacy
Evidence that honesty matters
Reputations for honesty and the success of diplomacy
The broader importance of reputations for honesty
Appendix A : Characterization of the equilibrium
Appendix B : The impact of communication on war and on welfare
Appendix C : Implications of the theory
Appendix D : The effects of power status, contiguity, and democracy